

THE POST-MODERN RELIGIOUS REVOLUTION IN EAST AND WEST:
TOWARD A THEOLOGICAL CONCEPTUALIZATION TO TIME,
PRAXIS, AND PEACE IN PROCESS PERSPECTIVE

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ABSTRACT

Any authentic revolution of a society presupposes a radical conscious break-through of the perishing nature of temporality, or an eschatological zest; a theology of revolution/liberation, if it lacks eschatological penetration will result in a shallow amelioration. My major concern in this dissertation is to give a reasonable solution to that problem from the perspective of process eschatology. The "post-modern" religious revolution as it expresses itself both in East and in West, specifically in Japan and in North America, provides, from its own unique "process" perspective, a real eschatological groundwork for social revolution on the global, ecological scale, centered upon the task of theological conceptualization of three basic components of eschatology: time, praxis, and peace.

The eschatological task of Christian theology is now to achieve penetration, clarity, and precision in terms of universality of the gospel. First, eschatology must be based upon a penetrating exploration into the structure of time -- through which not only the human self but also the total world, including sub-human creatures, moves forward. In

chapter 2, I will study how Whitehead and Nishida show their respective solutions to the eschatological problem, i.e., the nature of time as "perpetual perishing." Both of them agree that becoming or concrescence itself is "out of time." This is one solution. Nishida's idea of absolute Nothingness clarifies the point. Whitehead has shown another, theistic solution to the problem of temporality in his ideas of the primordial nature of God as the source of initial aim, and of the consequent nature of God as the everlasting, constant recipient and retainer of the past experiences in the world.

Second, eschatology must serve to clarify the real possibility of praxis -- praxis in its aesthetic, religious, and ethical significance. My method of study in chapter 3 is a comparative examination of the thoughts of Charles Hartshorne and John Dewey. Both of them agree that praxis can be dealt with in terms, e.g., of its intrinsic, instrumental, intended instrumental, and pragmatic value. But Hartshorne differs from Dewey in that he senses continuity of praxis at a deeper level than in human actions, in that he understands quality of feeling as extendable to all creatures, and as finally felt by God, the supreme sympathizer, and in that ethical decision occurs precisely as

an analogous service to that God. Hartshorne in his panpsychism identifies God as nature. Here I raise a question from a Japanese point of view, namely, that Takizawa's notion of the Proto-factum Immanuel elucidates the difference/relation/order between the Triune God and nature.

Third, eschatology must be precise to the extent that it elucidates the "actual" nature of peace. I will show in chapter 4 that a radical transformation of our vision of our personality and the world, i.e, a substanceless views of them, combined with a theory of creative praxis based upon the call of God provided a new conceptualization of peace as a creative synthesis of the future-orientated attitudes toward life in Christianity and the present openness to present relationships in Buddhism. This new spirituality is deeply concerned for the sustainability of the world human and non-human alike.

Now is the dawn of the post-modern revolution. Feudalistic heteronomy was broken through by the courageously independent people engaged in modern revolutions. But if people are simply revolting against the status quo in a quite similar way as they are oppressed, they are doomed to fall in group tyranny in manifold "revolutionary" ways. Hence, our task of peace as the revolution of the modern revolution.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1. The Problem

- 1) Any authentic revolution of a society presupposes a radical conscious break-through of the perishing nature of temporality, or an eschatological zest; a theology of revolution/liberation, if it lack eschatological penetration, will result in a shallow amelioration.
- 2) The "post-modern" religious revolution as it expresses itself both in East and in West, specifically in Japan and North America, provides, from its own unique "process" perspective, a real eschatological groundwork for social revolution on the global, ecological scale, centered upon the task of theological conceptualization of three basic components of eschatology: time, praxis, and peace.

Let me explain in the following what I mean by the above two statements; the former concerns the universal problem of eschatology, the latter concerns my own particular contribution to its solution in this dissertation.

First, with reference to the first statement, the above clarification of the problem with which I will deal in dissertation is important particularly in view of the present-day task of theological eschatology. Since the publication of Moltmann's Theology of Hope in 1964, theologians all over the world have been attracted by, and also engaged in eschatology reinterpreted as a central issue of Christian thought. Theologies of liberation and a new emergence of messianism

among oppressed people and their churches were closely connected with that eschatological renewal. But it is sometimes said that this theological trend toward liberation and hope in the church lacks a serious sense of Christian realism, that this is a "utopian," "preliminary," and "strategic"¹ movement, devoid of universality peculiar to the gospel.

Hence, the eschatological task of Christian theology is now to achieve penetration, clarity, and precision in terms of the universality of the gospel: (1) Eschatology must be based upon penetrating exploration into the structure of time -- time through which not only the human self but also the total world, including sub-human creatures, exist forward. That is, it needs, as its basis, a study of time from the perspective of natural theology. (2) Eschatology must serve to clarify the real possibility of praxis -- praxis in its religious, aesthetic, and ethical significance. Theism in its naturalistic form, focused on the notion of God as the supreme sympathizer, becomes essential in this connection. (3) Eschatology must be precise to the extent

1. Cf. John C. Bennett, The Radical Imperative (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1975) pp. 140-141.

that it elucidates the "actual" nature of peace as a creative synthesis of the present, wholehearted involvement in praxis and hope for the future. A comparative study of the Eastern and the Western spirituality, or of specifically Buddhism and Christianity, would be significant in this connection in order to work out a theological conceptualization of peace in view of the present-day pluralistic situation.

Second, with reference to the second statement, the writer is concerned mainly with studying revolution/liberation in religious perspective. The political interpretation of the gospel (Moltmann), political theology (D. Sölle), and theologies of liberation (Gutierrez, Cone) are some of the most conspicuous manifestations of the present-day theological concerns among leading thinkers in the churches. In contrast to them, I take up the theological task as related to revolution/liberation primarily in terms of the religious transformation of our vision(s) of the universe, since this approach alone can serve to cherish an enduring eschatological zest, the prerequisite for real social amelioration.

In this respect process theology in North American and its Japanese counterparts, Nishida's philosophy and Takizawa's theology, become important as two major streams of contribution to that transformation. They share in

describing their main task as "post-modern." The religious revolution as "post-modern" means negatively that any theological attempt for revolution/liberation, if it lacks the "post-modern" self-realization or a substanceless² view of personality and of the world as they happen through time, will entail group tyranny in manifold "revolutionary" ways by hypostatyzing as "holy" and "just" particular counter-attacks by particular groups against the establishment. But it means positively, too, that a radical religious revolution, insofar as it reshapes the total scope of Christian eschatology, will provide a new vision of, and also a new method to deal with, reality which involves in itself the call for creative praxis in terms of the "socio-politico-economic" dimensions of the universe.

Peace in its full meaning enters into my scope precisely in this connection. Peace as a political concept must be discussed and explained within the context of the total and radical transformation of our vision of our personality and the world as they happen through time, and also within the context of the total and radical conformation of our praxis to the call of reality. A holistic approach toward

2. This word is used by John B. Cobb, Jr. in his unpublished paper "Can a Christian be a Buddhist, Too?" (Spring 1977), p. 14.

peace is now necessary.

2. The Importance of the Problem

There is an ethical imperative for the church to be a transformer in society. In the case of the Japanese church, the task is: (1) to conceptualize attitudes of the church about the world in such a way as to challenge the shallowness of contemporary values and visions of "modernization," and (2) to develop ethical guidelines about personal and communal responsibility. The meaning of a responsible society should be worked out by the church. The task involves the description of inconsistency of Buddhist concern for the present, at the expense of the possibility of sustainable futures, and it also involves the clarification of limitations of traditional Christianity in seeking the future goodness based upon a substantialist view of personality.

3. The Thesis

As a topic of eschatology, peace is dependent upon the recognition of not only the present moment of serenity, but of the consequences of present actions in the perspective of a sustainable future both for the human beings and for sub-human creatures. In other words, peace can be understood

as a creative synthesis of future-orientated attitudes toward life and present gratification in present relationships. A radical transformation of our vision of our personality and the world, i.e., a substanceless view of them, combined with a theory of creative praxis based upon the call of God, or initial aim, provides a new conceptualization of peace as a creative synthesis of the future-orientated attitudes toward life in Christianity and the present openness to present relationships in Buddhism. This new spirituality is deeply concerned for the sustainability of the world, human and non-human alike.

Viewed ontologically, the above understanding of peace is to be linked with the inmost vertical structure/dynamics of the universe which Takizawa calls the Proto-factum Immanuel. The essential truth that peace demands is the radical conformation of appearance to this Proto-factum as it becomes actual and immanent, or to what Whitehead terms the "immanence of the Great Fact including this initial Eros (i.e., the primordial nature of God) and this final Beauty (i.e., the consequent nature of God).³ (Under the traditional Christian expression

3. Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, (New York, Mentor, 1933), p.294.

"Immanuel" (God with us) Takizawa addresses the same problem as does Whitehead's conception of the "primordial nature of God as the character of creativity." Takizawa's "God (Himself)" is not God in the usual Christian sense of that term, i.e., what John Cobb calls the "principle of rightness" as religiously ultimate. Rather, it is the metaphysical ultimate like Whitehead's "creativity." Therefore, he sometimes calls it the Absolute, sometimes the Triune God, understanding it, as a concept, in the context of Nishida's metaphysics whereas, as a term, borrowing it from Karl Barth.)

4. Definitions

THE POST MODERN RELIGIOUS REVOLUTION: The radical transformation of our modern vision of personality and of the world, i.e., a substanceless view of them, breaking through barriers between Christianity and other Ways, especially Buddhism, necessitated not only by the technological, economic conditions of the present-day world in which no longer can any religion self-complacently confine itself to itself, but also even more by the truth of life itself which demands a creative synthesis of religious traditions based upon its own ultimate nature as principle of relationship.

RELIGION: That in its most authentic significance which appears as the ultimate concern toward the inmost nature of the universe thereby revealing itself to be the solution to the problem of evil inherent in the nature of time as "perpetual perishing," or the "loss of the direct unison of immediacy among things," at least in a two-fold way; One way embodied in Christianity in the West is expressed in faith in God who is a factor in the universe constituting a general drive toward the conformation of appearance to reality, toward an order of the universe in which novelty does not mean loss, and toward such truth as is proper to the special appearance in question -- as was decisively revealed in the Incarnation of Jesus Christ. The other way appearing as Buddhism in the East is concerned with a radical realization of Emptiness, i.e., of the true nature of self or the where or the what of self -- as Gautama taught.

THE LOGOS: The religious ultimate which is the source point of human being, or of nature, i.e., the fundamental point of contact or principle of relationship between God the Creator (or more inclusively, the Triune God) and the human being (or more inclusively, nature). In its immanent aspect (i.e., the Christ) it is the call for

creative praxis and the supreme sympathy with the feelings of creatures, human and sub-human alike, and in its metaphysical aspect (i.e., Logos as such) it is the primordial exemplification of the metaphysical ultimate, i.e., of God the Creator or (more inclusively) the Triune God's own "immanent" essence as creativity or Emptiness.

EAST AND WEST: Buddhism and Christianity as they are reinterpreted as compatible both in Japan under the influence of Nishida's philosophy and in North America based upon the thought of Whitehead.

TIME: A unity of opposites, or of the two kinds of fluency, that is, transition as a flowing from eternal past to eternal future connected according to cause and effect, and concrescence as self-determination of the eternal Now.

PRAXIS: An eschatological human reality as it expresses itself in human life religiously, aesthetically, and ethically -- the essence of which lies not so much in what is, as in what, through our action, might be, only because we human beings are repeatedly called by I hope for conscious responsibility for our own destiny, leading to the creation of a new humanity and nature and can thus participate in and contribute a means of satis-

faction to the divine life which is an all understanding supreme actuality..

PEACE: An eschatological spiritual reality which involves in itself the seeing of tragedy manifested, for instance, in Auschwitz and Hiroshima, together with the results of colonialism, racism, totalitarianism, and sexism, and also involves an actual penetration into life manifested not as a mere serenity, or resignation, or detachment from evil in the world, nor as a mere enthusiasm for liberation or development but as a radical conformation of the human beings both as individuals and as a community (that is, both in terms of the individual faith, love and hope, and in terms of socio-politico-economic transformation of orders) to the fundamental human-nature-God unity which, despite the vast amount of violence, evil, or tragedy in history, continuously manifests the unlimited conceptual realization of the absolute wealth of potentiality, that is, of the Tri-une God's own "immanent" Love and Lordship.

PROCESS PERSPECTIVE: A philosophical and theological vision of the actual world as both the process of transition from occasion to occasion and the process of becoming actual, or "concrecence," which was developed in our century mainly by Whitehead and Hartshorne in North America,

and of which Nishida and Takizawa constitute a counterpart in contemporary Japan.

DEVELOPMENT: To reduce the violence hunger, famine, landlessness, high infant mortality rates, by breaking up the power pyramid through decentralization to the extent that smaller scale communities become the main framework for economic and political activity, and by making available a very substantial part of the massive sums devoted to military purposes for solving the urgent needs of life and society; and to improve the quality of human life in such a way that the fundamental human-nature-God unity can be realized in a holistic manner, i.e., in terms of the increase of human enlightenment, freedom, and dignity, and in terms of economic growth and responsible political activities.

MODERNIZATION: A human achievement in modern ages, both cultural and technological, first developed in Western countries, secondly in Soviet Russian and in other countries in East Europe, thirdly in Japan and sought by other non-Western so-called Third World countries, if centered upon such development or liberation of a country, and individuals as to increase and accumulate their economic and cultural possessions, necessarily tend to work destructively to

themselves because reality in itself is substanceless.

5. Methodology

The present writer will develop a comparative analysis of Eastern and Western traditions about three basic components of eschatology: time, praxis, and peace.

First, studying comparatively Whitehead's and Nishida's philosophies of time I will be able to clarify a common task of religious revolution today in East and West. What is important here is to study a substanceless view of personality and of the world in terms of the Christian and Buddhist natural theology. But at the same time, there arises a question concerning the different religious solutions to the problem of evil inherent in the nature of time as "perpetual perishing"; Buddhism is concerned with the realization of the what or Emptiness of all that exists including human selfhood, but Christianity asks how to properly realize God's will or aims in a particular situation.

Second, I will study comparatively Hartshorne's and Dewey's understanding of praxis in order to link their discussion, centered upon the question whether God is necessary in dealing with the problem of the possibility

of praxis, to a similar discussion in present-day Japan by Takizawa and Tagawa. The validity of theism in terms of creative praxis for social amelioration will thus be elucidated. With reference to the traditional Buddhist, Christian views of praxis, and also to the creative synthesis, the intrinsic, instrumental, and intended instrumental value of praxis will be discussed.

Third, I will show an attempt of creatively synthesizing the Eastern and Western views of time and of praxis as 'peace' from the perspective of Logos theology. Peace, from the perspective of the incarnate Logos (i.e., the Christ), appears both as a synthesis of the future orientated attitudes toward life and present gratification in present relationships, and as a synthesis of intrinsic value and instrumental value, that is, as intended instrumental value of praxis. The basis for peace is the Logos, the fundamental unity of God the Creator (or more inclusively, the Tri-une God) and the human being (or more inclusively, nature). Peace as an ethical task of the church can be investigated by the above consideration.

6. Work done in This Field

a. Johan Galtung clarified mainly the meaning of

peace from the perspective of a sociologically orientated peace research. His idea of peace as the absence of both personal and structural violence contributed greatly to a new conceptualization of a "peaceful social order" as the vast region of social orders from which violence is absent, and with which a number of ideologies outlining other aspects of social orders are compatible, rather than just as a point. His idea of peace resupposes a philosophical understanding of violence: that "violence is present when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realization are below their potential realization."⁴

b. Buddhist authors have experienced peace as serenity at the present moment detached from the worldly anxieties about past and future because they have realized the substanceless nature or Emptiness of their selfhood and of the world. Their openness for the present happening and their sense of peace receiving things as they are, however, lacks a sense of directivity toward future, and of strength to experience life's various intensities, to the extent that

4. Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research," Journal of Peace Research, No. 3, (1969) p. 168.

they tend to be obedient to the status quo.⁵

c. Alfred North Whitehead clarified the double nature of peace in relation to God: that (1) peace is the harmony of the soul's activities with idea aims that lie beyond any personal satisfaction, (2) to the extent that one's purposes, escaping from the restless egoism, extend beyond values for oneself to values for others. This double nature of peace means for him the immanence of the total deity, which he describes in these terms: "Great Fact including this initial Eros and this final Beauty which constitutes the Zest of self-forgetful transcendence belonging to Civilization at its height."⁶

d. Charles Hartshorne further clarified the double nature of peace particularly in terms of the meaning of praxis through time: that goodness as the goodwill, being "twice good" enriching one's own present experience and in its consequences tending to enrich future experiences, not necessarily one's own, is peace, i.e., "the self in its

5. Hakugen Ichikawa, Zen to Gendai Shisô (Zen and Contemporary Thought) (Tokyo: Tokuma Shoten, 1967), pp. 209-213.

6. Whitehead, p. 294.

purposes transcending the personal future and making itself trustee for others (according to religion, finally, trustee for God)."⁷

e. John B. Cobb Jr. put the above double nature of peace into the context of the dialogue with Buddhists and showed it as a creative synthesis of the Christian and Buddhist spiritualities. He wrote:

There is immediate gratification in working for a future in which we can believe....If we understand the realization of a Christianized Nirvana as the future for which we hope, we can also allow now the joy of pure immersion in the moment as a part of our orientation to the future for all.⁸

f. L. Charles Birch further clarified the double nature of peace from the perspective of process biology that lends credence to a view of the ultimate particles as having a subjective aspect as well as a mechanical aspect. He wrote:

The theory is saying that the only sort of universe in which evolution of organisms can occur is one in which the entities have subjective aim, and that there is an

7. Charles Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis & Philosophic Method, (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1970),
p. 308.

8. Cobb, p.19.

evolution of subjective aim alongside physical evolution.⁹

g. C. Dean Freudenberger clarified the necessity and possibility of peace by showing a solution to the problem of world hunger. He wrote:

Were the (advanced) nations to accept the World Food Conference's urgent recommendation that they reduce their spending for military arms by 10 percent (a reduction that would produce a sum. of nearly 30 Billion), and were they to commit that amount annually for rural and agricultural development over the next twenty years, the world would be well on its way to ending the food-deficit problem in every nation.¹⁰

In view of the work done in this field I would like to: (1) show a new conceptualization of peace in terms of a creative synthesis of the future-orientated spirituality in Christianity and the present openness and serenity in Buddhism, (2) provide some positive basis for the discussions about world peace, or the abolition of personal and structural violence, in close connection with contemporary world hunger;

9. L. Charles Birch, "Can Evolution Be Accounted for Solely in Terms of Mechanical Causation?" in John B. Cobb, Jr. and David Griffin, (eds.) (Washington: University Press of America, 1977) Mind in Nature, p.18.

10. C. Dean Freudenberger and Paul M. Minus, Jr., Christian Responsibility in a Hungry World, (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1976), p.59.

(3) and clarify that the above intention of the present thesis is significant in view of the global ministry of the church, given an eschatological hope and living in a creative praxis.

7. Scope and Limitation of This Project

a. I will discuss peace mainly in its philosophical connection with time and praxis in a process perspective in order thereby to provide a philosophical, theological basis for dealing with peace in its sociological setting.

b. A detailed discussion about peace in terms of peace research and Christian social ethics will need further investigation into each discipline.

8. Outline of Project

The understanding of Time in Whitehead's and Nishida's philosophies will be studied comparative in chapter 2. A substanceless view of personality and of the world will be introduced.

In chapter 3, the understanding of praxis in Hartshorne's and Dewey's religious thoughts will be studied comparatively so as to bring their discussion into the context of similar discussion in contemporary Japan by

Takizawa and Tagawa. The substanceless view of personality and of the world will be applied to the study of praxis.

In chapter 4, peace as a creative, higher synthesis of the Buddhist serenity to the present relationships and of the Christian future orientated attitudes toward life will be elucidated by studying critically the ethical thoughts of Johan Galtung, some Buddhist authors (such as D. T. Suzuki and Hakugen Ichikawa) Alfred North Whitehead, Charles Hartshorne, John B. Cobb, Jr., L. Charles Birch, Katsumi Takizawa, and C. Dean Freudenberger and others. Emerging ethical guidelines, in terms of peace from a process perspective, for articulating a world vision of present and future, and how this guides present decision of making and action of persons and societies, will also be discussed in connection with a brief historical survey of modern Japan.

Chapter 5, conclusions, will involve a summary of the chapters and conclusions about this study.

CHAPTER 2

WHITEHEAD AND NISHIDA ON TIME:
A STUDY OF CHRISTIAN AND BUDDHIST NATURAL
THEOLOGY IN THE MAKING

I. THE PROBLEM

The reopening of the work of Natural Theology in its authentic "Christian" meaningfulness is a rather recent event in the Protestant camp. John B. Cobb, Jr. wrote A Christian Natural Tehology. Based on the Thought of Alfred North Whitehead in 1965. His new attempt in this discipline of the Christian theology, as related to "a perennial task" to "translate the gospel into the vocabular of the day,¹" is internally linked up with an empirical observation that "for much of the culture that is growing up about us within us, 'God' has become an empty sound.²" He knows well that "in reacting to this situation, most of the theologians who have been opposed to natural theology have taken the position that this cultural phenomenon must be treated as if no fundamental importance for the gospel.³" But to him, because in Biblical and Christian history there is little justification for viewing God's action in radical independence of intellectual and cultural

1. John B. Cobb, Jr., A Christial Natural Theology (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1965), p. 13.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

history, natural theology as the struggle to restore the meaningfulness of the word "God" vis-a-vis the destructive forces of modern cosmology appears to be "a matter of ultimate importance for the health, even for the survival, of Christian faith."⁴

This view of the importance of the task of natural theology in terms of "proclamation," however, is inseparably connected with his unique understanding of "faith in Christ":

"...it is not possible to formulate a Christology without the employment of a conceptuality requiring clarification in natural theology. This does not mean that faith in Christ requires such prior clarification. The priority of natural theology applies only to doctrinal formulation. Apart from faith in Christ, the problem of Christian natural theology would not arise any more than would the problem of Christology formulation."⁵

If we compare such appearance of a Christian natural theology with the heated debate on theologia naturalis within the circle of dialectical theology in the 1930's, in particular with Barth's vehement "No!" against Brunner in 1934, we cannot but acknowledge a radical change of theological atmosphere not only in topics but also in nature. Barth appeared as an "avowed opponent of all natural theology"⁶ in the theological frontiers of his day. He, in the midst of the German Church struggle with its focus on how to arrive at a true knowledge of God, wrote against Brunner:

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Karl Barth, The Knowledge of God and the Service of God (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1955), p.6.

Ever since about 1916, when I began to recover noticeably from the effects of my theological studies and the influences of the liberal-political pre-war theology, my opinion concerning the task of our theological generation has been this: we must learn again to understand revelation as grace, and grace as revelation, and therefore turn away from all "true" or "false" theologia naturalis.⁷

Barth's theological influence, according to David L. Mueller, author of Karl Barth/Makers of the Modern Theological Mind, is evident throughout the Barmen Declaration--which the Confessional Church in opposition to the Nazi and the "German Christians" deliver--and nowhere more than in its first article which affirms that Jesus Christ is "the one Word of God, " and thus the sole means of all true knowledge of God.⁸ The following is his famous definition of natural theology as regard, in his view, as an "impossible" procedure:

Natural theology is the doctrine of a union of man with God existing outside God's revelation in Jesus Christ. It works out the knowledge of God that is possible and real on the basis of this independent union with God, and its consequences for the whole relationship of God, world and man.⁹

7. Karl Barth and Emil Brunner, Natural Theology (London: Centenary Press, 1946), p. 71, italics his.

8. David L. Mueller, Karl Barth (Waco, Texas: Word, 1972), p.88.

9. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, (Edinburgh: Clark, 1931-65), II/1, p. 168. His usage of the word "union", however, is, in my opinion, ambiguous. One can take it in terms either of reality or of knowledge. This ambiguity is correlative with his usage of the other important term "revelation."

He, therefore, is justifiably dissatisfied with the attempts of Tillich and Bultmann to interpret the human being's understanding of his or her existence "prior to faith, at least as an indication of man's openness to God's grace.¹⁰"

The theological task in our generation in late 1970's , in my opinion, should be worked out beyond the dichotomy between Christology and so-called natural theology, special revelation and general revelation, the objective reconciliation (Jesus Christ) and the subjective appropriation (the Holy Spirit), Christology and eschatology, and dogmatic and apologetic theology.¹¹ The present writer strongly endorses Cobb's renewal of the task of natural theology, inasmuch as he thinks as a theologian of today not only, on the one hand, concerned with conveying the Christian message to such, even major, segments of the population for whom the traditional neo-orthodox categories lost all meaning,¹² but also, on the other, inspired directly or indirectly by Whitehead's and Hartshorne's work so as to

10. Mueller, p. 90, italics mine.

11. Ibid. pp. 150-54

12. Cobb cit. p. 13

search and show "a fully developed alternative to the nihilistic tendencies of most modern thought," that is, a natural thinking not prior to theology but within theology, or the authentic reflection of "faith in Christ."¹³

But my interest in his enterprise goes further. As a Japanese theologian I feel an excitement to find that similar work has been done in Japan by Katsumi Takizawa, a Barthian thinker "between Buddhism and Christianity" (to borrow the title of an article written by Notto R. Thelle).¹⁴ Takizawa wrote a book entitled Nishida Tetsugaku No Konpon Mondai (The Fundamental Problem of Nishida's Philosophy) in 1936. This really is a Christian natural theology based on the thought of Kitaro Nishida, "the representative philosopher of modern Japan" (Robert Schinzinger).¹⁵ He in 1933 (the year before he met Barth) "suddenly one day clearly understood --thanks to the guidance of Dr. Nishida"¹⁶ whose works he had then been reading for a long time--"the meaning of the words: 'The place where the Absolute encounters me is here

13. Ibid.

14. Notto R. Thelle, "A Barthian Thinker Between Buddhism and Christianity: Takizawa Katsumi," Japanese Religions, October 1975), 54-85

15. Kitarô Nishida, Intelligibility and the Philosophy of Nothingness. (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1958 p.21.

16. Katsumi Takizawa, Bukkyô to Kirisutokyô (Buddhism and Christianity), (Kyoto: Hozokan, 1964) pp.134-235. I here use the translation by Thelle, pp.55-56.

and nowhere else.'" Then, the situation for Takizawa, is not that "the Absolute is there and I here, and we are later connected by some third (force or) 'mediator' (Mittler)."17 Rather, he says, "For me there is here a single limit, eternally determined, (emanating) from the Absolute Himself, and, moreover, in Himself.

Takizawa, after his encounter with Karl Barth, calls the "place" "the fundamental fact of Immanuel,"18 or "Grundbestimmung of human existence, common to all men."19 At the same time he criticizes Barth for considering the "Grundbestimmung." or the original contact between God and man," as "first initiated"20 at the time of the Incarnation, thereby denying God "the possibility of revealing Himself at other times and places"21 than the Incarnation. That is, Takizawa, within (not prior to) his faith in Immanuel, recognizes the possibility of the true knowledge of God outside God's revelation in Jesus, which is nothing other than the possibility of natural theology.

17. Ibid.

18. Takizawa, Ibid., p.151.

19. Ibid., p.216

20. Ibid., p.49

21. Ibid., p.54

It is fascinating that both in East and West the framework of neo-orthodox theology has been broken through. Appearing is a new frontier of the theological discipline, where, in my opinion, religious revolution (rather than reformation) will take place insofar as theology can now provide a basis for genuine dialogue between Christianity and other view of the universe including natural science and Buddhism.

My intention in this chapter is to study comparatively Whitehead and Nishida as they deal with the problem of "time." It is my presupposition that in the understanding of time basic characteristic of either philosophy, as Christian or Buddhist, comes for, particularly related to "the Absolute," "individual things," and "evil." In such characteristic either philosophy can be, in my opinion, considered as natural theology in the making.

II. NISHIDA'S THEORY OF TIME

"Time is a flowing, from eternal past to eternal future. Time is, so to say, born in eternity, and disappears in eternity. Everything revealed in history, has its form and figure on such a background of eternity. Seen from the point of view of history, everything is connected according to cause and effect, and flows from eternal past into eternal future.

"But time, as self-determination of the eternal 'Now,' is essentially contained in this Now. There where time is, contained and extinguished, personality appears, as

content of eternity."²²

Thus Nishida writes in an essay entitled "Goethe's Metaphysical Background" (1931). In this chapter, I will scrutinize how he tries to solve coherently the problem of opposition between two kinds of "time," in close relation to "the Absolute," "individual things," and "evil." For this purpose, I will use as basic text another, famous essay by him, "Unity of Opposites," which one of the best interpreters to the Western world of his philosophy, Robert Schinzinger, calls "a grandiose metaphysics of history as realization of the unreal, and at the same time a profound meditation on Zen-problem: the form of the formless."²³

A. Time and the Absolute

Nishida, because of his two-fold understanding of time as stated above, considers it impossible to think "either the one whole, or the many single beings, as substratum in the depth of this world."²⁴ He thinks the Absolute as "creative world"²⁵ which is "phenomenon as well

22. Nishida, IPN, p. 145.

23. Ibid, p.64.

24. Ibid, p.164.

25. Ibid.

as reality, moving by itself."²⁶ He also calls it "the world of absolute Nothingness,"²⁷ of "unity of opposites," or of "Being as well as Nothingness" because, in his opinion, that which "is" in reality, is as determined, through and through "being," and as formed through and through changing and passing away. Therefore, such a world can be called, as a world of endless moving, "the world of determination without a determining one."²⁸

The present writer is fascinated by Nishida's solution of the two-fold nature of time, in the idea of "the creative world of absolute Nothingness, or of unity of opposites, " because it is my contention that Whitehead's "creativity" is a similar solution of the opposition of two kinds of fluency, that is, "transition: and "concrecence." Later I will deal with Whitehead's case. But here I would like to stress the fact that Nishida is the counterpart in the East of Whiteheadian process thinking. Nishida left a group of followers who people call the "Kyoto school" because he

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid. Jay McDaniel, in his paper (unpublished) entitled "An Interpretive Review of Kitaro Nishida's Fundamental Problem of Philosophy" (November 20, 1975), rightly observes here the dialectical nature of Nishida's idea of "Basho" (place), and of "universal," appearing at once horizontally and vertically (p.23).

taught philosophy at Kyoto University until he retired from his post in 1928. Amongst a number of Kyoto school thinkers the prominent Zen philosopher Shinichi Hisamatsu is the most influential, comparable to Charles Hartshorne, "a major figure in American philosophy" identifying the resulting philosophy with that of Whitehead.²⁹ Hisamatsu's works such as Atheism, and Nothingness are quite equivalent in their magnitude, as developed by the second generation of process thinking in the East, to those in the West contributed by Hartshorne to "one 'global' argument on God,"³⁰ such as The Divine Relativity: A Social Conception of God, and Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method, although these latter works are written, in contrast to the atheistic direction of Hisamatsu, in the "properly formulated theistically religious view of life and reality."³¹ As for the third generation of Process thinking, I in the previous

29. John B. Cobb, Jr., and David Griffin, Process Theology (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1976), p.167.

30. Ibid., p.168. It must be noted here that in the Kyoto School "Process dialectics" was sometimes discussed as contrary to the "logic of Nothingness, Place." But I think that the basic character of Nishida's philosophy is Process thinking as I study in this paper.

31. Charles Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1970), p.276. Cobb and Griffin, Ibid.

chapter have already named Takizawa ³² in the East and Cobb in the West.

In considering that the world we live in is in its depth the world of "unity of opposites," Nishida takes up and thinks such difficult and important philosophical issues as "the present," "place" (Basho), "principle of formation," and "self-identity."

1. The Present First, from Nishida's viewpoint of the world as unity of opposites," the present appears to be determining the present. "This world is neither determined by the past through cause and effect, nor by the future, Theologically, i.e. it is neither the one of the many, nor the many of the one."³³ For Nishida, the present cannot be regarded merely as the moment, as a point on a continuous straight line, since then there is no present whatever, and consequently, no time at all. He rather holds that the past has passed, and yet has not passed, in the present, and that, furthermore, the future has not yet come although it shows

32. Strictly speaking, Takizawa belongs to the second generation since he had a direct contact with Nishida. But insofar as he developed his main thinking regarding "Buddhism and Christianity" in a sincere confrontation with Hisamatsu, I can, in this particular respect, deal with his thought as belonging to the third generation.
33. Nishida, IPN, p.164

itself in the present, since "past and future are confronting each other as unity of opposites, this being the stuff out of which time is constituted."34

Here I can quote an equivalent text from Whitehead's *Process and Reality*:...the fundamental inescapable fact is the creativity in virtue of which there can be no 'many things' which are not sub-ordinated in a concrete unity."35

Nishida's contention is, fundamentally, that although the moment must be thought as a point on a straight line (i.e., as "transition"). time is constituted as "discontinuous continuity, just as Plato stated the moment was outside time."36 This outsideness of "moment," however, can best be elucidated by the following Whiteheadian Text: "...we can never survey the actual world except from the standpoint of

34. Ibid., p.165, italics mine.

35. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality (New York: Macmillan, 1929), p.322

36. Nishida, IPN, p.165, italics mine. In this connection Masao Abe's idea of "inside of inside" (at Claremont Conference, November 1976) is comparable. Nishida's notion of "outside" nature of moment does not mean a mere negation of linear time. In his logic of our acting Self of Basho, every individual self-determination must once be negated so as to be united to its environmental determination as already once negated. See Nishida's Tetsugaku no Konpon Mondai, (The Fundamental Problems of Philosophy) Tokyo: Iwanami, 1949). p.158.

an immediate concrescence which is falsifying the presupposed completion."³⁷ Time as an immediate concrescence means for Whitehead the many becoming one and being increased by one. Likewise, Nishida states: "It can be said that time constitutes itself through absolute contradictory self-identity of the one and the man."³⁸

2. Place Second, in Nishida's philosophy of "unity of opposites," since the concrete present is essentially the "coexistence of innumerable moments, the one of the many," it is called "a quasi space of time."³⁹ His famous theory of Basho (place) appears here. It is interesting that Whitehead similarly refers to "extensive continuum," saying: "This extensive continuum expresses the solidarity of all possible standpoints throughout the whole process of the world."⁴⁰ To Nishida, reality is that in which we human beings "behave acting-reflecting."⁴¹ Therefore, he calls reality "the place where we are with our body."⁴² The same thing is suggested by Whitehead when he states that contemporary "images" in the

37. Whitehead, PR., p.322, italics mine. I think the outside-ness of moment is the "standpoint" of concrescence.

38. Nishida, IPN, p.165.

39. Ibid.

40. Whitehead, PT, p.103.

41. Nishida, IPN, p.170.

42. Ibid.

mode of "presentational immediacy" should be traced back to their root in physical prehension expressed by the "witness of the body."⁴³ Nishida, since he does not like most people, suppose the many as the basis of the world, is free from atomistic view of the world.⁴⁴

3. Principle of Formation Third, for Nishida, insofar as he imagines the moment as outside time, i.e., a "point in that dialectical 'space' where facing each other is, at the same time, negation and affirmation," the moment is the real time of the historical world, which he terms "principle of formation," or "style of productivity"⁴⁵ (whereas time as a straight-line flowing from the past into the future is a "time, thought abstractly"). The "real time," in this respect, is equivalent to Whitehead's doctrine of the "genetic process" which is not the

43. Whitehead, PR, p.99, italics his.

44. Nishida, IPN, p.169.

45. Ibid., p.178.

"temporal succession."⁴⁶ In contrast to the physics in which the present has no content; it is a point-of-moment, incomprehensible since the same production is repeated, the time of "the world of organisms," in his opinion, has a content of the style of productivity, that is, that "the present as unity of the opposites of past and future form."⁴⁷

This form he calls "the species of living beings," or subjective." Under the term "subjective"⁴⁸ he understands

46. Whitehead, PR, p.434. The question about the clarification of both concepts is currently the subject of considerable debate. See articles by John B. Cobb, Jr., Southern Journal of Philosophy, VII (Winter 1969), 409-25, and by Robert Neville and Lewis S. Ford "Genetic Succession, Time and Becoming," Process Studies I, (Fall 1971), 194-209. It is important to note with Cobb, in this connection, that there is an order of dependence in the sense that the origin of act of decision as a process is temporally earlier than its outcome, but that "neither the term dependence nor the terms prior and subsequent are used identically with their use in describing the relations between successive occasions" (Neville and Ford, p.199). This view of dependence provides a reasonable clue to the explication of the following Whiteheadian texts concerning time:

(A) The quantum is that standpoint in the extensive continuum which is consonant with the subjective aim in its original derivation from God.

(B) The concrescence presupposes its basic region, and not the region its concrescence. (PR.434, *italics mine*).

The terms "original derivation" in thesis A and "presupposes" in B never imply any successive temporality or efficient causation but rather do an order of dependence within the structure/dynamics of the here-now.

47. Nishida, IPN, p.178.

48. Ibid., pp.178-179

the biological world, where so far as past and future are confronted in the present, as the "place," the subject forms the environment and vice versa. But it is only in the "historical-social world" that "past and future are thoroughly confronting each other, and formed and forming and confronting each other: and formed forms even the forming, and the creature forms the creator."⁴⁹

This reminds me of the Whiteheadian concept of the "consequent nature of God." Whitehead states that "the non-temporal act of all-inclusive unfettered valuation (of the entire multiplicity of eternal objects)," the primordial nature of God, is at once "a creature of creativity and a condition for creativity, : that "it shares this double character with all creatures," and that "by reason of its character as a creature, always in concrescence and never in the past, it receives a reaction from the world; this reaction is its consequent nature."⁵⁰ In Whitehead's case, the relationship between creativity, God and the world (i.e., creatures) is first asymmetrical, and the reciprocal. At this point of the problem, Nishida is not so clear.

49. Ibid., italics mine.

50. Whitehead, PR p.47, italics mine.

However, when Nishida, concerning his idea of "style of productivity of historical creation," insists that the world becoming one single present means that the world becomes "one single style of productivity" and that, again and again, "something new or an always renewed world is born,"⁵¹ the present writer contends that his intention is quite the same as Whitehead states: "Each instance of concrescence is itself the novel individual 'thing' in question. There are not 'the concrescence' and the 'novel thing': when we analyse the novel thing we find nothing but the concrescence."⁵²

To Nishida, the style of productivity, therefore, is not a mere casual genesis of things, out of their environment, and no mere explicit acting of a latent (being), in the manner of a "subject" (in the organic world)⁵³ He does not agree with Bergson in thinking creation as a directed process which could not return to the past, even for the length of a moment, insofar as his own process thinking directs him to grasp creation essentially as "a genesis of thing out of the contradictory confrontation of infinite past and infinite future."⁵⁴

51. Nishida, IPN, p.179.

52. Whitehead, PR, p.321, italics mine.

53. Nishida, IPN, p.180

54. Ibid.

His "style of productivity," or "principle of formation," just like Whitehead's "principle of concretion (which is that actual entity from which each temporal concrescence receives that initial aim from which its self-causation starts)," however, is not compatible with a merely negative view of the past. He writes:

Creation of an always new world does not only mean that the world of the past is merely negated, gets lost; it means that the world of the past is 'lifted' ('aufgehoben'), as it is called in dialectical logic. In the historic-social world, the infinite past is lifted and contained ('aufgehoben') in the present. Even after having become human beings, we have not ceased to be animal beings.⁵⁵ Here we can rightly associate his idea of "aufgehoben" (lifted and contained) with Whitehead's more precise theory of "objectification" as "the discussion of how the actual particular occasions become original elements for a new creation,"⁵⁶ and we can describe it in relation to the Absolute, i.e., creativity, as "transition," which is nothing other than "the creativity in virtue of which any relative complete

55. Ibid.

56. Whitehead, PR, p.320. "Actual occasions" are something ordered into series, thereby constituting apparently enduring actualities, such as electrons, atoms, molecules, and cells. Each actual occasion, in Whitehead's view, once it has become and reached its satisfaction, loses its subjectivity, its own immediacy of becoming, and serves as a datum for succeeding generations of actual entities, which incorporate it, in some aspect, into their very being by prehending it as a datum to be absorbed into their own concrescence. Cf. Donald W. Sherburne, A Key to Whitehead's Process and Reality (Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1966) p.232

actual world is, by the nature of things, the datum for a new concrescence."⁵⁷

4. Self-identity Fourth, Nishida's philosophy of "unity of opposites" appears as a unique understanding of "self-identity": "The world of unity of opposites has its unity and self-identity, but not in itself. Identity, as unity of opposites, is always transcendent for this world."⁵⁸ This transcendent nature of self-formation of the world Nishida calls "spiritual."⁵⁹ To him now, by confronting God, we human beings have and are "personality."⁶⁰ But this fact does not mean that we are separate from God, but it, rather, means that "we are joined with God."⁶¹

He, in line with such view of God, even refers to "an unconditional surrender to God," "Luther's A Christian's Freedom,"⁶² "grace,"⁶³ and "agape,"⁶⁴ but, on the other

57. Ibid., p.322

58. Nishida, IPN, p.234.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid., p. 236.

hand, he insists that (although in such sense religion is considered unworldly) it must bring about the "rise of true civilization."⁶⁵ His contention is that some Buddhists' understanding of the "absolute over power" of Amida (Amitabha), as the salvation of the individual, or peace of mind, is wrong, only due to their own convenience, for "he who truly surrenders himself completely to the absolute, has, indeed, morality as his goal."⁶⁶ Such a view of religion in close relation to ethics result from his fundamental vision that "God and we are in the relationship of absolute unity of the opposites of the one and the many."⁶⁷ Whitehead's aspect of God who, as primordial, "is not before all creation, but with all creation,"⁶⁸ is not alien to him.

B. Time and Individual Things

In this section and the next, Time and Evil, I will only briefly survey Nishida's view of the topics in question. My intention solely lies in that Nishida's thinking on the topics be elucidated in contrast to Whitehead's view of time (of which I, in Section III, will attempt a critical

65. Ibid., p.235.

66. Ibid., p.236.

67. Ibid., p.234.

68. Whitehead, PR, p.521.

evaluation, in particular in terms of the relationship of time to "actual entities," and "evil"). This method I have already taken in a reverse way as to the theme: Time and the Absolute.

Nishida's reference to time as related to individual things seems to be focused on Leibniz' world of monads.⁶⁹ In the world of monads, according to Nishida, innumerable individuals are determining themselves, opposing, negating and joining each other. Insofar as the monad is moving "from its own center" and is "a continuity of time, where the present is pregnant with the future, carrying the past on its back," the monad is "a world in itself."⁷⁰ In Fundamental Problems of Philosophy: The World of Action, he says that the individual thing must be considered as "something absolutely independent, or something through and through determining itself, that is, causa sui."⁷¹

But his idea of "causa sui" as related to the Leibnizian monad, is by no means the "self-contained parts,"

69. Nishida, IPN, p.187.

70. Ibid.

71. Nishida, Tetsugaku no Konpon Mondai, p.29, trans., italics mine.

or "presupposition of individual independence," which Whitehead criticizes as the "fallacy of simple location."⁷² Rather, he stresses adopting Leibniz' definition of the monad, that such a relationship between the individuals and the world is, after all, nothing else but "representation expression" ("exprimer," "representer"). Furthermore, he comes to this conclusion: "The monad mirrors the world and is, at the same time, a viewpoint of perspective."⁷³ Here, his standpoint differs from that of Leibniz in that he deals with the formation and essence of "self-realization" (jikaku). or enlightenment, in his use of monadology, whereas Leibniz cannot go beyond a "merely pluralistic sort of monadology" since he philosophizes still within the context of the traditional scientific approach as to think the individual things as "independent substances."⁷⁴ Another of his dissatisfaction with Leibniz is that there is no room in the Leibnizian intellectualism for a consideration of "formation."⁷⁵ Nishida's view of the individual things culminates when he says:

Our acting in this world is a forming of things; we see things through "action-intuition," and act in this way,

72. Whitehead, PR, p.208.

73. Nishida, IPN, pp.187, 171.

74. Kitaro Nishida, Tetsugaku Ronbun Shû (Collection of Philosophical Essays) (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1950, pp.401-402, Eng.Trans. mine.

because the individual is individual only in so far as it participates in the forming of the world, through acts of expression, and in so far as it is one side of the self-determination of the world, as unity of opposites. Action-intuition means our forming of objects, while we are formed by the objects. Action-intuition means the unity of the opposites of seeing and acting.⁷⁶

I can make no pretense of being an accomplished student of either Nishida's philosophy or Whitehead's since my study of them is insufficient not only in amount but also in exact comprehension. But reading them together has a merit at least to me; one illuminates the other at the crucial points. One can grasp the meaning of an intellectual system, unfamiliar to one, only within the context of his or her own authentic "proposition."⁷⁷ In the case of the present writer at this particular stage of procedure, Nishida's idea of "action-intuition," with which he is rather familiar, provides him a capacity for the understanding of "symbolic reference" in the Whiteheadian system. I think that, insofar as Nishida states that we

75. Ibid., p.413

76. Nishida, IPN, p.191, italics mine.

77. A proposition, according to Whitehead, is a hybrid sort of entity in which an eternal object, simple or complex, is fused with an actual entity, or nexus of actual entities. The proposition itself is indeterminate as to its own truth. Its function in the world is to act as a lure for feeling. It paves the way for the advance into novelty. The proposition, therefore, also serves to be a lure for cultural dialogue.

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human beings are thoroughly creative,⁷⁸ as forming factors of the creative world which forms itself, while at the same time conditioned and decided by the historical past, as a kind of necessity⁷⁹ which penetrates into the depth of our personal Self, and which is beyond mere causal necessity, he is quite near to Whitehead when he contends: "Thus symbolic reference, though in complex human experience it works both ways, is chiefly to be thought of as the elucidation of percepta in the mode of causal efficacy by the fluctuating intervention of percepta in the mode of presentational immediacy."⁸⁰ The fact that "presentational immediacy," the perceptive mode "in which there is clear distinct consciousness of the 'extensive' relation of the world,"⁸¹ deals with the same datum as does "causal efficacy," "the mode of inheritance from the past," gives the ultimate reason why there is a common "ground" for "symbolic reference;"⁸² indeed the animal body is the great central ground

78. Nishida, IPN, p.223, italics mine

79. Ibid., italic mine

80. Whitehead, PR, p.271

81. Ibid., p.95

82. Ibid., p.262

underlying all symbolic reference.⁸³

Nishida's concrete logic of "action-intuition," as self-formation of the present of unity of opposites, has abstract logic of physics as mediation.⁸⁴

C. Time and Evil

My analysis of Nishida's understanding of time has come to the last stage. Here, I would like to raise two questions: "Why does Nishida state that something Dionysian (Nietzsche "Das Dionysische") is active at the root of the origin of society?"⁸⁵ and "What does he mean by saying that the form of life of animals is instinctive, that of man is 'demonic'?"⁸⁶

By raising such questions the present writer opens up a critical dialogue with Nishida, whose last (posthumous) publication, "The Logic of Place and a Religious World-view," is dedicated to a consistent research on this problem: the demonic world in terms of his philosophy of "Basho," or of "unity of opposites."

In the first question the present writer refers to Nishida's understanding that the demonic, or evil, is a

83. Ibid., p.258.

84. Nishida, IPN, 225

85. Ibid., p.203, italics mine.

86. Ibid., p.204, italics mine.

"indispensable factor of the creative world, or of unity of opposite."⁸⁷ In fact, he states:

The world of God's truly absolute self-negation must be a demonic world, that is, the world which thoroughly negates a subjective, monarchic God; it is a revolting world to the end....Quite paradoxically, a truly absolute God must be, on the other hand, at the same time, demonic. Otherwise, he cannot be truly omniscient, omnipotent....A God who merely fights against evil, is a relative God, no matter how persistently he may overcome evil. A God who is merely transcendent and Supreme Good, is an abstract. Absolute God must involve in Himself an absolute negation;⁸⁸ He must be such a God who descends to a state of extreme wickedness. Only such God who saves a heinous man, is truly absolute. The Supreme Form must formalize the worst matter. The Absolute Agape must be extended even to the most wicked man.⁸⁹

In the second question I am dealing with his view of temporal beings as evil, to be cursed. In fact, he says:

Our Self as a viewpoint of perspective of Absolute God as unity of opposites, is indeed a contradictory self-identity of good and evil....The world is full of the demonic. Our Self, as the man of such world, is at

87. Cf Katsumi Takizawa, Hikkyô: Symposium "Sei no Konkô o Tou" (In short: A symposium Questioning the Ground of Life) (Kyoto: Hôzôkan, 1974) p.121.

88. Cf. Suzuki's expression: "The Godhead must become God in order to make itself related to creatures." Daisetsu T. Suzuki, Mysticism Christian and Buddhist (London: Allen and Unwin 1957), p.92. Suzuki appreciates Eckhart's notion of "little point" which is a kind of axis around which we and God move (Ibid., p.87) This "little point" can be the "absolute negation" Nishida states. But his thinking is ambiguous because he mixes the idea of the demonic therewith.

89. Nishida, "Bashoteki Ronri to Shûkyôteki Sekaikan", (The Logic of Place and a Religious World-view) in his Tetsugaku Ronbun Shû, Hereinafter cited as LPRW, p. 116, Eng. trans. mine.

once demonic and devine.⁹⁰

Takizawa, very importantly, critically explicates Nishida's view of evil as it appears in such double connotation, as resulting from his failure to realize an irreversible nature of the relationship between (1) the Absolute and the individual things, and between (2) the self-expression of the Absolute in innumerable individuals and the expression of the Absolute by the individuals.⁹¹

The present writer would like to bring the same questions in the analysis of Whitehead's Theory of Time, which is the title of the next section .

III. WHITEHEAD'S THEORY OF TIME

In this section I think it unnecessary to repeat the same discussions which I attempted in the preceding section. My main concern here is critically to survey Whitehead's understanding of time as related to the problem of evil. My contention is that, through such survey, I

90. Ibid., p.117.

91. Takizawa, Hikkyô, pp.120-123; Katsumi Takizawa, Nishida Tetsugaku no Konpon Mondai (the fundamental problem of Nishida's philosophy) in his Chosakushû (Select Works) I. (Kyoko: Hozoha, 1972), pp.35-38; Katsumi Takizawa, Nihonjin no Seishin Kôzô (The Mental Structure of the Japanese) (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1973), pp.100-104

will be able to elucidate his view of the Absolute ("creativity") and individuals ("actual entities:") in an extensive way. That means that these topics will be assessed only within the context of Time and Evil.

A. Time and Evil

There is a striking page in Whitehead's Process and Reality, which lures me into an enthusiasm of speculation.

He states almost personally:

- (A) The ultimate evil in the temporal world is deeper than any specific evil. It lies in the fact that the past fades, that time is a 'perpetual perishing.' Objectification involves elimination. The present fact has not the past fact with it in any full immediacy. The process of time veils the past below distinctive feeling.
- (B) There is a unison of becoming among things in the present. Why should there not be novelty without loss of this direct unison of immediacy among things? In the temporal world, it is the empirical fact that process entails loss: the past is present under an abstraction.
- (C) But there is no reason, of any ultimate metaphysical

generality, why should be the whole story.⁹²

1. Two Types of Religion Thesis A introduces into the discussion the idea of "ultimate evil" as related to the character of time as "perpetual perishing." Thesis B reveals Whitehead's own existential question, centering upon the "continuity-in-discontinuity" nature, of time; that "novelty" (concrescence) is in unity-in-difference with "loss of this direct unison of immediacy" (transition) Here he is faced by the same paradox as is Nishida who has, as observed above, found the demonic at the root of the origin of society while holding that "society, as substantial freedom, becomes the moral substance, and our action, as forming act of the historical world, has moral significance."⁹³

But Whitehead, in my view, is more formative in his direction than Nishida insofar as he grasps the struggle with evil as "a process of building up a mode of utilization by the provision of intermediate elements introducing a complex structure of harmony."⁹⁴ Although likewise, Nishida looks upon human beings as social beings, that is, "zôon ploitikon" and therefore, "logon echôn," from his fundamental view of

92. Whitehead, PR, p.517.

93. Nishida, IPN, p.231.

94. Whitehead, PR, p.517, italics mine.

the human being as being "from the formed toward the forming," that is, "homo faber,"⁹⁵ he is more inclined to state the "impossibility of avoiding maximum contradiction of life appearing in human life" which he terms "original sin."⁹⁶ Whitehead, too, affirms that Appearance "makes possible the height of Beauty and height of Evil; because it saves both from a tame elimination or tame scaling down."⁹⁷ For him, however, to say something about "evil" is not to say nothing about "adventure." Rather, he clearly discerns that the question for discussion in the arena of religion, in its particular relationship to ethics, lies in "whether there exists any factor in the Universe constituting a general drive toward the conformation of Appearance to Reality."⁹⁸ His intention here is, on the one hand, concerned with "the most general formulation of the religious problem," which he, in Process and Reality, thus describes: "whether the process of the temporal world passes into the formation of other actualities, bound together in an order in which novelty, does not mean loss."⁹⁹ But his intention is, on the other hand, inextricably connected to its ethical demand:

95. Nishida, IPN, p.199

96. Ibid., p.205

97. Alfred North Whitehead, Adventure of Ideas (New York: Mentor, 1933), p.260.

98. Ibid., p.292, italics mine.

99. Whitehead, PR, p.517.

"This drive would then constitute a factor on each occasion persuading an aim at such truth as is proper to the special appearance in question."¹⁰⁰ To him it seems, "conformation in general possibility" is the subject-matter of religion, and "properness in particular realization" is that of ethic, both in terms of "truth." It is precisely in this connection that he refers to the "lure for feeling," the "eternal urge of desire," or the "initial phase of each subjective aim" as the primordial nature of God. He is the ground for hope.¹⁰¹

On the contrary, to Nishida the subject-matter of religion appears as "the problem of True Nature of Self, or of the Where of Self."¹⁰² He understands that the religious spirit does not, as many think originate from such a process-like relation as between finiteness and infinitude, or relativity and absoluteness. His contention is that it does not come into consciousness until one

100. Whitehead, AI, p.292, italics mine.

101. Only this truth that God is the ground of hope accounts for the fact that "while the thirst for totality, for the infinite, is a basic and wonderful part of our make up, it tends to claim more for itself than it really can achieve." See William A Beardslee, "Sex, Biological Bases of Hope," in Religious Experience and Process Theology by Harry James Cargas and Bernard Lee, (eds.) (New York: Paulist Press, 1976) p.193

102. Nishida, LPRW, p.124

questions his or her Self's being as it is here now. Therefore, "the religious problem is not a value-problem. We can confront our Self's being when we come to realize, at the root of our Self, a profound contradiction, that means, when we become aware of our being self-contradictory."¹⁰³

At this stage of our presentation it is interesting and important to note that John Cobb recently in his essay entitled "Buddhist Emptiness and the Christian God," radically differentiated between God as "the principle of rightness" and creativity as identified with the Buddhist "Emptiness; dependent co-origination (pratitya-samutpada)."¹⁰⁴ He says: "For years I struggled to subordinate creativity to God, rather than allow their radical difference to stand out clearly. It has required an encounter with Eastern thought to clarify the religious meaning of the work of both Heidegger and Whitehead and to force the issue of God." ¹⁰⁴ His main point is to direct Christian theology

103. Ibid., p.105.

104. John Cobb, Jr., "Buddhist Emptiness and the Christian God," Journal of the American Academy of Religion XLV, 1 (1977)p.24, italics mine.

into a "right understanding of this principle in its purity and distinctness instead of the effort to unite with it the metaphysical ultimate."¹⁰⁵

2. The Task and Locus of Natural Theology At any rate, religion of "How, or Why" (rightness) is distinct from that of "Where, or What" (Being).¹⁰⁶ The former, represented by Christianity, and the latter, appearing as Buddhism, however, have a common ground, insofar as they can realize the distinctive relation of How-problem and the What-problem. Thus, the task of our discussion turns out to be both religious and metaphysical. Under such definition of the task, the present writer understands the authentic locus of natural theology. Insofar as the Buddhist must enter into this locus from his or her well-disciplined dealings with the what-problem, and the Christian, in contrast, from his or her familiar scholarship of the How-problem, their modes of discussion are different from each other, but the locus is the same.

In this connection, I must stress, it is Whitehead who has directed the Western thought into this locus, on

105. Ibid., p.25.

106. Cobb and Masao Abe agree in regarding Christianity as religion of "How, or Why," and Buddhism as that of "What."

condition of a reasonable basis. Thesis C, in my opinion, discloses his inner appetite to break through a stiff metaphysical generality. Something is driving in him, in particular in dealing with the crucial problem of "evil," to go beyond the finally estimated level of the "ideal opposites," "joy and sorrow, good and evil, disjunction and conjunction--that is to say, the many in one--flux and permanence, greatness and triviality, freedom and necessity, God and the world."¹⁰⁷ And what is noteworthy, he decisively states: "In this list, the pairs of opposites are in experience with a certain ultimate directness of intuition, except in the case of the last pair."¹⁰⁸

B. God and the World

Whitehead, in the last chapter of his cosmology Process and Reality, deals with the issue: "God and the World," introducing the note of interpretation of the cosmological problem" in terms of a fundamental metaphysical doctrine as to the "quality of creative origination, namely, conceptual appetite and physical realization."¹⁰⁹ It is

107. Whitehead, PR, p. 518, italics mine.

108. Ibid., italics mine.

109. Ibid., italics mine.

quite noteworthy here that he considers God's primordial nature ("conceptual appetition") and consequent nature (which takes up into itself the "physical realization" occurring in the world) to be the quality of the metaphysical ultimate, or creativity ("creative origination"). The primordial nature of God is the conceptual side of the quality, the consequent nature the physical side. This is his fundamental solution of the issue stated above as to the relation between the How-problem and the What-problem.

1. The Primordial Nature of God If that is the case, we must first concentrate on this "quality," in order truly to elucidate the nature and location of "the ultimate evil" (Whitehead), or of "the demonic at the root of the origin of society" (Nishida). But we here need to keep in mind that Nishida seems to be talking about the origin of evil in the sense of destructiveness, whereas Whitehead is talking about a more ultimate evil -- evil as perishing of immediacy (an evil that only arises for a reflective mind).

Whitehead never intends to say that God as the metaphysical ultimate has his own primordial nature by himself. Such a substantialist notion of God as the "unmoved mover" (Aristotle) together with the other notion

of God as "eminently real" (classic Christian doctrine) he rejects, because "The combination of the two into the doctrine of an aboriginal, eminently real, transcendent creator, at those fiat the world came into being, and whose imposed will it obeys," is, in his view, "the fallacy which infused tragedy into the histories of Christianity and of Mahometanism."¹¹⁰ What is worse, in the course of the Western history people adopted and applied the "image of the Egyptian, Persian, and Roman imperial rulers" to the concept of God.¹¹¹ He, however, finds in the Galilian origin of Christianity another suggestion quite different from the three main strands of thought mentioned above; that is, the suggestion of "purpose in the present immediacy of a kingdom not of this world." God is here at the present, and at the same time he is the quality of creativity, that is, "not of this world."¹¹²

More in detail, Whitehead refers to the "conceptual quality" or God's primordial nature in this way: "The

110. Ibid., p.519

111. Ibid., p.520

112. Ibid., italics mine.

particularities of the actual world presuppose it; while it merely presupposes the general metaphysical character of creative advance, of which it is the primordial exemplification."¹¹³ This is one of the most brilliant passages in his works. Here the real relationship between the individual things, the conceptual quality, and the Absolute is excellently stated. He also says: "The primordial nature of God is the acquirement by creativity of a primordial character."¹¹⁴ The conceptual quality as God's primordial nature is the primordial character of creativity.

2. God and Evil Therefore, it is simply natural and reasonable that he, in Religion in the Making, clearly states that God must be "exempt from internal inconsistency which is the not of evil."¹¹⁵ The true understanding of the relationship of God to creativity, as manifested in his idea of "quality," "exemplification," or "acquirement," simply rules out the theory of "complete determinism," which identifies God with the metaphysical ultimate to the extent that it holds, by reason of the necessity of

113. Ibid., p.552, italics his.

114. Ibid.

115. Whitehead, Religion in the Making (New York: Macmillan, 1926) p.95, italics mine.

conformation with the nature of God, that "the evil in the world is in conformity with the nature of God."¹¹⁶

Whitehead can even say, "His completion, so that He is exempt from transition into something else, must mean that his nature remains self-consistent in relation to all change,"¹¹⁷ since God's self-consistency does not mean His self-contained monarchical power but the "character." The following is his conclusion as to the discussion of "evil":

The temporal world exhibits two sides of itself. On one side it exhibits an order in matter of fact, and a self-contrast with ideals, which show that its creative passage is subject to the immanence of an unchanging actual entity. On the other side its incompleteness, and its evil, show that the temporal world is to be construed in terms of additional formative elements which are not definable in the terms which are applicable to God.¹¹⁸

Karl Barth refers to such an "additional formative element" as "das Nichtige"--which he understands not as "a self-differentiation within the being of God," like Berkouwer,

116. Ibid., p. 92.

117. Ibid., pp. 95-96.

118. Ibid., p. 96, italics mine.

but simply as the "original self-differentiation of God from evil." He states more clearly: "Evil is what it is according to the divine sentence, no other, no more and no less. Hence, it is--but only in the character of 'ontological impossibility'."¹¹⁹ But, insofar as he identifies "das Nichtige" (ontological impossibility) with "His original turning aside from the possibility of chaos mentioned in Gen. 1:2,"¹²⁰ he is not so clear in his understanding of the nature and location of the "primordial character" whose counterpart in his theology, in my view, appears as the Proto-factum Immanuel, or the Logos.

That is, (1) Barth's understanding of das Nichtige, because of its close connection with the chaos in Gen. 1:2, leaves no room for a proper consideration of the unique meaning of chaos as inherently creative, and as thus totally distinct from evil;¹²¹ (2) it also obscures his insistence the das Nichtige as real evil means what is "in opposition to the totality of God's creation," to the extent that creative energy manifesting itself as chaos is not free from its association with a personal, controlling God

119. Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV/3, pp.178-179

120. Ibid., IV/3, p.188

121. Cf. Katsumi Takizawa, Jiyū no Genten: Immanuel (origin of Freedom-Immanuel) (Tokyo: Shinkyo Shuppansha, 1969), p.136.

who does not will evil as such, but does only such an evil as serves God's purpose for the best of all possible worlds;¹²² and (3) these two points are related to his understanding of the locus of the Proto-factum as "initiated" by the Incarnation of Jesus Christ, as critically clarified by Takizawa.¹²³

Nishida, antagonistic to the Barthian concept of the "transcendent God," attempts to locate what he terms "the Absolute Negation" in God's Nature.¹²⁴ But by so doing, it seems to me, he not only minimizes the positive aspect of the Barthian theology as revealed in the concept of das Nichtige, but also substantializes evil, since he identifies the Absolute Negation with the demonic,¹²⁵ because of his unclear location of "Basho." However I appreciate his adventure to re-examine the concept of God as "Absolutely Transcendent." He point out two important problems:

(1) The Absolute has its Self through and through in Self-Negation.

122. Cf. David R. Griffin, God, Power and Evil (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1976) pp.150-173

123. See Takizawa, Karl Barth Kenkyû (A Study of Karl Barth, 1941) (Kyoto: Hozokan, 1970).

124. Nishida, LPRW, p. 110.

125. Ibid., p.116

(2) The true absoluteness lies in its ability to turn itself, through and through relatively to the world.¹²⁶ In the first respect, he refers to the "Trinitarian God;" in the second, to "panentheism."¹²⁷ Thus, Nishida, from his perspective of Buddhist natural theology, clarifies the double problem of God, namely, that the Triune God's own "immanent" essence is Self-Negation or Emptiness and God as the religious ultimate (i.e., the Logos, or the Son) is the supreme self-negating, empty One.¹²⁸

126. Ibid., p.110. Abe has further developed Nishida's idea of the "self-negation of the Absolute" as the Triune God's own "immanent" essence. He writes: "The Christian God is not 'Being' in the sense that he simply transcends nihility, but a God who has embraced even nothingness itself, and empties himself. His self-negation of love precedes his self-negation in the creation of the world, which is the other than himself" Masao Abe, ("Buddhism and Christianity as A Problem of Today," Japanese Religions, III, (Autumn 1963), 23. It is interesting to know that the Christian doctrine of the Trinity is appreciated and even deepened by a Buddhist from his own perspective of Emptiness. Heinrich Dumoulin, Christianity Meets Buddhism (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1974) finds Abe's (and also another prominent Japanese Zen philosopher Nishitani's) contribution to Christian theology in their new understanding of the Triune God as śūnyata or Emptiness (pp. 180-182).

127. Nishida, LPRM

128. Cf. Cobb, "Buddhist Emptiness...", p.22

In his 1943 essay entitled "Jikaku ni tsuite" (On Realization), Nishida develops the above double understanding of God in the context of the processive nature of the "absolutely self-contradictory world." He writes:

The world of the unity of opposites must be the world of absolute facts. It must be such a world in which individuals, insofar as they are absolutely substanceless (or groundless), perish as facts-once-for-all and yet they maintain themselves, insofar as they are qualified as a self-expression of the absolute One.¹²⁹

It is clear that Nishida here calls the "Trinitarian God" the world of the unity of opposites, and God as religiously ultimate the 'absolute One.' For him, the absolute One is nothing else but the image of the world of the unity of opposites as reflected in itself; the world of the unity of opposites has in this image its self-reflection, self-identity, that is, it becomes conscious of itself here in this image. ¹³⁰

From Nishida's perspective, actualities can only be as perishing, once for all, and substanceless. Since what he calls absolute facts only come into being as the act of self-limitation of absolute Nothingness, the perishing nature of time is perceived by Nishida as resulting from the

129. Nishida, Zenshû (Complete Works) X (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1950), p.487. translation mine.

130. Ibid., p.525.

inmost metaphysical nature of the universe as Emptiness. In this regard, he is repeating the ancient Buddhist solution to the problem of time appearing as the cause of suffering as long as we cling to some fragmental, substantialized portion of time (e.g., youth). Yet, he does affirm that "actualities must be restored in the absolute Other."¹³¹ In this connection, he states that Buddhism is right in hold that the creative world (i.e., Whitehead's creativity) is the world of absolute Negation, or of perishing, but is not right in lacking in the insight into the positive aspect of this creative world, an insight into the nature of time not only as beyond the so-called perishing time but also as including it.¹³²

Thus, Nishida seems to be conscious of the task of Buddhist natural theology. He felt a "divine ought" arriving from his "absolute One," or the Logos.¹³³ But the clarification of the problem of God was not his major work. The Far Eastern religious world had to wait for Takizawa to promote this task; he forces the issue of God just as Hartshorne did in the Western religious world,

131. Ibid., p.487.

132. Ibid., pp. 492-493.

133. Ibid., p.525.

interpreting in a unique way Whitehead's metaphysics. But Nishida's clarification of the inmost nature of time as Emptiness, that is, as the metaphysical ultimate, is elucidation of creativity, both of which often seem to be overlooked or misinterpreted (in terms of the association with the religious ultimate) by their respective major disciples.

3. The Consequent Nature of God Whitehead's view of "evil" as alien from the primordial nature of God leads, next, to a unique solution of the problem of "fluency and permanence." He thinks that there is not the mere problem of fluency and permanence. Rather, in his opinion, there is the double problem: actuality with permanence, requiring fluency, as its completion; and actuality with fluency, requiring permanence as its completion. "The first half of the problem concerns the completion of God's primordial nature by the derivation of his consequent nature from the temporal world. The second half of the problem concerns the completion of each fluent actual occasion by its function of objective immortality, devoid of 'perpetual perishing,' that is to say, 'everlasting'."¹³⁴

134. Whitehead, PR, p.527, italics mine.

Because of the consequent nature of God as thus defined, "the revolts of destructive evil, purely self-regarding," that is, various phenomena of the demonic, are "dismissed into their triviality of mere individual facts," and yet, he says, "the good they did achieve in individual joy, in individual sorrow, in the introduction of needed contrast"--insofar as, although human beings commit sins, the consequent nature of God as a "tender care" and "infinite patience" does not cease to be operative--is yet "saved by its relation to the completed whole."¹³⁵ Hence, we can hope in spite of the tremendous amount of evil and tragedy in the world in which we live. The true eschatological zest is cherished repeatedly when we find ourselves in the bosom of the consequent nature of God, the supreme sympathizer who understands.

4. Faith and the Incarnation This view of "evil" in terms of soteriology, however, has a peculiar importance in its relation to the understanding of "the incarnation and faith." Whitehead, therefore, goes further to state:

135. Ibid., p.525

"God and the World are the contrasted opposites in terms of which Creativity achieves its supreme task of transforming disjoined multiplicity, with its diversities in opposition, into concrescent unity, with its diversities in contrast."¹³⁶

The reason he here deals with God and the world as the "contrasted opposites" at an equal level seems to be that he is now observing a phenomenon (imagine, e.g., the Incarnation or faith) from a double viewpoint. For instance, someone believes in Christ. This phenomenon as an actuality occurring here-now is to be considered at once as God's action in the Holy Spirit, viewed conceptually, and as his or her subjective decision, view physically. This double problem cannot be separated into two distinct problems. Then, the following explication becomes very important as to the understanding of "faith:"

In each actuality these are two concrescent poles of realization--'enjoyment' and 'appetition,' that is, the 'physical' and the 'conceptual.' For God the conceptual is prior to the physical, for the World the physical poles are prior to the conceptual poles.¹³⁷

136. Ibid., p.528, italics mine.

137. Ibid., italics mine.

The former "prior" I would like to call the irreversible priority, the latter the reciprocal priority, since the initiation of creative purpose is only made possible by God whereas its physical enjoyment in the world reacts to and passes into the divine love which understand. These two terms, in my view, are also applicable to the two aspects of the one Incarnation; to Jesus as the Christ who says, "Truly, truly, I say to you, before Abraham was, I am" (John 8: 58), and to Jesus of Nazareth who asks, "Why do you call me good? No one is good but God alone" (Mk. 10:18).¹³⁸ In this case, the irreversible priority or the divine aspect of Jesus as "true God" (verus deus) fits exactly with the reciprocal priority or his human aspect as "true human" (verus homo) in the structure of Jesus existence. But in our case, faith can only come into existence as an act of

138. The reader might think these texts are widely different from each other to the extent that if one would take as his viewpoint the Markan text as to the understanding of Jesus' personality he could no longer hold the Johannine text. But it is my contention that Jesus' personality has a profound two-fold nature. The Johannine and the Markan texts represent the divine and human aspects of his personality respectively. They are not separate from each other. Yet, they are not identical with each other. The divine aspect, as typically manifested in the Johannine text, precede the human aspect as it in the Markan text expresses itself in a radical conformation to the former, namely, in a truly human figure.

repentance.

Therefore, we cannot, like Nishida, say simply that "The relation between God and man is to be understood as a relation between God who expresses Himself through and through self-negatively and man who, as expressed (as being by God, self-expressively responds to Him."¹³⁹ However, Nishida himself insists on "repentance in the presense of God the Father, Buddha the Mother, that is, the Origin of Self."¹⁴⁰ But as he sometimes equates what he terms "the Groundless Ground of Self" with original sin,¹⁴¹ it is still rather hard to grasp what Nishida really means by "repentance," although one thing is quite clear that he is thinking here something beyond moral self-condemnation.

Meanwhile, Whitehead acknowledges that specualtive methods of metaphysics are dangerous, easily perverted.¹⁴² It is the present writer's proposal that what Whitehead calls "adventure," or "the zest of self-forgetful transcendence belonging to Civiliation at its height,"¹⁴³ be

139. Nishida, LPRW, p.151.

140. Ibid., p.119.

141. Ibid, p.120.

142. Whitehead, AI, p.294

143. Ibid.

radically related to Nishida's non-objective, non-dualistic way of thinking as follows: "It is not to go away from the actual, historical Reality but penetrate into its depth, that our Self returns to the Absolute, through a radical, transformative seeing of its Ground."¹⁴⁴

IV. WHITEHEAD AND NISHIDA IN TERMS OF THE TASK OF NATURAL THEOLOGY OF TIME TODAY

Nishida, from his standpoint of "panentheism," stresses that "Buddha is prior to creature; and creature is prior to Buddha." (Hotoke atte shujô ari; shujô atte hotoke ga aru).¹⁴⁵ He calls this relationship of Buddha and creature "mutual priority in mutual limitation" (gyakugentei; yakutaiô). This concept, appearing at the last stage of his life as a philosopher, very much resembles Whitehead's idea of "contrasted opposites" stated above.

144. Nishida, LPRW, p.135

145. Ibid., pp. 110, 121. Cf. Hartshorne's same notion Deity is, in his view, in some real aspect distinguishable from and independent of any and all relative items, and yet, taken as an actual whole, includes all relative items. There are logically the three views: (1) God is merely the cosmos, in all aspects inseparable from the sum or system of dependent things or effects; (2) he is both this system and something independent of it; (3) he is not the system, but is in all aspects independent. The second view is Hartshorne's "panentheism." See Charles Hartshorne, The Devine Relativity. A Social Conception of God(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948). pp.89-90.

It is a result of his breakthrough of the predicament inherent in the neo-orthodox doctrine of the "transcendent God."¹⁴⁶ He finally discloses his theory of "time" under this concept:

The moment of time, never stopping at any moment, is in a relation of 'mutual priority in mutual limitation' to the Eternal Now. Hence samsara is at once nirvana. Transcending one's Self is through and through returning to one's Self, that is, becoming a True Self. ¹⁴⁷

Here the initiative personal self is negated, but therefore a true self is affirmed in a process/relationship to the Eternal Now, since the Eternal Now preserves its self-identity while always emptying itself to infinite diversification in time, that is, eternally engaged in the work of creation.

In the present writer's understanding, Nishida's immense, yet insufficiently known contribution to Buddhist natural theology lies in the fact that he gave a new light upon the traditional Buddhist logic -- which is called the logic of "Hannya-sokuhi 般若即非 , or of Prajñā-

146. Ibid., p. 110.

147. Ibid., p. 135.

intuition,¹⁴⁸ especially in a tireless confrontation with Western philosophy and theology until his death in 1945. Some obscurities left in his thinking can be critically examined. Katsumi Takizawa, one of this most sincere disciples, criticizes him, saying that leaving undone an important task of further careful examination as to what kind of distinction/relation/order is implied in the one

148. Prajñā-intuition, according to D. T. Suzuki, is "becoming conscious of itself" of prajñā, the ultimate reality itself. Prajñā is the law of identity as often declared by the Zen Buddhist: A is not-A and therefore A is A. This truth is an established self-evident truth requiring no objective evidence. From vijnāna-thinking (or analytical, differentiating, objectifying thinking) to prajñā-seeing there is no mediating concept, no room for intellection, no time for deliberation. Because prajñā is itself the way or mediation of prajñā is itself the way or mediation of prajñā-seeing. Therefore, the Buddhist master urges us to "speak, quick, quick!" Immediacy, no interpretation, no explanatory apology -- this is what constitutes prajñā-intuition. From this viewpoint, mere aggregates have no significance, and this is why in Buddhist philosophy all dharmas (elements). when they are regarded as individual existences, are declared to have no ātman; the ātman is a unifying principle, and the idea is that, as long as all dharmas are conceived without any reference to that which unifies them, they are just disconnected parts, that is, they are non-existent. Prajñā is needed to make them coherent, articulate, and significant. See. D. Y. Suzuki, "Reason and Intuition in Buddhist Philosophy," in Charles A. Moore (ed.) The Japanese Mind: Essentials of Japanese Philosophy and Culture. (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1967), pp.66-95.

original point which he faced and termed 'unity of opposites,' or 'Basho,' Nishida seems to have intended to "merely systematically explicate the relations between, and the roles of, the opposites in the world," without fully taking into account the evil factor in the universe, i.e., das Nichtige (ontological impossibility), which breaks any human system of thought.¹⁴⁹ (Whitehead's thesis C cited earlier seems to be in line with Takizawa's rejection of a merely systematic explication). In this very respect, Whitehead's theism is quite suggestive, though it originates from the standpoint of Christian natural theology. He refers to "God" in conjunction with cosmology as follows:

Thus the universe is to be conceived as attaining the active self-expression of its own variety of opposites --of its own freedom and its own necessity, of its own multiplicity and its own unity, of its own imperfection and its own perfection. All the 'opposites' are elements in the nature of things, and are incorrigibly there. The concept of 'God' is the way in which we understand this incredible fact -- that what cannot be, yet is.¹⁵⁰

the religious consciousness is awakened when we encounter a network of great contradictions running through the universe, especially through our human life. These contradictions are not themselves evil. But if we cannot find a point in the universe working as the unity of all contradictions, we are

149. Takizawa, Nihonjin no Seishin Kôzô, p.100.

150. Whitehead, PR, p.531.

unavoidably tempted by an unhappy thought that we are thrown into a totally ambiguous world, that nothing in the universe is certain or meaningful. Clinging to that thought, we sometimes attempt to substantialize evil which is nothing else than what Karl Barth calls das Nichitige, or ontological impossibility. -- Things are always such, unless we come to realize: that God as the unity of opposites is the only solution to the problem of contradictions in the universe.

Natural theology in its authentic sense deals with "God" in conjunction with cosmology. And, more importantly, this new task of theology is primordially supported with the truth that "...He (God) is not before all creation, but with all creation."¹⁵¹ In the end of this presentation on a comparative study of Whitehead and Nishida as to their understanding of "time," the present writer now would like to call the reader's attention to the fact that Takizawa's philosophy/theology of Immanuel has attempted a penetrating exploration into this "with-ness" of God, in a living dialogue between the Eastern and Western thought, Kitaro Nishida and Karl Barth. Immanuel, as elucidated by him

151. Ibid., p.521.

as implying that the Absolute, or the metaphysical ultimate, is with us creatures here and now, both in the form of the primary and the secondary unity of it with particulars, i.e., as the Logos and the Christ,¹⁵² is, in my view, correlative with the Whiteheadian idea of God in the primordial and the consequent nature, with the primordial nature of God being the primordial character, exemplification, and instantiation of creativity. Takizawa distinguishes between the Logos, i.e., the primary Immanuel or the unity of the Absolute with us particulars, and the Christ, i.e., the secondary Immanuel, (which correspond to the usual Christian sense of the term) just as Whitehead does between the primordial nature and the consequent nature of God.

152. Cf. Thelle, pp.65-68. Takizawa's notion of "primary, original contact between God and Man" is identical with "the Logos" in John 1:1-3. He, from this point of view, criticized Barth's understanding of Immanuel as initiated by and with the incarnation, and affirms that a true knowledge of God (i.e. the secondary contact) can and does appear also extra muros ecclesiae. He therefore finds the same thing in the Buddhist notion of "butsubon ittai" (the basic unity of Buddha and the ordinary man). "God" in Takizawa's usage, in my view, is rather near to Eckhartian "Godhead." "God" has relationship with creature hic et nunc in the two-fold connotation.

A further discussion on this point by process thinkers of East and West would be valuable for a real promotion of Christian natural theology, as defined by John Cobb as the task of theology, "gaining insight from special revelation, but asking that it be accepted on its own merit as illuminating the human situation."¹⁵³

In sum, we have learned in this chapter on time from the perspective of a process eschatology that time in Nishida's Buddhist natural theology is primarily understood as the self-negating, self-emptying, self-determining activity of the Eternal Now, although he does not overlook other side of time, i.e., "flowing from eternal past into eternal future," that time which for Whitehead primarily appears as "transition" -- in which all the sentient beings, especially we human beings, aim at the future experiences lured by God's initial aims (i.e., His primordial nature) and are saved and understood by God's tender care and infinite patience (i.e., His consequent nature) -- although he understands clearly the other nature of time, i.e., "concrecence."

Nishida's and Whitehead's respective understandings of time show their respective solutions to the difficult problem inherent in time, i.e., "perpetual perishing."

153. Cobb, CNT p.277.

Nishida breaks through the problem in terms of the notion of the "self-negation of the Absolute," implying at the same time Buddhist Emptiness and God as the supreme self-negating One. In contrast, Whitehead breaks through the problem in terms of the notion of God as the source of the initial aim and as tender care, or eternal patience. That is Nishida solves the problem of "perpetual perishing" in his radical present-orientated attitude toward life; Whitehead in his future-orientated one. But it is my contention that both of them have a common ground for Buddhist-Christian dialogue in terms of a natural theology of time, or eschatology in its naturalistic form, precisely in the idea of the "character of creativity," or Takizawa's idea of the "Proto-factum Immanuel."

The above two-fold result of our study of time, i.e., Nishida's present-orientated solution and Whitehead's future-orientated solution, is symbolically expressed, in my conviction, in terms of the "horizontal projection of hope by traditional Christian apocalypticism," i.e., the resurrection of the body, and in terms of the "vertical projection of hope by Gnosticism," i.e., the immortality of the soul. Hope is in either case expressed, as Schubert M. Ogden affirms

in symbols that point beyond themselves.¹⁵⁴

154. Schubert M. Ogden, "The Meaning of Christian Hope," in Cargas and Lee, p.206.

CHAPTER 3

HARTSHORNE AND DEWEY ON PRAXIS:
FROM A JAPANESE POINT OF VIEW

I. THE PROBLEM

We began the present dissertation with a keen consciousness of this problem; that any authentic revolution of society presupposes a radical, conscious breakthrough of the perishing nature of temporality, or an eschatological zest; a theology of revolution/liberation, if it lacks eschatological penetration, will result in a shallow amelioration. In the previous chapter we studied that there are at least two solutions to the problem of time: the Buddhist solution, as manifested typically in Nishida's metaphysics, regards the inmost nature of time as Emptiness (the equivalent of Whitehead's concrescence, or the many becoming one and being increased by one, whereas the Christian solution, as it expresses itself particularly in Whitehead's metaphysical theism, perceives time as transition, which is nothing more than the "creativity in virtue of which any relative complete actual world is,

by the nature of things, the datum for a new concrescence"¹
 -- a datum which is objectively immortal, devoid of "perpetual perishing," because of the existence of a supreme sympathetic love, or the consequent nature of God. We hope we have thereby cherished an eschatological zest for being open/empty/relational to the present relationships and yet waiting and hoping in the right way.

The above two solutions to the problem of time are important to our question of praxis in this chapter: How is praxis possible,? since there can be no proper consideration of praxis apart from the study of a "system of relations amid relata (or events) in nature," i.e., of time.²

It is precisely in this connection that I sense the following statement of Hartshorne attractive:

The basic value is the intrinsic value of experiencing, as a unity of feeling inclusive of whatever volition and thought the experience contains, and exhibiting harmony or beauty. If we know what experience is, at its best or most beautiful, then and only then can we know how it is right to act: for the value of action

1. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality (New York: Macmillan, 1929) p.322.

2. Cf. Jerome Ashmore, "Diverse Currents in Whitehead's View of Time," Process Studies, II,3 (Fall, 1972) 196.

is in what it contributes to experiences.³

Experiences are experiences of actualities as they concresce and then become the data for a new concrescence, namely, experience in time. Praxis matters only insofar as it is related to what experience is metaphysically. Accordingly, human praxis in its presentational immediacy, bringing into existence "unexpected unpredictable good" can and needs to be metaphysically undergirded.

It is in line with Hartshorne's view of praxis as mentioned above that William L. Rees made a pertinent remark in the book Philosophers Speak of God (co-authored with Hartshorne) in reference to H. N. Wieman's idea of "God" as "creativity," or "the creative event," which implies the producer, or the production or emergence, or the manner of production or emergence, of "unexpected, unpredictable good" (which is characteristic in every human praxis whether religious, aesthetic, moral, or political). Reese points out that, although the term is obviously Whiteheadian, the concept is rather "more reminiscent of

3. Charles Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method (La Salle, IL.: Open Court, (1970), p.303, italics mine.

John Dewey than of any metaphysician."⁴ One can see in Wieman's case a subtle interrelation between two representative philosophies of America, pragmatism and process philosophy, in terms of praxis. Reese's remark is interesting (and also suggestive) to the present writer insofar as Wieman, while showing genius in dealing with the human behavior and experiences involved in significant value-emergence in our lives, is, in Reese's view, "generally skeptical of the validity of metaphysical undergirding," because Reese is thereby critically, albeit indirectly, dealing with the concept of Dewey.

Furthermore, Reese, talking about Wieman, does not hesitate to quote the following words of Dewey (since both Wieman and Dewey speak of processes of creation, describe the production of good as issuing from a context of event, and are willing to use the term "God" in this connection):⁶

- (A) The process of creation is experimental and continuous. The artist, scientific man, or good citizen, depends upon what others have done before him and are doing around him. The sense of new values that become ends to be realized arises first in dim and uncertain form.

4. Charles Hartshorne and William L. Reese, Philosophers Speak of God (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953) p.395, italics mine.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

As the values are dwelt upon and carried forward in action they grow in definiteness and coherence. Interaction between aim and existent conditions improves and tests the ideal; and conditions are at the same time modified. Ideals change as they are applied in existent conditions.

- (B) The process endures and advances with the life of humanity. What one person and one group accomplish becomes the standing ground and starting point of those who succeed them. When the vital factors in this natural process are generally acknowledged in emotion, thought and action, the process will be both accelerated and purified through elimination of the irrelevant element that culminates in the idea of the supernatural. When the vital factors attain the religious force that has been drafted into supernatural religions, the resulting reinforcement will be incalculable.
- (C) These considerations may be applied to the idea of God, or, to avoid misleading conceptions, to the idea of the divine. This idea is as I have said, one of ideal possibilities unified through imaginative realization and projection. But this idea of God, or of the divine, is also connected with all the natural forces and conditions -- including man and human association -- that promote the growth of the ideal and that further its realization. We are in the presence neither of ideals completely embodied in existence nor yet of ideals that are mere rootless ideals, fantasies, utopias. For there are forces in nature and society that generate and support the ideals. They are further unified by the action that gives them coherence, and solidity. It is this active relation between ideal and actual to which I would give the name "God." I would not insist that the name must be given. There are those who hold that the associations of the term with the supernatural are so so numerous and close that any use of the word "God is sure to give rise to misconception and be taken as a concession to traditional ideas.⁷

7. Ibid., John Dewey, A Common Faith (New Haven: Yale University Press), pp.49-51

It is, then, the present writer's contention that in the fore-going passage Dewey's unique three-fold understanding of human praxis appears, that is (1) in its meaningfulness as experimental and continuous process of creation" (Thesis A); (2) in its enduring relationship to "the life of humanity" (Thesis B); and (3) in its connection with the term "God" (Thesis C). In what sense and to what extent, I would like to ask, is this three-fold view of praxis vulnerable to Reese's above-mentioned critique? The major purpose of this chapter is to give a reasonable answer to that question.

Reese's standpoint is, as is clear in his critical statement against Wieman and Dewey, that human praxis in its presentational immediacy, bringing into existence "unexpected, unpredictable good," can and needs to be metaphysically undergirded. It is precisely from the perspective of this standpoint, explored thoroughly, that Charles Hartshorne has proposed what he calls "revisionist metaphysics," or Theistic naturalism," or "surrelativism." We would like to study below whether this standpoint, as elucidated metaphysically by Hartshorne, should vindicate its validity concerning Dewey's thesis A, B, C, respectively. In order to vivify this discussion and make relevant to

another cultural context in the Far East, I would like to refer to a similar discussion between Katsumi Takizawa, a Japanese Barthian thinker, and Kenzo Tagawa, a Japanese Marxist New Testament scholar, as to whether or not revolutionary praxis, or praxis in general, emerges only in connection with "God" as the fundamental factor in the universe (including the human self) that makes praxis possible in the first instance.

To put it another way, the problem of praxis ultimately concerns the alternative of theism or humanism in terms of its foundation for Dewey and Tagawa take the latter alternative because both of them suspect that concentrating all values in a supreme value in God, or in the one ultimate point such as Takizawa's concept of "ningen no genten" (the origin or source point of human being), may result in the neglect of various historical values in their rich diversity. On the contrary, Hartshorne and Takizawa strongly contend that only a thorough going Theism -- which doesn't stand in opposition to human nature (or nature qua nature) but rather radically accepts that nature into its conceptualization, as in Hartshorne's theistic naturalism or Takizawa's theory of "ningen no genten" -- can provide a rightful basis for praxis in

general, and for ethics in particular. Praxis, as is clear in Hartshorne's statements cited earlier, involves in itself esthetics, which is not restricted within the human world but is common to the universe including the sub-human world (minimally speaking) and God (maximally speaking), and ethics peculiar to humans.

First, I will discuss in detail the confrontation of Hartshorne's theism with Dewey's humanism concerning two important points: praxis and value; and theism versus humanism. Second, I will discuss the critique by Takizawa of Tagawa's historicism, thereby bringing the former's position into a comparative study with Hartshorne's theistic naturalism. The above procedure of this chapter is necessary for me since I am here concerned to force the issue of both as it expresses itself in the context of "eschatology of praxis," urgent to the life of the church today, in East and West alike.

II. PRAXIS AND VALUE

As is clear in the aforementioned thesis A, Dewey thinks that human praxis, as "process of creation" by the artist, scientific man, or a good citizen, is "experimental and continuous, " that is, at the same time existential and

social as well.

In its existential pole praxis comes into being insofar as "The sense of new values that become ends to be realized arises first in dim and uncertain form." In this pole of praxis, therefore, the actor senses and enjoys "new" values happening in him or her; they, in their novelty for the present satisfaction of the actor's experiences, are to be called intrinsic values to him or her (though Dewey does not use this term). But at the same time, since these values become "ends" to be realized, they contain a directive nature in themselves (they are therefore not enjoyed physically but only appetitively), they are conceptual values to him or her.

On the other hand, since one's present praxis in its social pole appears dependent upon "what others (including his own past self) have done before him and are doing around him," it is to be contributed by various past actual occasions in order to enjoy its own intrinsic value; those past actual occasions constitute instrumental value for the praxis. But insofar as the values are "dwelt upon and carried forward in action," by the actor, they are pragmatic values to him or her, growing in "definiteness and coherence." In this way, praxis as interaction

between aim and existent conditions strives to "improve and test" the ideal (value inherent in the depths of human beings), thereby at the same time modifying conditions pragmatically. Praxis in the social pole thus concerns intended instrumental value, that is morality.⁸

8. I am indebted for the five value conceptions mentioned above, i.e., "intrinsic value," "instrumental value," "ideal (inherent value," conceptual value," and intended instrumental value," to David Griffin in his lecture on May 10, 1977 and in a handwritten comment on the first original draft of this chapter (as a term paper) dated May 25, 1977. He writes in that comment as follows:

- 1) I (Griffin) use intrinsic value for the enjoyment which an occasion of experience has in and for itself.
- 2) I use instrumental value for past actual occasions (or aggregates of such, e.g., an apple) which contribute to the intrinsic value of present occasions of experience
- 3) I use "inherent value" for those things (possibilities-actualities) which have the capacity to contribute to intrinsic value, either through objectification or ingression.
- 4) "Ends to be realized" contributes still another meaning of value -- they could be called "conceptual values," as they are not realized or enjoyed in the physical pole, but are only felt appetitively, i.e., in the conceptual pole. They are the recognition of (and consequent aim toward the physical realization of) the inherent value of some possibility (meaning 3).

From the above explanation is omitted the reference to "intended instrumental value" which he, in that lecture, identified with ethics. For the application of them to Dewey and for other ideas, of course, I am responsible.

A. Hartshorne's Agreement with Dewey

Thesis A, as thus explained by the present writer, seems to be a meaningful discussion on praxis and value. In the following, I would like to examine how Hartshorne, affirmatively and critically responds to thesis A.

1. Intrinsic Value Although Reese calls Dewey's standpoint "somewhat truncated naturalism,"⁹ Hartshorne in his Philosophers Speak of God, interesting, introduces into the discussion the positivist William R. Dennes' agreement with Dewey that the term "God" cannot be given meaning save as designating "some experienceable process -- such as the 'multitude of facts and forces which we brought together simply with respect to their coincidence in producing one undesigned effect -- the furtherance of good in human life'".¹⁰ In line with that appreciation of Dewey by Dennes, Hartshorne counts Dewey among the five philosophers of process of great genius and immense knowledge of the intellectual and spiritual resources of this century including Bergson, Peirce, James and Whitehead.¹¹ The idea of praxis as 'process of creation'

9. Reese, Hartshorne, PSG, p.396

10. Ibid., p.491.

11. Hartshorne, CSPM, p.xiii, also see Ibid, p.494

in Thesis A is important in this connection.

Hartshorne himself sums up the process philosophical view of the universe (especially of memory, perspective, and causality) in his doctrine of "creative synthesis" or "creative synthesis" or "creativity" as the "ultimate" abstract principle of existence.¹² His repeated reference to Buddhism in terms of "creative synthesis" in his most important work Creative Synthesis & Philosophic Method suggests that he understands "creative synthesis" as similar to one of the Buddhist key-notions, pratitya-samutpâda (dependent co-origination). He in this context, regards the principle of action for a truly rational animal as the appeal of life for one's present life, reality, or self rather than the appeal of a self for that same self; or even the appeal of other selves for the own self.¹³

Although he has never, as John B. Cobb, Jr., critically elucidates, quite come to realize the radical distinction of the Whiteheadian concept of "creativity" as the

12. Ibid., p.xv.

13. Hartshorne, CSPM, p.xx, italics mine.

metaphysical ultimate from the religious ultimate, God,¹⁴ Hartshorne agrees with Whitehead (and also with Buddhists) in finding intrinsic value in the midst of human praxis at the present moment. With the discover of that value is connected his "revisionist" metaphysics, in contrast to "descriptive" metaphysics (in Strawson's terms). Usually revisionists are criticized for denying as "unreal" some aspects of experience. (Hartshorne agrees that this usually occurs). However, from Hartshorne's point of view, descriptivists, being too passive and unsuspecting in the face of simplifications of the complexities of life and the universe, fail to describe human thought in its full range. As the prime example, Hartshorne refers to the "idea of substance, or individual thing or person, taken as not further analysable or reducible."¹⁵ The descriptivist starts from that idea, seeing that it does quite well in ordinary practical discourse. Hartshorne as a revisionist metaphysician, however, breaks through the idea partly because he clearly see that it has broken down in micro-physics, and is dispensable in cosmology. Furthermore, he

14. John B. Cobb, Jr., "Buddhist Emptiness and the Christian God," Journal of the American Academy of Religion, XLV,1 (1977), 11-25.

15. Hartshorne, CSPM, p. xix.

connects his revisionist view with Buddhism, which he thinks discovered two thousand years ago that the idea of substance is inadequate in ethics and religion.¹⁶

Since Hartshorne denies the idea of substance as explained above, the basic motivation for his metaphysics is neither the appeal of a self for that self, nor even the appeal of other selves for the own self, but rather it is the appeal of life for life as it is here-now,¹⁷ that is, of life in its intrinsic value. His re-discovery or re-definition of the idea of God in connection with the above view of substanceless life has resulted in the progress theological movement in America. He sees that there are logically the three views of God: (1) God is merely the cosmos, in all aspects inseparable from the sum or system of dependent things or effects; (2) he is both this system and something independent of it; (3) he is not the system but in all aspects independent.¹⁸ The first is traditional pantheism, like Spinoza's; the second, Hartshorne's new proposal of panentheism; and the third, traditional theism.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid., p.xx.

18. Charles Hartshorne, The Divine Relativity, p.90. (New Haven:University Press, Yale, 1948)

In the panentheistic vision, God literally contains the universe as it is here-now.¹⁹ His axiological explanation of this is: that if A contains the value of B and also some additional value, then the value of A exceeds that of B.²⁰ In other words, his idea of God is not, like that of traditional supernaturalistic theism, coercive or destructive to the intrinsic value of each actuality, and yet is not, like that of traditional panethism, the "all of relative or interdependent items, with nothing wholly independent or in any clear sense nonrelative."²¹ Rather, in some real aspect it is "distinguishable from and independent of any and all relative items, and yet, taken as an actual whole, includes all relative items."²²

The substanceless idea of personality creatively synthesized by Hartshorne into a unique theory of God as thus viewed is, in the present writer's opinion, revolutionary in the history of Christianity, as is properly labeled "post-modern," or "post-personal" by Cobb. The present writer affirms that it is essential for the East-West dialog to notice that a similar revolutionary re-discovery of God

19. Ibid., italics mine.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid., p.89.

22. Ibid.

as well as of the "intrinsic value" of human experience (or experience in general) occurred in Takizawa's philosophy of "Immanuel" in present-day Japan, which will be discussed later.

2. Pragmatic Value When he states concerning meaning, belief, and action that "Ideas are significant only if they can or could be believe,²³ and that "there is no adequate test of the genuineness of belief other than this: can (and in suitable circumstances would) the belief be acted upon or in some sense lived by?²⁴ Hartshorne reveals himself to be continuous with Peirce's and James' pragmatism. In fact Hartshorne recognizes that from both great pragmatists he accepts a basic pragmatism which he calls also "a kind of existentialism."²⁵ According to his conviction ideas must be expressible in living and behavior or they are merely verbal.²⁶ Hartshorne, in agreement with Peirce, James, and Dewey, affirms that "belief can be livable without being true."²⁷

Pragmatic value concerns how an idea can or could be

23. Hartshorne, CSPM, p.80.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid. p.xvi.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid., p.80

acted upon so as to experimentally verified in the future. In this respect, this value differs from intrinsic value of a thing for and in itself at present. Pragmatic value is a twofold character it is, on the one hand, "livable," but, on the other, "rationally defensible." As Hartshorne contends, the problem for metaphysics is to find or create a view of first principles that covers both aspects of that value.²⁸ It is precisely in this connection that Hartshorne quotes Whitehead's statement that "rationalism is the search for the coherence of the presuppositions of civilized living."

As for the "livable" aspect of pragmatic value, Hartshorne states that "if they (beliefs) are in no sense livable then they cannot be true, for they have no definite meaning."²⁹ As for the "reasonable" aspect, the present writer holds that the cosmic reality (or purpose or meaning), which Hartshorne regards as "something more enduring than any animal, or than any species of animal," is the very basis for reasonability (or verifiability). As Hartshorne contends, life is enjoyed as it is lived; but its eventual

28. Ibid., p.xvi

29. Ibid, p.80, italics mine.

worth will consist in the contribution it has made to the cosmic reality, the "final beauty," or the "beauty of holiness."³⁰

To refer to William James' pragmatism, his insistence that true ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify, mainly concerns the former aspect of pragmatic value. For him, theories thus become instruments, not answers to enigmas upon which we can lie back.³¹ In contrast, Charles Sanders Peirce's thesis of pragmaticism "does not make the summum bonum to consist in action, but makes it to consist in that process of evolution whereby the existent comes more and more to embody those generals which were just now said to be destined, which is what we strive to express in calling them reasonable."³² That is, he is mainly concerned for the latter aspect of that value.

Hartshorne wants to purify Peirce's thought of certain ambiguities and to apply his pragmaticistic categories, though Peirce himself refused to do so, to God.³³

30. Ibid., pp.317, 321.

31. The Writings of William James, (New York:Modern Library, 1968) p.380.

32. Charles Peirce, Philosophical Writings (New York: Dover, 1955) p. 265, *italics his*.

33. Hartshorne, CSPM, p.xvi.

Hartshorne's endeavor is, in my view, endorsed by Whitehead, for example in his thesis of the "superjective nature of "God:" "The 'superjective' nature of God is the character of the pragmatic value of his specific satisfaction qualifying the transcendent creativity in the various temporal instances."³⁴ Whitehead thereby shows that he means the metaphysical categories (in this case the superjective nature of actual entities), to apply to God.

3. Intended instrumental Value It is noteworthy that Reese in his afore-mentioned book (co-authored with Hartshorne), attribute the emergence of value to "the co-working of men plus more general factors,"³⁵ while admitting that Wieman would say that this emergence is the work of God. The idea of "interaction between aim and existing conditions" in thesis A, must be emphasized here. Reese's assumption comes from a Whiteheadian (he thinks) understanding of the emergence of value as "due to man's co-working with God rather than regarding it either as literally God's working or man's working."³⁶ His understanding is right. Whitehead certainly writes: "...the

34. Whitehead, PR., p. 135

35. Hartshorne, PSG, p.396, italics mine.

36. Ibid.

initial stage of aim (subjective)aim is rooted in the nature of God, and its completion depends on the self-causation of the subject-superfect."³⁷ or "... he (god) is that actual entity from which each temporal concrescence receives that intial aim from which its self-causation starts."³⁸; or "If we prefer the phraseology, we can say that God and the actual world jointly constitute the character of the creativity for the inital phase of the novel concrescence."³⁹ In this connection, the original Christian tradition, such as Jesus' enigmatic statement after healing, can also be referred to as follows: "Your faith has made you well; go in peace and be healed of your disease." (Mk. 5:34, RSV) The healing even of Jesus as the Christ is regarded by him, however, as at the same time participated creatively by the healed person's faith.

According to Hartshorne's value theory, the intrinsic value of experiences is by definition aesthetic value. In contrast, ethical value, goodness, is not the value of

37. Whitehead, PR, p.373.

38. Ibid., p.374

39. Ibid., p.

experiences themselves, but rather the intended instrumental value of acting insofar as the actor acts to increase the intrinsic value of future experiences, particular those of others than himself or herself.⁴⁰

In this sense, ethical value is of salvific importance for the future experiences, especially of others. Salvation comes into existence as a function of intending to increase the intrinsic value of persons and sub-human beings in question. But such a function, or work, which ethical value has, is not workable unless there arises a causa sui here and now, that is, the will. The will has to be purified as good at the present moment so as to work as the motivation of that function, or ethical work.

It is in this connection that Hartshorne, quite importantly for our discussion about praxis and value in this chapter, elucidates the third dimension of value, that is, the good will. The good will, the will to enhance the value of future experiences generally, he contends, is itself, as experienced, an "element of present harmony"⁴¹ just as hatred is a kind of discord. In this sense, good will is twice good: it enriches one's own present experience and in

40. Cf. Hartshorne, CSPM., p.308.

41. Ibid.

its consequence tends to enrich future experiences, not necessarily one's own."⁴²

This passage, in my view, is one of the best interpretations as regards "realized eschatology" It is, I think, along this line that John B. Cobb, Jr., in his lecture "Can a Christian Be a Buddhist, Too?", comes to realize that the Christian encounter with the Buddhist Nirvana may provide us Christians "a new way of conceiving the immediacy of blessedness for which time is no longer important."⁴³ He is convinced of there being "immediate gratification in working for a future in which we can believe."⁴⁴ A value which is intrinsic and instrumental at the same time does exist. It can be called "intended" (or to borrow a Buddhist term, "vowed") instrumental value. It is inspiring, in this connection, that Cobb does not hesitate to "accept" the ideal of Dharmākara Bodhisattva who, in his Original Vow, refuses final entry into Nirvana until all sentient creatures can cross the threshold together.⁴⁵ I here, in order to explicate the Vow in process philosophical terms, cannot

42. Ibid., italics mine.

43. John B. Cobb, Jr., "Can a Christian be a Buddhist, too?" (Spring 1977), p.19.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.

do better than to quote Hartshorne's beautiful interpretation of "goodness" as follows:

Goodness is the self in its purposes transcending the personal future and making itself trustee for others (according to religion, finally, trustee for God). In this transcendence of the personal there is a kind of 'peace' or 'Nirvana,' an escape from the agonies of egotism. This peace is the only essential reward of virtue. It is in the present and is not a looked-for reward in the eventual future. Rather, so long as one's own future is taken as the the important matters, there is no peace.⁴⁶

Goodness, in Hartshorne's usage, is, in the first place (positively), the good will emerging in the present; and, in the second (negatively), ethical goodness which Kant would call "the moral ought"⁴⁷ and Nietzsche would ironically label "the ascetic ideal."⁴⁸ But in his case, because of his theistic understanding of goodness as ultimately lying in the making oneself "trustee for God," the tension between the moral out and the good will, or what Kant calls autonomy of the will, is resolved; that is, it is transformed into a higher synthesis of the intrinsic value of the present experiences with the instrumental

46. Hartshorne, CSPM, p.308.

47. Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the metaphysics of Morals (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969), p.84.

48. Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals (New York: Random House, 1969), p.162.

value of the present experiences for the future ones, as the intended instrumental value cherishing peace.

This is particularly important in view of an ethical aporia which Kant in his Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals struggled with, but left unsolved. He wrote:

The absolutely good will, the principle of which must be a categorical imperative, is thus undetermined with reference to any objects. It contains only the form of volition in general, and this form is autonomy. That is, the capability of the maxims of every good will to make universal laws is itself the sole law which the will of every rational being imposes on itself, and it does not need to support this on any incentive or interest.⁴⁹

But how such asynthetical practical proposition is possible and why it is necessary is, as Kant himself admitted, a problem whose solution does not lie within the boundaries of the metaphysics of morals.⁵⁰ He showed only through the development of the universally received concept of morals that "autonomy of the will" is unavoidably connected with it, or rather that it is its foundation.

Since Kant was not able to find a real ground, or reason, for his synthetical practical proposition that autonomy is the foundation of the moral ought, he had to define the moral ought in terms of its strained relationship

49. Kant, p.72.

50. Ibid.

to the world of sense, or to suffering (in spite of his repeated insistence that the moral ought and hence the good will is independent of happiness or suffering). In fact, he stated that the moral ought is the actor's own volition as a member of the intelligible world, to the effect that it is conceived by him "as an ought only in so far as he regards himself at the same time as a member of the world of sense."⁵¹ This view is not alien to Nietzsche's cynical observance that "the ascetic ideal" offers humanity's suffering meaning which has filled the tremendous void, or nihilism.⁵²

In contrast, Hartshorne solves the difficult problem of the ethical good by relativizing it from the perspective of theism, because it is, in his view, not only inapplicable to some animals, but it is not applicable in the same sense to deity. God, he holds, is an artist fostering and loving the beauty of the creatures, the harmonies and intensities of their experiences, as data for his own.⁵³ He strongly states that this love is in every way more than our goodness, not less.

51. Ibid.

52. Nietzsche.

53. Hartshorne, CSPM, p. 309.

In addition to the above conception of God's love Hartshorne affirms a unique theory of God's self-interest to the effect that "God alone inherits all the harvest for which he, or anyone sows the seed,"⁵⁴ namely, that "To forbid him to enjoy the harvest, since that would make him selfish, is one of the oldest confusions into which sentimentalists have ever fallen."⁵⁵ Accordingly, the required ethical synthesis of autonomy of the will and the moral ought is fulfilled theistically by Hartshorne's this idea: "God cannot benefit another without benefiting himself."⁵⁶ That is, in God's case, according to Hartshorne, self-interest and altruism are indeed coincident, but not in the usual utilitarian sense that he is clever enough to do us good so as to satisfy his own egoistic desires,⁵⁷ since he has no egoistic desires, but only a supreme interest in creaturely good in a supreme sympathy with the creatures' happiness they seek for themselves.

In any case, ethical goodness, as grasped by Kant and Nietzsche, must be supported by a new conceptualization

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid., p.310.

57. Ibid.

of the good will, for which they strove respectively. It is in this connection that Hartshorne's unique contribution to moral philosophy, as we have seen it above, is essential for today.

Hartshorne's idea of "goodness" as good will, the self transcending the personal into "peace" or "nirvana," is, in my view, uniquely referring to what Kant strove to articulate as regards "autonomy," or the freedom of the will as the presupposition of a categorical imperative, but without sufficient theistic foundation. It also elaborately expresses what Nietzsche wanted to grasp, in vain, under the negativistic notion, "a will to nothingness."

B. Hartshorne's Critique of Dewey

In the previous section I have surveyed the points on which Hartshorne agrees with Dewey. In other words, I have confirmed a continuity of process philosophy with pragmatism. In this section I would like to see the difference between two philosophies in terms of Hartshorne's critique of Dewey. This discontinuity between them is a sign of progress in American philosophy of religion

Moreover, that discontinuity become important, mutatis mutandis, within the context of the present-day

insistence by the liberation theologians (Black, Latin-American, Asian, feminine and ecological) of liberating, historical praxis in opposition to "elaborating an ideology to justify postures already taken" (Gutierrez).⁵⁸ A kind of particularism is shared by liberation theologians, as is expressed by Gutierrez when he states that "The universality of Christian love is only an abstraction unless it becomes concrete history, process, conflict," and that "it is arrived at only through particularity."⁵⁹ Under the concept "particularity" Gutierrez understand "authentic solidarity with the poor and a real protest against the poverty of our time."⁶⁰ He is, I think, right insofar as he is concerned with "the concrete, vital context necessary for a theological discussion of poverty."⁶¹

But, is that a particularity of love and protest truly incompatible with the universality of theology? That is, is the particularism peculiar to the present-day liberation theologies to be found entirely antagonistic to a radical examination of theism as delivered by Hartshorne?

58. Gustavo Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation (New York: Orbis, 1973), p.ix.

59. Ibid., p.275, italics mine.

60. Ibid., p.302.

61. Ibid.

Insofar as many liberation theologians (such as Gutierrez, Cone, Alves, and Miguez Bonino) limit their conceptual scope within the boundaries of "an understanding of history in which man assumes conscious (and creative) responsibility for his own destiny,"⁶² i.e., not inclusive of the total destiny of the total universe (minimally, the non-human creatures; maximally, God), it is my contention that the theistic naturalism of "an untamed rationalist" (Hartshorne), breaking through a shallow pragmatic reason in many ways as I will show in the following, is also critically valid in some way for today's "concrete, vital context," especially in the Third World. In this dissertation, however, I will discuss its critical validity only within a Japanese context (in Section IV of this chapter).

1. Continuity Hartshorne's first criticism is directed toward Dewey's understanding of "continuity" in human praxis. He calls this one of the "subtlest" problems which even pluralism like pragmatism must face, because

62. Jose Miguez Bonino, Doing Theology in a Revolutionary Situation (Philadelphia:Fortress Press, 1975) p.xi.

people are prone to regard the apparent continuity of process as its "lack of distinct units."⁶³ Dewey, Bergson, Peirce, all three careful thinkers much interested in the analysis of experience as such, it seems to him found no definite discreteness in the becoming of human experience.⁶⁴

As is clear in his thesis B, Dewey regards the life of humanity as continuous in such a sense that "what one person and one group accomplish becomes the standing ground and starting point of those who succeed them." Such a continuous nature of human experience, in Dewey's view, is consistent with a natural scientific truth called "a chain of cause and effects" in what happens with inanimate things, namely, that "To live signifies that a connected continuity of acts is effected in which preceding ones prepare the conditions under which later ones occur."⁶⁵

However, the chain, Dewey states, has a cumulative continuity for living creatures, distinct from that for inanimate things. That is, as organisms become more complex in structure and thus related to a more complex environment,

63. Hartshorne, CSPM., p.192

64. Ibid.

65. John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty (New York: Capricorn, 1960), p.224, hereinafter cited as QC.

the importance of a particular act in establishing conditions favorable to subsequent acts that sustain the "continuity of the life process," becomes at once more difficult and more imperative, to the extent that "Acts are then relatively more instrumental and less consummatory or final; even the latter (i.e., acts) are haunted by a sense of what may issue from them."⁶⁶ It is here, according to Dewey, that the natural man dislikes the disease which accompanies the doubtful and is ready to take almost any means to end it.⁶⁷ Because exposure to danger breeds an overpowering love of security, love for security, translated into a desire not to be disturbed and unsettled, leads, Dew criticizes, to "dogmatism, to intolerance and fanaticism on one side and sloth on the other"⁶⁸ -- in a word, to supernaturalism. Traditional supernaturalism is by nature hostile to what occurs in experimental inquiry, namely, that "nothing is introduced save what is objective and is accessible to examination and report(with regard to nature).⁶⁹

It is precisely in this context that his criticism of traditional theories of mind and its organs of knowledge

66. Ibid., pp.224-225.

67. Ibid., p. 227.

68. Ibid., pp.227-228.

69. Ibid., p. 229.

is directed toward its isolation of them from "continuity with the natural world."⁷⁰ Dewey finds and rejects the introduction by traditionalists of the supernatural or extra-natural into the observation of the continuity of the life process. Contrary to traditional theories, Dewey contends that the "the metaphysical problem of the relation of mind and body is converted into a question, to be solved by observation of facts of a differentiation of actions into those which, because of directed quality and distinctive consequences, are mental."⁷¹

Then, what is the difference between the physiological and the mental? Dewey's insistence that mind is not to be placed outside of nature is reasonable. But inasmuch as his answer to the above-mentioned question cannot go beyond such a statement that "The organism is a part of the natural world; its interactions with it are genuine additive phenomena."⁷² Dewey can never show the true reason of that additive phenomena. If the continuity of a life-process, as he affirms, is secured only as acts performed render the

70. Ibid., p.230

71. Ibid., p.231

72. Ibid., p.234, italics mine.

environment favorable to subsequent organic acts,⁷³ Dewey must discuss and clarify the meaningfulness of acts, beyond mere causality.

Is it, then, truly right for Dewey to say that things that were causally effective in producing experience results became means to consequences to the extent that these consequences incorporate in themselves all the meanings found in the causes which "intentionally" produce them?⁷⁴ Here it is my contention that Dewey has never succeeded in showing the power of such incorporation of all the past meanings into the present consequences. In short, he has failed to see the important elements constituting the present events as such, discrete from the past events while incorporating the latter into themselves.

Ethically speaking, Dewey cannot provide any metaphysical ground for pragmatic value inherent in praxis inasmuch as he wants to remove the incompatibility between "the traits of an object in its direct individual and unique nature" and "those traits that belong to it in its relations or continuities" only by action.⁷⁵

73. Ibid., italics mine.

74. Ibid., italics mine.

75. Ibid., p.237.

On the contrary, Hartshorne, from his viewpoint of "event-pluralism," discusses (1) that in both "substantial" and "adjectival" changes, as in all becoming, there is the creation of a new unit of definite reality (not the insertion of new predicates in an old unit), (2) that succession should, similar to spatial coexistence, involve a definite plurality, (3) that no subject can have contradictory predicates, (4) since that a unit event is not similarly relative to arbitrary criteria (for even for divine perception it would simply be given in its discreteness) the event language and the final measure of things, (5) that in terms of events or states one has dependence upon the past, but independence of contemporary or subsequent, entities or parts, and (6) that, ethically speaking, we can love the other as ourselves because the self as future is also another.⁷⁶ He finds discreteness in all aspects of the life-process, human and sub-human alike.

Hartshorne, therefore, finds continuity as related to praxis, not in acts like Dewey does but in the fact that the incoming officer of an organization and previous officers both represent the same on-going society,⁷⁷ that is,

76. Hartshorne, CSPM. pp.195-198.

77. Ibid., p. 193, *italics mine*.

pratitya-samutpada (dependent coorigination) in Buddhism, or "creativity" -- i.e., that ultimate principle by which the many, which are the universe disjunctively, become the one actual occasion which is the universal conjunctively -- in Whitehead.⁷⁸ Although Harshorne does not explicitly discuss the above-mentioned Buddhist and Whiteheadian concepts, his insistence that a rational momentary self must in a generalized sense be unselfish, aiming at a future good, although its own good is already complete (at present), in my view presupposes those.⁷⁹

It is, therefore, quite noteworthy that for Hartshorne, contrary to Dewey's idea of continuity inherent in "acts," to love oneself as identical with oneself and the other as not identical with oneself is not to love the neighbors as oneself.⁸⁰ In other words, he is free from a pragmatic bias inherent in such a love of others so as to satisfy his own egoistic desires insofar as he contends that the difference between "self-love" and "love of others" is not

78. Whitehead, PR., p.31.

79. Hartshorne, CSPM, p.199. But the fact that Hartshorne does not explicitly discuss pratitya-samutpada or creativity, in my view, is internally related with the character of his theism. He does not clearly differentiate "on-going society" from continuity.

80. Ibid., p.200.

metaphysical, nor anything absolute, but a relative matter,⁸¹ and to such an extent, he is theistically motivated in his understanding of "continuity," in terms of this vision of God; that in the divine reality self-interest and altruism are coincident.

To sum up Hartshorne's view of continuity, contrary to that of Dewey's it is important for us to know, on the one hand, that Hartshorne shares such a common view of causality with Dewey that each momentary actuality necessarily inherits causally from its past, and that this inheritance necessitates that a certain class of possible successors to that past should not remain⁸² empty (that is, they are in a "cumulative" process). But, on the other hand, Harshorne differs from Dewey in that he holds that each new concrete self faces the task, not merely of prolonging a chain of causal necessities, or of continuing to express an antecedent character which, with circumstances, uniquely determines concrete actions, but of freely creating a slightly new character, and thus establishing

81. Ibid., p.201.

82. Ibid., p.202.

a new set of causal possibilities and probabilities.⁸³
 the former point I might call "transition," and the later
 concrescence," in Whiteheadian terms.

Dewey seeks an element of continuity in acts where-
 as he admits a causal chain determining them.⁸⁴ He thus
 is never aware of the fact, which Whitehead found that in
 every act of becoming there is the becoming of something
 with temporal extension whereas "the act itself is not
 extensive, in the sense that it is divisible into earlier
 acts of becoming which correspond to the extensive divisi-

83. Ibid., italics mine. Dewey too, refers to the
 process of creation in his own way (See his Thesis
 A). But here the problem is whether he, like Harts-
 horne, can grasp it as "fee" from causality, and
 therefore as "new" in character. He is so much pre-
 occupied with the continuity in terms of acts, or
 with pragmatic value, that he cannot truly realize
 the inner procedure of the intrinsic value, as
 concrescence of many entities into one actuality.

84. In this respect, Dewey is vulnerable to
 Takizawa's critique of Tagawa's historicism as follows:
 "Tagawa states that an individual subject is totally
 defined by external powers in history. And yet he
 admits that the individual can be freely committed
 to historical formation. Then, where and how are
 the two aspects of man's historical existence, the
 complete annihilation of human subjectivity and
 its complete preservation, compatible?"
 See Katsumi Takizawa, Watashi no Daigaku Tōsō (My
University Struggle) (Tokyo: San-ichi Shobo, 1972)
 pp. 216-217. See also the last chapter of this
 paper.

bility of what has become."⁸⁵ Acts of becoming themselves are atomic. This fact is stubborn . Since he is pragmatically optimistic about the direct influence of preceding acts to subsequent events (see his Thesis B as regards the life of humanity), Dewey fails to see, on the one hand, the true nature of "temporal extension" as an objectification of each event for a new event (essential to both inanimate and living things including humans), and, on the other, the true nature of "acts" (or praxis) as subjectification of the present events.

Truly the question how " the becoming of something with temporal extension" is connected with "the act of becoming itself," is, as Whitehead affirms, a splendid example of the difficulty of philosophical issues. In Hartshornean terms, no process directly exhibited in human experiences seem to come in clearly discrete units,⁸⁶ that is, a real discreteness is only vaguely or approximately given.⁸⁷ Hence, the difficult problem of continuity. As is clear above, his conclusion regarding this problem is that "continuity" belongs with the abstract, indefinite,

85. Whitehead, PR., p.107.

86. Hartshorne, CSPM., p.192, italics mine.

87. Ibid., p.195.

possible, infinite, not with the concrete, definite, actual finite. That truth, in his view, was missed by Bergson, Peirce, and Dewey, but seen by James and Whitehead (anticipated by Buddhists and some Islamic thinkers).⁸⁸

Hartshorne's understanding of "events in continuity as thus elucidated, can be, in the present writer's opinion, compared with Takizawa's concept of "factual beings" (jijitsu sonzai) in the context of Japanese philosophy/theology: contingent individual, existing factually, are permitted and lured by the one absolute Lord to subjectify themselves, i.e., to reflect His glory in themselves insofar as they enjoy themselves within the limits of the fundamental fact that they are not themselves "subjective subjects" like the Lord is, but

88. Ibid.

simply "objective subjects."⁸⁹ The subjective subject, or the one absolute Lord, objectively and subjectively coalesces into one body with each individual here-now. In that sense, it is equivalent to Whitehead's "creativity," though the terms used for are reminiscent partly of Nishida and partly of Karl Barth, Takizawa's two teachers. Objectivity, for Takizawa, means, primarily, not so much the relation of past events to a present event as a thing's relation to "God," or the subjective subject. Subjectivity is also a

89. The usage of the term "glory" by Takizawa is reminiscent not only of Karl Barth under whom he studied in the 1930's but of the great American philosopher of religion Jonathan Edwards when he writes "God's internal glory is partly in his understanding, and partly in his will.... God communicates himself to the understanding of the creature, in giving him the knowledge of his glory; and to the will of the creature, in giving him holiness, consisting primarily in the love of God: and in giving the creature happiness chiefly consisting in joy in God." Edwards, referring to John 1:14, goes further to state that the first part of this glory is called truth, the latter grace. (Jonathan Edwards, Basic Writings (New York: New American Library, 1966), p.236. The distinction between intelligere and credere -- which many philosopher thinks important for clarifying man's relation to Being and God (see, e.g. Tillich's famous essay (To types of philosophy of Religion)) -- understanding of the communication of God's glory to the creature, see section IV.

thing's or human's mode of expressing in the world of "God." It cannot be merely "inherent" in things or humans. It is to be noted, particularly in this context, that Takizawa's "God" is not the religious ultimate as in the usual Christian sense, but the metaphysical ultimate (as mentioned in the introduction).

Each factual, atomic being is continuous with other beings (including its own future self) (1) insofar as it is factually and contingently situated "in" the limitation (or place, Basho in Japanese) given by the Lord, the subjective subject, and (2) insofar as it reflects in itself here-now the glory of the one absolute Lord -- who is and sees in secret (Mt. 6:6).⁹⁰ Takizawa's first thesis concerns the objective dimension of "continuity," and his second thesis its subjective dimension. But continuity as such, in Takizawa's opinion, is nothing other than the limitation, or Basho, of all beings including human beings, which he identifies with the Logos as the "Proto-factum Immanuel." (For Takizawa, "God" who is with us beings here-now, is, ultimately, not Basho but KamiSonomono (God as He is in (himself)). The here-now is the Basho).

90. See Takizawa, MUS., pp. 175-182

In any case, insofar as Takizawa's idea of "objective subject" as "the primordial structure of things (including human)"⁹¹ expresses in a two-fold way "continuity," it is comparable with Hartshorne's statement as follows: "The universality of order, and of creative freedom from order, are two expressions of the immanence of God whose attributes are the supreme values of the cosmic variables."⁹² One difference of Takizawa's idea from Hartshorne's is the fact that for Takizawa the objective or determinate nature of a thing is related to its an-sich relation (as the primary unity or the Proto-factum Immanuel) with the metaphysical ultimate, i.e., with God as He is in Himself, whereas for Hartshorne the universality of order (together with the ground of our trust in natural law) solely lies in God as the religious ultimate who "is nature, envisaged as rationally and concretely as man can envisage her,"⁹³ or who is "the unitary drives...by virtue of which the world is

91. Takizawa, Nishida Tetsugaku no Konpon Mondai (The Fundamental Problems of Nishida's Philosophy) Kyoto, Hozokan, 1972) pp.370-377.

92. Charles Hartshorne, Beyond Humanism (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1957) p.164. But we must be careful about the difference of Takizawa from Hartshorne, namely, that the former grasps objectivity and subjectivity as the expressions of "the one absolute Lord," who more akin to Whitehead's "creativity" than to Hartshorne's "God."

93. Hartshorne, BH, p.163, italics mine.

itself a living individual -- in this case a deathless (though not an unchanging!) one."⁹⁴ The other difference is the fact that the subjective or indeterminate nature of a thing is, for Takizawa, related to its für-sich relation (as the secondary unity) with the metaphysical ultimate, whereas the factor of creative action, real possibility, and an open future, for Hartshorne, is the expression of the immanence of God as "a supreme creativity in the world."⁹⁵ (As for a compartice study of Hartshorne's "God" and Takizawa's "Immanuel," see the last section.)

2. Quality of Feeling The pragmatic value inherent in each human praxis is not to be regarded as continuous all the time, as I have clarified above. Pragmatic historicists, like Dewey and present-day theologians of liberation, however, are not aware of the discreteness of a human event from other human events, including one's own future self. The act of becoming simply enjoys an intrinsic value in and for itself at the present moment. Of course, when we act ethically we intend to contribute some goodness, done by us here and now, to future events, but an intended instrumental value of our good will can never

94. Ibid.

95. Ibid., p.162

guarantee its real influence to future events. Future events must take care of themselves for themselves.

Here lies the necessity for deepening our thought regarding "continuity" further than a mere time-sequence and causality. Hartshorne's "immanence of God" and Takizawa's "Basho" are the concepts found for such a continuity deeper than human praxis as such.

Then, a new question arises: If our acts are to be found meaningful because they participate in the immanence of God at every present moment, how can or could they be conceptualized by us from the viewpoint of that immanence of God? How is the ideal value, essential to God's immanence, related to the conceptual value peculiar to our intellect? Our intellect works when we reflect upon our own action, or experience. Then, we say that experience is "good," or "pleasant," or "bad." But what guarantees such judgment as meaningful. Thus we come to the question of "quality of feeling."

It is, in this connection, important that Hartshorne criticizes several commentators (including John Dewey of the great panpsychist theoretician of "feeling quality," Charles Sanders Peirce, Hartshorne says they have tried to purify Peirce's theory of feeling quality from its psychic

aspects (by distinguishing between its "monadic" property and the special case when this quality is a quality of feeling), only to ruin Peirce's first category altogether.⁹⁶ First, what explains the existence of red or blue, in their view, is bare oneness, whereas the whole point of Peirce's endeavor, Hartshorne stresses, was to show "how such feelings are the basis of logical unity, not the reverse."⁹⁷ Second, these commentators, in Hartshorne's view, are contradicting Peirce's category of universal "thirdness" or continuity as the essence of the universal.⁹⁸ Hartshorne affirms with

96. Ibid., p. 185.

97. Ibid. Why an individual is predicatively connected with generals, is the logical problem. It is interesting to notice that here Hartshorne introduces his thesis of "feeling" as related to panpsychism, because I know a similar thesis by Takizawa who, since he wrote his first published paper entitled "Ippan gainen to kobutsu" (Generals and Individuals) in 1933, has assiduously been concerned with the same problem. Takizawa, in his recent paper "Jôdo shinshû to kirisutokyô" (Shin Buddhism and Christianity, 1974), takes up and explores that problem in terms of the Christian confession "Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God" in a comparative exploration into the logical character inherent in the Buddhist doctrine of Dharmakara Bodhisattva, or "causal Amida." Takizawa's thesis is called by him that of "basho" or the proto-factum Immanuel," or the "source point of human being."

98. Hartshorne, BH.

Peirce that quality, as a universal, can only be a continuum. We have already discussed how Hartshorne deals with the second point. Our next task in this section is to explore the first point.

Peirce, in this theory of categories, thinks that experience has the three basic aspects of feeling-quality, reaction or conflict and meaning. As for those three categories, Hartshorne holds that since existence (or experience) is an integration of three categories, it is feeling that has the more adequate constations.⁹⁹ He here finds one reason of Peirce's being a panpsychist. Furthermore, Hartshorne explains himself that there seems to be a distinction between quality and feeling, as due to the fact that "feeling" suggests the integration of the monadic category with the other two categories of reaction and meaning, whereas "quality" abstracts sharply from all relations.¹⁰⁰ refers to "whatever is continuous with (through whatever range of intermediaries) such sensory or effective predicates as red or sweet or painful or the feeling-quality of a human consciousness as a whole."¹⁰¹ A qualitative genus (like

99. Ibid., p.185.

100. Ibid., p.186.

101. Ibid., italics mine.

color) is a larger section of the continuum, a species (like red) a smaller slice of it. In any case, it is important for us to note that Hartshorne, primarily based upon his concept of "continuum," intends to deal with "the panpsychic extension of feeling to all things in so far as they are qualitative."¹⁰²

An actual entity, if it is to be itself, must be a particular. It cannot be a predicate, but a logical subject. But in order to "be," it must be situated "in" the continuum, the universal. Thus awareness of "it" appears as a two-fold phenomenon, namely, objectively as its prehension of "it" and subjectively as its feeling of the universal as related to "it." In this respect, Hartshorne is right when he states that "The direct object of awareness is participated in by awareness, and "colors" awareness (as feeling), so that its quality belong for the time being to two systems, the object's and the mind's"¹⁰³ If we, in our understanding of awareness, disconnect one system from the other, and consider either as isolated, we will fall into what

102. Ibid.

103. Ibid.

Hartshorne terms "an explanation of the concrete by the abstract."¹⁰⁴ (that is, not by the universal) -- the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness," as Whitehead calls it. Then we make "quality" either "bare oneness" or a "a bare word."¹⁰⁵

What is discussed above concerning Hartshorne's understanding of "feeling-quality" reminds me of Takizawa's explication of Nishida's philosophy of "Basho" as follows:

For instance, the judgment 'Red is a color' means that 'red,' as a particular of 'color,' is 'in' color. If a certain general is specialized, and yet it is considered to be 'in' the same general (at its last stage of encounter with a species), an extensive relation comes into existence. Reversely speaking, this means that red comes into existence as a self-limitation of color. The 'Basho' (place) in Nishida's philosophy means what contains individuals in itself as its self-limitation, the predicative general which makes individuals its own extension.¹⁰⁶

Of course, there is a crucial difference between Hartshorne and Takizawa, namely, that the former, in his idea of "the panpsychic extension of feeling to all things insofar as they are qualitative," refers to the equation of "qualities" with 'qualities of feeling,' whereas the latter, in what he calls "self-limitation of the general," refers to the distinction of

104. Ibid.

105. This is the common feature among pragmatic historicists, old and new.

106. Katsumi Takizawa Ippan Gainen to Kobutsu (Generals and Individuals 1933) (Kyoto; Hozokan, 1972), pp. 205-206

genus and species.

But inasmuch as Hartshorne, in his doctrine of "feeling," presupposes "feeling of feeling," ultimately that of God's in the sense that "God feels wicked feelings not as his own feelings but as his creatures'."¹⁰⁷ he recognizes as a universal phenomenon that the "objective form" of the experience is shared by the "subjective form" after the fact. That is, he recognizes a "self-limitation" of the divine feeling (as originally the "unity of opposites" or coincidental with creatures' self-causation) into the sympathizing with creatures' feeling. And this must be the true foundation for the panpsychic extension of feeling to all things.

If that is the case, Hartshorne's panpsychism is not necessarily alien to Takizawa's doctrine of "Basho." Furthermore, inasmuch as Takizawa states that "what truly is is extensive is not something like 'color' that loses its extensiveness, being a particular itself as compared with (more extensive generals), but the predicative general which can never be qualified logically-subjectively as a

107. Hartshorne, CSPM., p.241, But I ask, why is "feeling of feeling" metaphysically possible in the universe? That that is the nature and meaning of the divine immanence, doesn't provide any clarification of its ultimately metaphysical reason, distinct from the religious reason.

as a particular,"¹⁰⁸ his idea of "extensiveness" is extendable, like Hartshorne's "feeling," to all things in the universe.

At any rate, the conceptual value of a thing universally corresponds to its ideal value, in terms of "quality of feeling," or reversely seen, in terms of "self-limitation" of continuum. Here lies the possibility of logical unity, or the coincidence of words with facts.¹⁰⁹

3. Ethical Decision The third criticism of Dewey by Hartshorne deals with the former's argument that the basis of ethical decision is the total, unique, concrete situation, not some abstract rule.¹¹⁰ In fact Dewey, quite antagonistic to traditional religion's emphasis upon salvation of the personal soul and also to the utilitarian insistence upon private pleasure as the motive for action, finds that "the real object of all intelligent conduct" lies in "the idea that the stable and expanding institution of all things that make life worth while throughout all

108. Takizawa, Ippan Gainen to Kobutsu, p.206. Here the predicate "general" means for Takizawa basho as such.

109. The above-mentioned different procedures, between Takizawa and Hartshorne, of dealing with the same problem, i.e., the basis of logical unity, in my view, manifest their different view of "nature" in its supreme actuality, which will be discussed later.

110. Hartshorne, DR. p.125.

human relationships."¹¹¹ That is, Dewey seeks the intended (or vowed) instrumental value of morality. He seeks it apart from Being which is universal, fixed, and immutable,¹¹² but rather in view of the inherent uncertainty characteristic of practical activity.¹¹³

Hartshorne, however, criticizes Dewey's position because "man does not see the concrete situation, except with enormous and more or less willfully selected blind spots."¹¹⁴ How can Dewey prove that man is free from his pragmatic bias?

I can understand that Dewey in the above-mentioned thesis is motivated by a hatred of traditionalists' hypocrisy that they are devoted to intellectual certainty for its own sake although actually they want it to safeguard what they desire and esteem.¹¹⁵ But, I ask, is it truly because of the traditionalists' engagement in metaphysics (or philosophy, or theology) that they preserve "protection and prosperity in action"? I do not think so. I contend that Dewey's pragmatism is shallow insofar as he cannot grasp the traditionalists' ideology, as he describes it above, as resulting

111. Dewey, QC, p.31.

112. Ibid., p.7.

113. Ibid., p.6.

114. Hartshorne, DR, p.125.

115. Dewey, QC, p.39.

from their metaphysical failure. A better metaphysics leads Hartshorne to say the following:

There is no reason or motive for pursuing the good but the good itself. To know the end is to have all the motive there can be for seeking to actualize it. If, then, God is adequately aware of all actuality as actual and all possibility as possible, he has adequate motivation for seeking to actualize maximal possibilities of future value. There can be no ethical appeal beyond the decision of the one who in his decision takes account of all actuality and possibility.¹¹⁶

Here it is clearly stated the basis of the intended instrumental value. And because of his knowledge of that basis, Hartshorne can differentiate between two dimensions of that value, the divine and the human, when he states that (1) man needs the help of rules, adopted in moments of calm and disinterested reflection, to protect himself and others against the bias of his perceptions and inferences, whereas (2) God needs nothing but his perceptive grasp of the actual and potential experiences and interests, and the power of reaching a decision, any decision, taking account of what he perceives.¹¹⁷

But, it is to be asked, what kind of view of praxis (or historical experience) will one have if he or she lacks such knowledge? As for the point 1, he or she will regard,

116. Hartshorne, DR., pp.124-125.

117. Ibid., p.125.

like Dewey, "rules of morals" just as "forms of dependence."¹¹⁸
 And as for the point 2, he or she will agree with the Japanese historicist Tagawa when he says:

The power which is at once outside of oneself and within oneself, is history, but not 'origin' (as the fundamental source of human existence, or God). Until we come to realize this historical character of the basic power limiting human beings, we cannot fully posit our struggle against it. As long as one, like Takizawa, regards the power as 'origin,' he fails to find strength of overcoming his own present (alienated) situation.¹¹⁹

Tagawa, in the above attempts merely externally (only in his brain) to combine the factual or actual aspect and the axiological or possible aspect of the historical existence of human beings, as Takizawa critically answers to him.¹²⁰

Tagawa's theory is akin to Dewey's judgement that a demonstration that "Absolute Being already contains in eternal safety within itself all values" entails the consciousness of a "moral holiday."¹²¹ But such reasoning has been repudiated by Hartshorne (and Takizawa) as I have explicated thus far in this section.

To sum up, it has been studied in this section,

118. Dewey, QC., p.272.

119. Kenzo Tagawa, Hihanteki Shutai no Keisei: Kiristokyo Hihan no Gendaiteki Kadai (The Formation of Critical Mind: The present-day Task of Critique of Christianity) (Tokyo: Sanichi Shobo 1971) p.55.

120. Takizawa, MUS., p.217

121. Ibid. p.39.

first, that, as to the pragmatic value inherent in human praxis, (although Hartshorne agrees with Dewey that an idea, or belief has to be "livable," as is clear in my discussion in the previous section) Hartshorne criticizes Dewey's view of that value because the latter is unaware of the discreteness of each event of becoming from others, to the extent that he assumes continuity in human "acts." On the contrary, Hartshorne clarifies that truly continuous is the on-going society which is represented by the incoming actors subjectively and by the previous actors objectively. The present writer, however, suggests that Hartshorne differentiate the "on-going society" from the "immanence of God." Since he regards the "on-going society,"¹²² or the "social character of experience,"¹²³ or "experiential synthesis,"¹²⁴ the "temporal structure of experience" (i.e., transition),¹²⁵ as "becoming or creativity as creative synthesis" in the sense that "it puts together antecedent factors in a new unitary reality,"¹²⁶ since he understands this as a clarification of Bergson's notion of experiencing (human and non-

122. Hartshorne, CSPM., p.198.

123. Ibid., p.8

124. Ibid., p.3

125. Ibid., p.xxi.

126. Ibid., p.14

human) "as at once creative and preservative, and as in its becoming La realite' même,¹²⁷ and since he connects with this a theistic idea that "even God's creativity is his higher form of emergent experiential synthesis, or response to stimuli,"¹²⁸ to the extent that "He influences us supremely because he is supremely open to our influence." it seems to me that Hartshorne is thinking about the on-going society in terms of the immanence of God. In fact, for him, the universality of natural order, and of creative freedom from order, are two expressions of the "immanence of God!"¹²⁹ In contrast, the above suggestion is based upon Takizawa's thesis of "Basho," or the "Proto-factum Immanuel," in which it is the metaphysical ultimate (i.e., God as He is in Himself) who always coalesces into one body (as the Logos and the incarnate Logos) with particulars.

Second, it has been stated, as to the intrinsic value of present experience, that (although Hartshorne agrees with Dewey that creative synthesis in the universe

127. Ibid., p.xv.

128. Ibid., p. 12, italics mine.

129. Hartshorne, BH., p.164.

produces the undesigned furtherance of good in human life here-now) Hartshorne criticizes Dewey's view of that value because the latter cannot truly elucidate the secret of the logical unity inherent in the present experience, to the extent that he separates feeling-quality from quality. On the contrary, Hartshorne clarifies his panpsychism, namely, that feeling is extendable to all things in the universe, on the basis of "feeling of feeling" by God. The present writer compares Hartshorne's panpsychism with Takizawa's idea of the "self-limitation of the Basho."

Third, it has been stated, as to the intended instrumental value of an ethical decision, that (although Hartshorne agrees with Dewey that the emergence of value is attributable to "the co-working of men plus more general factors") Hartshorne criticizes Dewey's view of that value because the latter fears any exploration into God, as antagonistic to the uncertainty inherent in praxis. On the contrary, Hartshorne shows that the basis of ethical decision lies in the good itself, God; if one fails to store in time of speculation such a knowledge as expressed in moral rules, he or she cannot escape from his or her pragmatic bias in time of action. It is in this connection that Takizawa's criticism of Tagawa appears similarly important.

From the perspective of theological eschatology, the above three points are concerned with three components of the Kingdom of God: (1) discipleship, (2) grace and (3) love. The kingdom of God means, first, the call to discipleship, without giving in advance any verification of its truth or trustworthiness; immediate following of Jesus is the only chance of verification. It means second, the grace of God, or the fact that God feeds and clothes the creatures day by day; God's sympathy or responsive love for the creatures is the secret factor of each present life. It means, third, that "he who loves is born of God and knows God."

III. THEISM VERSUS HUMANISM

Dewey, in his thesis B, considers the creative process as a "natural process" in the sense that it endures and advances with the life of humanity to the extent that it can be "both accelerated and purified through elimination of that irrelevant element that culminates in the idea of the supernatural." His idea of "natural process" intermingled with the life of humanity, I think, corresponds in a sense to Royce's concept of "community" (in The Problem of Christianity). And it is interesting to know that Hartshorne highly

appreciates Royce's concept (in the Preface of Creative Synthesis & Philosophic Method), though he criticizes Royce in that Royce failed to see clearly that "there are some mutually external experiences."¹³⁰

130. Hartshorne, CSPM., p.xii. Royce's famous text is as follows: "The universe, if my thesis is right, is a realm which is through and through dominated by social categories. Time, for instance, expresses a system of essentially social relation. The present interprets the past to the future. At each moment of time the results of the whole world's history up to that moment are, so to speak, summed up and passed over to the future for its new deeds of creation and of interpretation. I state this principle here in a simply dogmatic form, and merely as an example of what I have in mind when I say that the system of metaphysics which is needed to define the constitution of this world of interpretation must be the generalized theory of an ideal society. Not the self, not the Logos, not the One and not the Many, but community will be ruling category of such a philosophy." Josiah Royce, The Philosophy of Josiah Royce (New York: Crowell, 1971, p.389. Hartshorne's critique is justifiable. In the Whiteheadian terms, continuity is related to what is potentia; whereas actuality is "incurably atomic." In this respect, Royce is one-sided in his neglect of the principle that, so far as physical relations are concerned, "contemporary events happen in causal independence of each other." (Whitehead, PR, p.95.) Here from a Japanese point of view) lies the importance of Takizawa's concept of "factual being" (Jijitsu sonzai or l' être-en-soi which is incommensurable with pure "intuition" l' être-nour-soi) or interpretation. In this connection, Dewey's following words in A common Sense are rather misleading: "The things in civilisation we most prize are not of ourselves. They exist by grace of the doings and sufferings of continuous human community in which we are a link" (p.87). True, as he contends, ours is the responsibility of conserving, transmitting, rectifying and expanding the heritage of values we have received from our predecessors. But I cannot, like him, believe that "Here are all the elements for a religious faith that shall not be confined to sect, class or race" (Ibid. italics mine.) He is only partially right.

But, as is also clear in thesis B, Dewey is a radical anti-supernaturalist. In this respect, he discloses his humanistic hope of keeping the vital factors within the limit of the natural so as to gain an incalculable reinforcement. This hope is inseparably connected with his idea of "God" in thesis C. He names "an active relation between ideal and and actual" God. This naming corresponds to his differentiation of "the religious" from religions (See Chapter 1, "Religion Versus the Religious," In A Common Faith). In this section I will show how Hartshorne responds to, or repudiates, Dewey's humanistic naturalism which is not mysteriously, atheistic.

A. The Possibility of Praxis

I have already discussed to a certain degree the problem of praxis in terms of value. Hartshorne's theory of praxis, as far as I can see, culminates in his concept of "peace," which is the embodiment of what I call "vowed" instrumental value. Transcendence of egotism at the present moment, while striving to fulfill divine purpose for the future, is the characteristic of "peace." The problem I want to discuss and solve in this section is: to what extent the possibility of such praxis is internal to Harshorne's theism,

and to what extent Dewey's humanism is responsible for Hartshorne's criticism.

In Chapter Three of his Beyond Humanism, "Dewey's Philosophy of Religion," Hartshorne starts his discussion with a comment on the paradoxical character of religious consciousness, that it, the tension which it involves between the finite and the infinite. It is, then, his contention that there is a natural tendency for men to seek escape from religion as thus mentioned. He writes: They do this in two opposite ways: by trying to escape from their human sense of finitude through mystical illusion of absolute oneness with God, or by trying to obliterate their no less human consciousness of the infinite."¹³¹ The first is the standpoint of traditional theology while the second, in Hartshorne's view, is best represented by Dewey's A Common Faith.

Hartshorne accepts Dewey's quite interesting contention that atheism, like traditional theology, is lacking in appreciation of the fact that without nature we could do nothing. In this respect, Dewey's concept of "natural piety" which Dewey insists, the atheist lacks is significant

131. Hartshorne, BH., p.39.

to Hartshorne, too, but only insofar as it means panpsychism, because then, "there is a fairly obvious reason for suspecting that it also means a kind of theism, though not the kind Dewey is explicitly opposing."¹³² Here we can see another philosophical expression of what the first original modern Japanese philosopher Nishida called "the self-limitation of the general" which we have discussed earlier referring to Takizawa's study of Nishida. (See II, B,2) For Hartshorne, in any case, Dewey's rather naive position can be formulated as: "Crudely, God is simply nature as serviceable to man."¹³³

But, I ask, can Hartshorne by so saying, fully repudiate Dewey's considerably persuasive argument on the "naturalness" of purposive action, that, of morality? Dewey thinks and hails the newer tendencies in science as favorable to its recognition. As long as the Newtonian science, with its dogmatic assertion that purposes have no real part in natural process, at least below the human level, was firmly held, Dewey rightly observes, a dichotomy between human and non-human nature favored supernaturalism. But since above the actualities of nature there are the "unrealized but realizable possibilities of nature," that is, ethical

132. Ibid., p.41, italics mine.

133. Ibid., p.39.

adventure by men and women, the God of supernaturalism as an actual individual endowed with perfection is, for Dewey, simply the vicious identification of the possible and the actual. To these words of Dewey, Hartshorne seems to have no objection. Rather, insofar as he does not hesitate to accept as rightful insistence such an argument of Dewey's as that "Moral and religious faith are not so much in what is, as in what, through our action, might be,"¹³⁴ or as that "To destroy this 'might be' character of the ideal is to cut the nerve of action,"¹³⁵ Hartshorne, too, seems to see the possibility of praxis along the same line as Dewey does. Then, what is the true difference of Hartshorne's theism from Dewey's humanism?

Hartshorne's final position is this:

Dewey is a shrewd critic of the human lust for absolute knowledge. But the "quest for certainty," as the cowardly search for life without risk, is one thing; while the quest for assurance that there is a minimal significance to the brave facing of risk -- and all life when well lived -- is another thing. The one is cowardice or madness, as you choose. The other is merely rationality the intelligent understanding of the implication of courage.¹³⁶

The "livable" aspect of the pragmatic value of experiences

134. Ibid., p.41

135. Ibid.

136. Ibid., p.44

was prized and explored by Dewey, but not the "verifiable" aspect in its deepest sense -- that is, in the sense of the verifiability of faith in God, or worshipability. As Hartshorne rightly states he or she is most religious who is certain of but one thing, the world-embracing love of God.¹³⁷ True as Hortshorne affirms, everything else we can take chance on; everything else, including human's relative significance in the world, is mere probability. But that does not mean that God's love is an unchanging certainty, but rather an always developing compassion. Moreover, it is itself a courageous "superjective" movement of God in prayer toward the universal of universals for every creature -- qualifying thereby the transcendent creativity in the various temporal instances. It is itself a "superjective" process of "pros ton theon" (John 1:1) which includes the primordial and the consequent natures of God, and creatures, as one in harmony. Always praying, always groaning, and always petitioning, the whole universe thus moves toward the universal of universals. Therefore, faith as the quest for assurance is to be sought not as an observing reasoning but as a praying participating exploration into creativity,

137. Ibid., p.42.

lured and sympathized by God. Its verifiability only lies in this movement.

To the present writer it is extremely interesting, in this context, that Hartshorne discloses his position as "temporalistic" and admits "open possibilities for the future," saying: "Human choice may then make a difference to God as the action of a man's cells make a difference to the man."¹³⁸ His concept of "analogy" between a human's cells, human, and God in terms of "action" is typically indicative to his theistic naturalism in regard to morality.

138. Ibid., p.42. This view of God by Hartshorne is unacceptable to some ontological philosophers such as Tillich and his exponent Smith who states that we must speak of the "reality" or the "being" of God rather than of "existence." See John E. Smith, Experience and God (London: Oxford University Press, 1968) p.119 and Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology (Chicago University of Chicago Press, 1951) I, 205. As for a critical discussion on the existence of God in the theology of Tillich, Robert R. N. Ross, "The Non-Existence of God: Tillich, Aquinas, and The Pseudo-Dionysius," Harvard Theological Review, LXVIII, (April 1975) is illuminative. In any case, if the non-existence of God is approved, some "media"-- the person of Christ, history and the Bible -- through which it is possible that an otherwise non-sensible reality might be disclosed to man," as Smith demands, become necessary (Smith, p.71). But the crucial question is, Are such media not uprooted from and indifferent to the human self at its base?

I have once attempted a similar kind of concept, i.e., analogia actionis as to how to understand the relationship of the action of Jesus of Nazareth to the risen and proclaimed Christ.¹³⁹ My major concern then was to distinguish that new concept from Barth's concept of analogia fidei which he radically dissociated from the Roman catholic concept analogia entis. Barth was right insofar as he criticized that the reasoning about the existent as such is not in its own right extendable to the knowledge of God. But I insisted, he was wrong insofar as he, in his concept of "analogia fidei" which was defined by him as "man's conformity with God which takes place in faith, and the 'point of contact' with the word of God posited in this conformity," occurring as "the sole work of the actual grace of God,"¹⁴⁰ included Jesus of Nazareth, or Jesus as Jesus (to borrow Tillich's term), in the prevenient object, that is, the Christ. It was my contention

139. Analogia Actionis Proposed as a contribution to a solution of the issue "Jesus and the Christ" (unpublished, December 1977), originally written and read in Japanese at the symposium held by the Evangelism Research Institute of the Kyoden (UCC, Japan), on January 27-28, 1970.

140. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, (Edinburgh: Clark, 1931), I/1, p.280.

that Jesus, as Jesus, was himself a responding figure to the Christ who was inseparable from his existence, or the "hidden core"¹⁴¹ of his personality. My conclusion there was, therefore, that Jesus as Jesus, in his salvific action, loved and suffered as an contingent person; his freedom was not that of non posse peccare but that of posse non peccare.

From my point of view as thus reviewed, Hartshorne's statement that "His (God's) future enjoyment will thus be partially contingent upon our action"¹⁴² is agreeable to me, in terms of the relationship of Jesus' action to the Christ. But this understanding of Jesus' action and (therefore) of action in general is incomplete unless we can fully refer to "intelligence in action." And intelligence is, as Hartshorne says (against Dewey), essentially "the power to generalize beyond the mere finite (as, for example, in mathematics), so that it can hardly make a satisfactory religion to conceive of human ideals as referring to a merely finite future."¹⁴³ Here, I think, Hartshorne hits the mark.

141. Katsumi Takizawa, Seisho no Iesu to Gendai no Shii (The Biblical Jesus and Thinking for Today), (Tokyo: Shinkyō Shuppanshū, 1965) p.112.

142. Hartshorne, BH., p.42

143. Ibid., p.43.

In the present writer's terms, the possibility of praxis now appears as the problem of "analogia actionis." That is, it now matters how and why action can be subjectively or conceptually related to the prevenient object, God. I, thus, agree with Hartshorne that "he is most religious who is certain of but one thing, the world-embracing love of God."¹⁴⁴

In this connection, it is very important for us in the discussion about the possibility of praxis that Hartshorne distinguishes the "quest for assurance" that there is a minimal significance to the brave facing of risk from "quest for certainty," the cowardly search for a life without risk. Under the former expression Hartshorne understands "the intelligent understanding of the implication of courage,"¹⁴⁵ which represents an ideal which cannot be identified with mere possibility. The latter expression as Dewey ironically explains in detail in his Quest for Certainty, is cowardice or madness.

Now the problem is how to find, in the midst of risk action, the "significance, consciousness and ideals" which

144. Ibid., p.44.

145. Ibid.

are "more than marks of the human."¹⁴⁶ Since Dewey sees no reason for believing them, his conclusion is that the part cannot swallow the whole.¹⁴⁷ That is, he finds no "conceptual" analogy of praxis to the universe. Therefore, it is very much crucial for Dewey's pragmatism to be given such a question by Hartshorne as: How can a universe devoid as a whole of consciousness or significance be "carried forward" by the consciousness of some of its parts? or, How, being as a whole without value, can it gain value from the parts? or, How can the universe, as it is not a volitional being, "do" anything in the sense here relevant?¹⁴⁸

In contrast, inasmuch as his panpsychism breaks through egotistic theism which sees the function of the "powerful god" as primarily bending the world to our wishes, and also it breaks through Dewey's pragmatic wish for a unity with the universe, Hartshorne rather can state that "our satisfaction can form part of a cosmic good that is

146. John Dewey, Experience and Nature (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1925), p.418.

147. Ibid.

148. Hartshorne, BH., p. 45.

lasting.¹⁴⁹ Not as a mere means to our life, he goes further to say, is the divine life to be thought of, but as a superior life to which we can also be "in the relation of means."¹⁵⁰ Thus, Hartshorne's analogy is that of service of "lower life to "higher."

Furthermore, a man's service is because of his feeling that he is understood by someone who is an all-understanding being, being everlastingly actual. (The attainment of complete sympathy and appreciation would contradict the conditions of human life as such. Hence, humanism cannot know the concept of "service" in its most authentic sense.) Thus Hartshorne's conceptual analogy to the universe expresses itself as that of sympathy and appreciation in the sense that "a very deep aspiration of men and women to be able to feel that they are now completely understood, not necessarily, indeed not possibly, by other human beings, but by someone,"¹⁵¹ now becomes valid.

Hartshorne's understanding of the possibility of praxis, vis-a-vis that of Dewey's as thus explicated, is best elaborately concluded in the following:

149. Ibid.
 150. Ibid., pp.45-46.
 151. Ibid., p.47.

(1) Dewey is greatly, and justifiably, concerned about the failure of traditional religion to enter wholeheartedly upon the task of social amelioration. He believes that super-naturalism turns attention away from the "values that inhere in the actual connections of human beings with one another" or from "the sweep and depth of the implications of natural human relation."

(2) To hold that his ideal is based upon the actuality of a perfect understanding is not at all to fall into the error, so properly condemned by Dewey, of destroying the meaning of the ideal as that which we might accomplish. For here is one ideal that could never correspond to actuality -- unless there exists a God.¹⁵³

The first thesis shows that he endorses Dewey's understanding of the possibility of praxis which is connected with a bitter criticism of traditional theism. The second thesis, however, expresses his own understanding of the possibility of praxis which resulted in a critique of the limitation and the narrowness of Dewey's humanistic naturalism. Although he, with Dewey, recognizes that "the divorce of God from nature, of spirituality from materiality, found in some forms of theism has undoubtedly worked havoc with orthodox ethics,"¹⁵⁴ Hartshorne, as a theist himself, does not hesitate to declare that the new theism rejects such theism.

From the perspective of theological eschatology,

152, Ibid., p.50.

153. Ibid., p.47.

154. Ibid., p.50.

it is important that the above discussion provides an authentic basis for worship, or service to God, because God in His consequent, concrete nature is the supreme sympathy with the feeling of the creatures, especially with our human beings' experiment in praxis; His sympathy is the ground of praxis. The eternal divinity is not something self-sufficient in its creative work, but rather never escapes the conditions of the temporal world consisting of the creatures' creative praxis. Thus, Protestantism which holds the doctrine of the justification or salvation by faith alone, should now proceed to affirm "the salvation in praxis," which only can replace meaningfully the "salvation by work."

B. God or Nature

What the present writer has elucidated in the previous section of Hartshorne's understanding of the possibility of praxis, has, in his view, mutatis mutandis, some correlation to what Hartshorne says about the beauty of the creatures:

The value of the world does not reside merely in there being a single perfect understanding of the individuals in that world (1), but also in the aesthetic richness arising from the variety and intensity of the experiences of those individuals (b).¹⁵⁵

155. Ibid., p.47.

Here Hartshorne is still discussing ethical matters. In the previous sentence, for instance, he refers to the perfection of God naturally conceived as an absolute only in terms of one dimension of value, and to another dimension in terms of which there is no absolute maximum, but only an inexhaustible opportunity of improvement. But if the text is read as it is, it has an intrinsic meaning distinct -- albeit inseparable -- from the ethical connotation. In other words, the relation between (a) the natural perfection of God (cherishing the value of the world) and (b) the aesthetic richness (arising from the variety and intensity of the experiences of those individuals) is not to be restricted within the limit of the human world but to be extended to the sub-human world.

Of course, we have to be careful in seeing the difference between humans and animals. For, as Hartshorne contends, all animals are subject to aesthetic good and evil, but not to ethical good and evil. It is only humans who can be ethically good in the sense that one considers future consequences "not only for oneself and mate, offspring, or other herd members, but impartially for individuals generally, and even in principle for species generally,"¹⁵⁶

156. Hartshorne, CSPM. p.309.

Although other terrestrial animal can be "intentionally useful" to¹⁵⁷ others of their kind, or even to a member of another species. But if it is right, for Hartshorne, to say that the ethical good is not only inapplicable to some animals, but that it is not applicable in the same sense to deity, it is also equally right to grasp the value of the world simply (and primarily) in terms of aesthetics, namely as an analogical relationship of the aesthetic richness (b) to the natural perfection of God (a). It is in this connection, in my view, that Hartshorne talks about deus sive natura following Spinoza.

As is clear in the discussion above, Hartshorne's analogy of human praxis to God is not incompatible with another analogy of the beauty of the creatures to God, beautifully expressed by him as follows: "God, I hold, is an artist fostering and loving the beauty of the creatures, the harmonies and intensities of their experiences, as data for his own."¹⁵⁸ Thus, the heart of Christendom, which Hartshorne see as deus est caritas, as taught by Jesus, is consistently brought together with the intellect of Spinoza.

157. Ibid.

158. Ibid.

He, therefore, thinks it his fortune that he no longer has to choose between Spinoza and Jesus inasmuch as "the reasons which prevented Spinoza from regarding nature not only as God but as the God of love," in his view, can be proved as erroneous in the light of the new science and the new logic, Whitehead's philosophy as uniquely elucidated by him as "panentheism."

But is this new logic acceptable to Dewey? No, insofar as he assumes that, when God is brought in by traditionalists to explain the human being as being different from the rest of nature, only a supernatural explanation of him or her is possible. But quite important to our discussion here, his assumption is baseless, since he is not articulate enough in his view of nature to recognize that, in terms of the principle of continuity, or the supreme law of rationality (which he also accepts), (1) every individual in nature is in some degree akin to the human being either as inferior or as superior; (2) nature as a whole, as the inclusive individual, can only be conceived as superior, and this in a maximal sense.¹⁵⁹ That is, Dewey has to think the new logic not in terms of supernaturalism but in terms of panpsychism, i.e., in terms of the self-limitation of

159. Cf. Hartshorne, BH, p.50, italics mine.

the general (to refer to Nishida's concept again). Hartshorne's panpsychism, very interestingly, here expresses itself as a "conceptual analogy" to God or nature and its beauty, in the present writer's terms. In any case, Dewey, as Hartshorne critically shows, is confusedly antagonistic to theism because of what in reality is a "radical corruption"¹⁶⁰ of theism.

But since Dewey cannot attack the true weaknesses of traditional naturalism, Hartshorne then goes further to argue, Dewey fails to see the danger that "something which participated in the partiality of my ego is held -- without full recognition of the fact -- to be the only standard by which that partiality may be judged."¹⁶¹ Fleeing the divine tyranny, humanism may only be appalled by other tyrannies which take its place, i.e., a philosophical system and the group tyranny which together with other evils contained in (albeit neither intended nor caused by) the cosmic reality are in Hartshorne's view, "in spite of this (cosmic) meaning, not because of it."¹⁶²

Hartshorne here is really sharp and precise in his

160. Ibid.

161. Ibid., p.53

162. Hartshorne, CSPM, p.317.

view of the historical dynamics of humanism. People's humanistic enthusiasm for social amelioration have often degraded into a group tyranny when they took hold of the hegemony of a community, or a nation. But that such degradation is in spite of cosmic meaning, not because of it, is the truth which is always going on beyond the degradation. Therefore, we can hope against a hope which has become an ideology.

And hope is always connected with a deep, vivid interest in what is in the universe. Therefore, men and women of hope assiduously study nature philosophically and scientifically. On the contrary, humanists like Dewey, as Hartshorne recognizes, have "no eager delight and no burning passion to penetrate her (nature's) secrets"¹⁶³ with all their mild sense of her grandeur and fascination.

For Dewey, nature as a whole need not be supposed conscious, to the extent that he has sought to lead people from supernaturalism to a "not too egregiously atheistic naturalism."¹⁶⁴ It is, however, Hartshorne's humorous appreciation of Dewey to state, concerning a subtle, a rather paradoxical, relationship of process philosophy to pragmatism: It is possible that, somewhat indirectly at least, he

163. Ibid., p.56

164. Ibid.

may prove a principal creator of what may appear as the twentieth century's supreme theoretical discovery -- theistic naturalism (or more correctly, panentheism -- which is a more elaborate and recent expression of his position).¹⁶⁵

The present writer knows no better conclusion of our discussion in this section than Hartshorne's elaborate critique of both Dewey and supernaturalism, in these words:

Dewey and traditionalists agree in giving pantheism short shrift. Either God alone or nature alone appears to be the choice. Again, there is a third position, we may agree with Dewey that there be no extra-natural being, and yet hold that there must be in nature a being not only higher than others, but in some aspects the highest possible, the supreme or maximal being--supreme, in temporal endurance and in power to embrace within itself the content and value of the beings. This supreme natural being is nature herself, taken not distributively, but as an integrated individual.¹⁶⁶

Thus, eschatology now penetrates into the deepest structure of the universe. From the viewpoint of theistic naturalism as thus explored by Hartshorne, Moltmann's famous "category of resurrection" should be radically

165. Ibid. In the Preface to the Bison Book Edition Hartshorne says he is a supernaturalist (VIII). and no longer tries to call himself a naturalist.

166. Ibid., p.57.

remodeled. Moltmann writes: "The resurrection of Christ does not mean a possibility with the world and its history, but a new possibility altogether for the world, for existence and for history."¹⁶⁷ In contrast, we can say that the resurrection of Christ means a radical manifestation of the always new possibility of the supreme natural being, God. Fundamentally, hope does not come primarily from the resurrection of Christ, but from a deeper dimension of reality, i.e., the general possibility of newness, which Paul expressed as this: "...if there is no resurrection of the dead (in principle, then Christ has not been raised" (I Cor. 15: 13, 16).

IV. CONCLUSIONS:

FROM A JAPANESE POINT OF VIEW:

TAKIZAWA AND TAGAWA ON PRAXIS

Hartshorne is quite sensitive to the major concern among pragmatist, as most typically manifested by Dewey, that "might be" character of human praxis was overlooked by traditional theology, with its notion of God as in which all values are eternally actualized, or as sheer

167. Jürgen Moltmann, Theology of Hope (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), p.179.

power without passivity and without change, to the extent that the temporal struggle of men and women with evil was made unintelligible altogether. Such a concern at present is also found among many sincere thinkers and practioners all over the world (especially in the Third World countries) striving for the liberation of people. In this sense, Hartshorne's critique of Dewey's humanistic naturalism may have a world-wide significance. Have the assiduous and humanistic enthshiasm for the transformation of society attempted by Latin American, Black, feminist, and ecologist theologians of liberation have been successful in providing a rightful basis for their ethics?

The answer to this question may depend upon their ability to break through the framework of supernaturalism in such a way that the realization of all values in a supreme value in God, does not, as Dewey feared, lead to the neglect of ordinary values in their rich diversity and to the importance of actualizing such values.

The present write has discussed in this chapter the fact that Dewey's humanistic naturalism, although it agrees with Hartshorne's naturalistic theism in affirming the pragnatic, intrinsic, and intended instrumental, values in human praxis, cannot show the true philosophical

foundations for those values, which Hartshorne clarifies respectively as (1)"continuum" which is nothing other than "on-going society" or "immanence of God" (this equation will be critically discussed later by the present writer), (2) "panpsychism" as ultimately supported by God's "feeling of feeling"; and as (3) the good itself, God. Thus, Hartshorne's theism is not, as Dewey suspects, incompatible with the assiduous, courageous struggle for social amelioration to the extent that an analogia actionis, in the present writers terms, becomes available, not only in the sense as related to praxis but also to intelligence and beauty.

Human praxis, for Hartshorne, plunges into "open possibilities for the future," making an important difference to God. Human intelligence stands in the relation of service to God's complete sympathy and understanding. Human exploration into nature philosophically, scientifically, and aesthetically expresses itself as an eager delight and burning passion to penetrate her secrets, inspired by the idea that nature as a whole is conscious.

In sum, Hartshorne, by thus repudiating Dewey's fear that theism might deprive a human praxis of its courageous "might be" character, challenges any pragmatic thinker including the liberation theologian of today. It is the

present writer's strong contention that process philosophy/theology, as manifested by the grand works of Hartshorne, greatly contributes to the necessary transformation of today's pragmatism all over the world, lest it fall into "group tyranny," fleeing "the divine tyranny" peculiar to traditional theism. This I say especially in view of another cultural context of the problem in the Far East with which I am familiar.

There was also in Japan a heated debate on the same problem of the possibility of praxis exchanged between Takizawa and Tagawa, as I have occasionally mentioned earlier.¹⁶⁸ This debate was not affected either by Hartshorne or by Dewey; it was therefore an independent and parallel event in the Far East. Tagawa in 1971 published a book entitled Hihanteki Shutai no Keisei (The Formation of A Critical Mind). In this book Tagawa critically discussed

168. This debate first occurred in the conference on "Genten Ron o Megutte" (On the Philosophy of Origin), Summer 1970, in Takarazuka City, Japan, held under the auspices of the radical ministers' federation, Jibokuren. The present writer proposed and named the Jibokuren, and was also responsible for the conference, in the executive position of the Kyodan (United Church of Christ in Japan). This paper is written in the sincere hope that it may theologically contribute to the genuine transformation of the Kyodan.

Takizawa's position known as the philosophy of "Origin." The term "origin," genten in Japanese, is used here as meaning the intersection of coordinates axes, applied to the fundamental problem of the human being. Takizawa, often talks about the "origin" of the human being, ningen no genten in Japanese.) The main points of Tagawa's critique are:

(1) Takizawa's thesis of 'origin' of the human being is self-contradictory in that it produces keen insight into the actual problems and sincere struggles with them, but it is narrow in its adherence to a supreme point (genten can also be translated as 'original point.'). Takizawa rightly states that one must see the actual problems at their roots, but not superficially. But since the origin, or radix, of the human being is itself history, we have to deal with it only in terms of history.¹⁶⁹

(2) It is simply indicative of the narrowness of Takizawa's concept of 'origin' that Takizawa thereby is concerned for maintaining religion (this counter revolutionary element). It might be supposed, judging from the fundamental merit inherent in his thesis of

169. Tagawa, PTCC, pp.46-47.

'origin.' that he criticizes a religious attitude that keeps religion as a special sphere of human activities. But his theory gave rise to a kind of 'religious revival' in the late 60's while 'student power' which he once advocated, declined.¹⁷⁰

(3) Only by grasping as 'history' the fundamental part of our lives can we resist evil actualities. It is true to say that an individual subject is totally determined by the outer elements or forces of history (i.e., "Unterbau"). But it is likewise true to say the subjective self can commit itself freely in forming history. Our negative question to the world is thereby the basic energy for action. It was partly because of the validity of his approach in this historical aspect that Takizawa was able to recognize in 'student power' breaking out in 1968 and 1969 that a question from the 'origin,' and toward the 'origin,' was operative.¹⁷¹

It is very interesting to notice in Criticism 1 that Takizawa's theory of 'origin' of the human being which (in Hartshornean terms) concentrates all values in a supreme value, in God, while at the same time realizing ordinary values in their rich diversity, seems to Tagawa simply to be

170. Ibid., p.51.

171. Ibid., p.56

"self-contradictory." Tagawa, thus, introduces the concept of "history" so as to overcome that self-contradiction. But inasmuch as it is quite clear that he, in the concept of "history," wants to express his unwillingness to refer to a supreme value as the radix of the human beings (and at once, of all creatures), he cannot show any definite integrating point of history. In contrast, Takizawa, in his Watashi no daigaku tōsō (My University Struggle, 1972) answering to Tagawa's critique, clarifies that the "origin" of the human being implies at once the self-expressing point (or perspective) in the human being of the truly eternal, freely operative God and (in an absolutely irreversible distinction) the same expressing point of God by the human being.¹⁷² In this sense, Takizawa's God is at once necessary and contingent (like Hartshorne's God), but only in the one real point contact, or unity, or "concrecence" of God and the human being, that is, in the "origin" of the human being. Therefore, Takizawa contends that it is impossible for the human being not to be operative, expressive, and creative; the formation of the "origin" of the human being and the appearance of historical actualities are simultaneous (or coter-

172. Takizawa, MUS., pp. 182-183.

minous).¹⁷³ There is not mere problem of the "origin" and history, or being and action (concomitant with value), separate from each other.

Tagawa, in his View 2, is antagonistic to Takizawa's theism. But Takizawa, in a critical reply to him, affirms that we have to distinguish a reasonable effort for clarifying in the religious sphere of human activities its necessary essence and its contingent actualities, from a fundamental perversion of replacing the "origin" of the human being with particular religious achievements.¹⁷⁴ To reject religion in any sense of the word, in Takizawa's view, must lead to the neglect of the supremely solemn and gracious fact that all of us, both supernaturalists and radical critics of religion, are equally humans, and, hence to an extreme pride and hypocrisy.¹⁷⁵

To Tagawa's Criticism 3, Takizawa in his turn raises a critical question. If he means by the concept of "history" that each individual person is totally determined (by the

173. Ibid. The original Japanese expression for "simultaneous or conterminous" is "Kanpatsu o Itezu" literally meaning "directly," "immediately" or "without any delay."

174. Ibid., p.204.

175. Ibid., pp.203-209.

mechanic forces in the substructure), determined, whence can he as such a person draw his responsible energy for negating evil actualities in history?¹⁷⁶ This is an unanswerable question for Tagawa since he is skeptical about the existence of what Hartshorne calls "the supreme interest in men and women,"¹⁷⁷ or "the supreme participating sympathy,"¹⁷⁸ or "a worthy object of devotion,"¹⁷⁹ "a (perfect) preserver of values once realized,"¹⁸⁰ -- which Takizawa names the "origin" of the human being.

Takizawa, in his concept of "origin of the human being," distinguishes three dimensions as follows:

- (1) 'I' am, fundamentally speaking, an object, a thing,

176. Takizawa's question reminds me of Whitehead's "protest against the exclusion of value from the essence of matter of fact, "which he develops in the fifth chapter of Science and the Modern World endorsing the nature-poetry of the romantic revival as "a protest against the traditions on behalf of the organic view of nature." Value is the word he uses for the intrinsic reality of an event. See Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York: Free Press, 1953), pp.75-94.
 177. Hartshorne, BH., p.54
 178. Ibid.
 179. Ibid., p.57.
 180. Ibid.

an extreme point in the universe situated 'in' the origin and thereby united with God by God, but what is usually called a 'free subject,' as isolatedly-abstractly assumed by Western individualism.

(2) But, only as such a 'thing (i.e., not apart from the thing's nature as such, but conterminous with it),' 'I' can truly be a 'free subject,' that is, 'I' am determined to be operative in a unique way, distinct from all animals, i.e., to be "selective," always asked by God to be right and precise in 'my' knowledge of God, judged if wrong.

(3) the above-mentioned two dimensions of 'I' inherent in the 'origin' of 'I' come into existence only insofar as 'I' am an object 'of' and 'in,' the Absolute, Invisible Subject.¹⁸¹

Takizawa understands these three dimension of "origin of the human being" as correlative to the triple structure of "thing consisting of (1) the fact of existence of finite things, (2) the character of things of being the points-of-expression of God, (3) Thereby related to God as he is in Himself.¹⁸²

As is clear in his discussion above, Takizawa finds no fundamental difference, in terms of primordial ontological

181. Takizawa, MUS., p.175.

182. Ibid., 179.

structure, between humans and the rest of the creatures. Things involve in themselves humans. In this sense, his standpoint might be called "panameterialism." But insofar as things are the points-of-expression of God and in this nature of things lies the true reason for the human being to appear as the conscious, selective, and creative subject in a unique way, distinct from all animals, at the final stage of evolution, his position is not alien to Hartshorne's "panpsychism."

Takizawa in another place, referring to Nishida's statement that "we live, therefore we think," reasons that human thinking and action have developed from sub-human creatures' perceptions and activities, and, furthermore, that an animal's eyes and legs have arisen from the world of things.¹⁸³ But in so saying he never means that human thinking and praxis are "latent" in things. Rather, he thinks that since the actual things are through and through both temporally and spatically limited, and therefore contingently here-now, discrete from all there-thens, they contain in themselves nothing hidden or latent, that is, they are substanceless.¹⁸⁴

183. Takizawa, Ippan Gainen to Kobutsu, pp.370-372.

184. Ibid., pp.372-373.

According to Takizawa, that which is absolutely limited limits itself. The truly actual, historical time proceed that from the fact that the limited present limits itself. That the which is created creates in the sense as thus explicated, seems to be contradictory."¹⁸⁵ But such, for Takizawa following Nishida, is the nature of reality. The absolute contradiction, or the unity of opposites, is itself reality; here in the absolutely contradictory, self-identification of a thing lies the nature of reality as causa sui.¹⁸⁶

For Takizawa, that things historically develop into sub-human creatures, and then into humans, never means that that which created ceases being created, nor does it mean that the primordial limitedness of a thing as created, becomes obscure but rather, more and more explicit. Created things, from their own standpoint, proceed to "express themselves" as created more and more explicitly, which is the true meaning of the statement that "things work, or create."¹⁸⁷

185. Ibid., p.373.

186. Ibid., "Causa sui" is my translation of the original Japanese expression "shinni sore jishinni votte tatsu" (truly standing by itself)

187. Ibid., p.375.

The self-expression of a thing, as thus explicated, never means for Takizawa that a spatial thing latently involves in itself time, but that a spatial thing, actually speaking, is in an irreversible, irreparable stream of the cosmic time. Time is the first clear manifestation of the fact that a spatial thing, as created and limited, contains in itself nothing latent (or substantial). In that sense, there is the double problem: reality with phenomenon, or jitzuzai soku genshō in Japanese.¹⁸⁸

Quoting Romans 1:20: "Ever since the creation of the world his invisible nature, namely, his eternal power and deity, has been clearly perceived in the things that have been made," Takizawa proceeds to state that the "primordial structure" of a thing as created and expressive of its own creatureliness never ceases to be so, but must at the same time be its eschatological structure. The only difference of the inanimate thing from sub-human living creatures and humans is the fact that it is not conscious of itself as being in the primordial structure; it does not express itself

188. Ibid. As for "soku," I sometimes struggled to translate it as "at once." But this connotes time. "With" is better here since Takizawa is thinking of concrescence, in Whiteheadian terms, of the Absolute with particulars.

as a "special structure," or habitual system in the broadest sense of that term. 189

But we cannot deny, according to Takizawa, that even in the mere thing which is lifeless, that which is actual self-negatively express its endless aspiration toward that which creates (Cf. Rom 8:18ff). Here may lie the truly objective basis of Hesse's deep aesthetic experience inspired by "clouds." This does not mean, for Takizawa, a mystical vitalism explaining the material as vital. Takizawa, on the contrary, regards life as a stage of the self-expression by the primordial - historical thing, the absolutely non-human.

Thus, Takizawa shares with Hartshorne in panpsychism.

To return to our earlier discussion, from Takizawa's perspective of the "origin of the human being," the universe is to be understood at once panmaterial (in terms of its "primordial structure") and panpsychial (in terms of its "special structure," or habitual system). These two natures of the universe are absolutely incommensurable. Either of them obtains its nature only in relation with God Himself, or the Absolute; the panmaterial nature in its "an-sich relation" to Him, and panpsychic nature in its "für-

189. Ibid., p. 377.

sich relation" to Him. Behind and in these two natures Takizawa is primarily thinking of two aspects of the Logos, in Logos Christological terms, that is, the Logos as the principled possibility and the Logos as the relevance of that principle,¹⁹⁰ since for him, the universe's relation to the Absolute is nothing other than the logos, as identical with the "origin" or "source point" of the human being, which he also calls the "Proto-factum Immanuel," in Barthian terms.

It is, I contend, crucial for the comparative study of Takizawa and Hartshorne to notice that under the traditional Christian expression "Immanuel" (God with us) Takizawa addresses the same problem as does Whitehead's conception of the primordial nature of God. Takizawa's "God (himself)" is not God in the usual Christian sense of that term, i.e., what John Cobb calls the "principle of rightness" as religiously ultimate. Rather, it is the metaphysical ultimate like Whitehead's "creativity." Things are very perplexing when we want to discuss Takizawa's "God,"

190. Cf. John B. Cobb, Jr., Christ in a Pluralistic Age (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1975), p.77.

inasmuch as he does not necessarily clearly state that he is understanding it, as a concept, in the context of Nishida's metaphysics whereas, as a term, he borrows it from Karl Barth.

As for the concept "Immanuel," it does not, as in Hartshorne's theism, mean the "immanence of God," at least primarily. Since "God" in Takizawa is the metaphysical ultimate, "Immanuel" means nothing other than "concrecence" (in the special theistic sense of the term in Whitehead's scheme), as I have once mentioned above. I am here thinking of Whitehead's definition of the primordial nature of God, or the primordial character of creativity, as the "concrecence of an unity of conceptual feelings including among their data all eternal object."¹⁹¹ The concrecence is, Whitehead further states, directed by the subjective aim, that the subjective forms of the feelings shall be such as to constitute the eternal object into relevant lures of feeling severally appropriate for realizable basic condition. In fact, his Japanese expressions for that term "shin Jin ittai" (the divine and the human in one body), "sesshoku" (contact), and "Tôitsu" (unity, or rather coalescence) support my

191. Whitehead, PR, p. 134.

explanation.

If that is the case, his repeated usage of the term "determine," referring to the human being's relation to the Absolute, never imply a temporal causation, or determinism in the traditional Western sense of that term. For a meaningful dialogue with Westerners, these terms must be clearly and precisely defined, or (if necessary) revised, in the Western context. Otherwise, Takizawa's concepts inherent in them, vitally important for today's metaphysical revolution in the East and the West as well, will be easily overlooked (See in 'this connection' note 46 of Chapter Two.)

The foregoing consideration on Takizawa's metaphysics, in my mind, contributes a necessary preparation to the critical survey into Hartshorne's idea of "nature." Hartshorne, as we have seen earlier, writes: "This supreme natural being (God) is nature herself, taken not distributively, but as an integrated individual."¹⁹² From Takizawa's standpoint, it seems that Hartshorne in this statement deals with the ultimately an-sich aspect of the totality of the universe, the Logos. But, I ask, why does he call it "nature herself?"

192. Hartshorne, BH, p.57, italics mine.

It is clear that he now is not dealing with "natura naturata," since this concept is understood by Spinoza as "all that follows from the necessity of the nature of God, or of any one of his attributes, that is, all the modes of the attributes of God, in so far as they are considered as things which are in God, and which cannot exist or be conceived without God."¹⁹³ In contrast, Takizawa's idea of the Proto-factum Immanuel, like Whitehead's conception of the primordial characterization of creativity, may correspond to Spinoza's "natura naturans" as explicated as "that which is in itself and through itself is conceived, as such attributes of substance as express eternal and infinite essence, that is, God, in so far as he is considered as a free cause."¹⁹⁴

Then, one can ask, when he equates God with "nature herself" in that sense of the term, what kind of metaphysical basis does Hartshorne have? It seems to me that he is thinking of the totality of nature primarily in terms of the consequent nature of God. Here is an explanation by David Griffin:

Hartshorne says, that God is nature "as an integrated

193. Cited from Hartshorne, PSG., pp.192-293.

194. Ibid., p.192.

individual." The analogy is with the mind of a human being as including and exerting dominant influence over the whole bodily organism. The analogy would be more exact if the mind literally included the whole body spatially, rather than only the brain cells. It's more exact with a cell. The cell can be considered distributively: as such it is a group of molecules; but there is in each moment an all-inclusive experience which makes the cell an individual. Likewise, God's all-inclusive experience at each moment makes the universe an individual.¹⁹⁵

In a word, God is the mind of the universe viewed as an individual totality. Then what is the mind of God? As a supreme tality or "an integrated individual," how can he think?

The present writer thinks it necessary here for the Whiteheadian metaphysician Hartshorne metaphysically to clarify this position as to the understanding of Whitehead's important statement as follows: "The primordial nature of God is the acquirement by creativity of a primoridal character."¹⁹⁶ The totality of nature, as indentified with God, can obtain its character only insofar as it is in an an-sich relation to "creativity," since, in Whiteheadian words, "The particularities of the actual world presupposes it (primoridal nature of God); while it merely presupposes the general metaphysical character of creative advance, of

195. Griffin's clarification made in the first draft of this dissertation, dated February 16, 1978.

196. Whitehead, PR., p.522.

which it is the primordial exemplification."197

It is precisely in this connection that I am skeptical about the metaphysical properness of Hartshorne's equation of "on-going society" with "immanence of God." (see our discussion in II.) The "on-going society" should be identified with "creative advance," the metaphysical ultimate.

In any case, if my reasoning above is not wrong, another aspect of Takizawa's theory of the "origin of the human being," that is, the für-sich aspect, may also be suggestive in our discussion in this chapter on Hartshorne and Dewey on Praxis," especially in connection with Hartshorne's beautiful words as follows:

To be interested in God is accordingly to be interested the Supreme interest in men and women; it is to be sympathetic toward all lives under inspiration from the supreme participating sympathy.198

From the present writer's eschatological perspective, it is important that Takizawa explains that time is the first clear manifestation of the fact that a spatial thing, as created and limited, contains in itself nothing latent or substantial. That means that time is the most conspicuous exemplification of Emptiness. Emptiness, or *śūnyatā*, is

197. Ibid., The word "presuppose" here is what Takizawa really means when he uses the term determined.

198. Hartshorne, BH., p.54

said, by D. T. Suzuki, to be a reservoir of infinite possibilities and not just a state of mere emptiness. "Differentiating itself and yet remaining in itself undifferentiated, and thus to go on eternally engaged in the work of creation -- this is sûnyatâ, the prajñâ continuum."¹⁹⁹ Takizawa's notion of the an-sich nature of the universe (maximally, the Logos as the principle of possibility) is related to the "undifferentiated" aspect of the metaphysical ultimate, Emptiness. Hence, he conceives the primordial structure of actual entities as materialistic although he at the same time affirms the für-sich nature of the universe (maximally, the Logos as such as the relevance of the principle of possibility), as in Hartshorne's notion of panpsychism (which however starts, it seems to me from the incarnate Logos, but not from the Logos as such). For him, panmaterialism and panpsychism are incommensurable, but not incompatible.

In terms of the possibility or lure for praxis, however, Takizawa's theology/philosophy of the Proto-factum Immanuel functions primarily as a check or critical reflec-

199. D. T. Suzuki, "Reason and Intuition in Buddhist Philosophy," in Charles A. Moore (ed.) The Japanese Mind (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1967), p. 97.

tion upon the motivation of praxis, but not as an encouragement for pragmatic leap for the future, as in Hartshornean naturalistic theism. If we could combine the two motifs, i.e, Takizawa's checking principle and Hartshorne's pragmatic principle, in terms of Logos theology for today, we might have a new spirituality as regards praxis in time which is at once still and futuristic. Toward such a new spirituality, I appreciate, Dewey's naturalistic humanism and Tagawa's historicism strive unconsciously in their enthusiasm for social amelioration.

CHAPTER 4

PEACE AS IT EXPRESSES ITSELF IN THE GLOBAL
AND LOCAL MINISTRY OF THE CHURCH:
A DISCUSSION FROM JAPAN

The essential truth that
Peace demands is the con-
formation of Appearance to
Reality.

-- Alfred North Whitehead

I. THE PROBLEM

Peace, as discussed in this chapter, means nothing other than the subject-matter of the Christian ministry. The Christian church, founded on the eschatological spiritual reality of the "peace of God, which passes all understanding" (Phil. 4: 7), proclaims the "God of peace" (Phil. 4: 9) to the whole world, engaged in a creative and salvific praxis with God. It was precisely because of this receptive and active structure of the church that the ecumenical vision of the unity of the church arose in the 1930's. W.A. Visser't Hooft's reply, when asked about the motivation of the ecumenical idea, is famous: "It's quite clear that it was born first in the missionary movement."¹ That is, the unity of the church as a

1. W.A. Visser't Hooft, Risk, IX, 4 (1973), 11.

structural embodiment of the "peace of God" was cherished in the church's involvement in the "Great Commission: for salvific praxis. The address of the present general secretary, Philip Potter, at the Synod of Bishops in Rome in 1974 endorses this view at a new stage of the ecumenical movement, saying: "The conviction of the World Council of Churches has been that evangelization is the ecumenical theme per excellence."² Mortimer Arias, getting a new insight into "unity" from his peculiar commitment to the Evangelical Methodist Church in Bolivia, paraphrases the two above-mentioned important statements as to the nature of WCC as follows:

"This means that from the perspective of the Church's mission unity is not merely an eschatological hope, a spiritual reality or an inter-ecclesiastical aim; it is an actual prerequisite of mission. We are not seeking unity per se, but rather, as in the prayer of Jesus, 'that the world may believe'. "³

The church should seek unity in the midst of its proclaiming activity for the good of the world.

However, such missionary task of proclaiming the "God of peace" cannot be carried out regardless of the context of

2. Philip Potter, "Evangelization in the Modern World" Monthly Letter about Evangelism, (January 1975), 2, italics mine.

3. Mortimer Arias, "That the World May Believe," World Council of Churches Fifth Assembly (Nairobi, Kenya, November 23-December 10, 1975, Address Document A 7) 1, italics his.

today. C. Dean Freudenberger states:

"The world community is facing unprecedented problems which impede the development of the quality of human life for the vast majority of humankind. The process is hindered because of economic organization, international trade, resource use, migration, armaments, population growth and political structure."⁴

Peace in this context, implies the development of the quality of human life, or the full actualization of the potential richness in humans endowed by the Creator, for the vast majority of humankind; in harmony with the ecological systems in the universe.⁵

That means that the church has an authentic responsibility to struggle against socio-politico-economic structures impeding peace. Such struggle for peace, no matter how strange the combination of the two contrasting words may sound to some, is never outside the reach of the Christian mission. In this conjunction, we should, rather, recall the strong words of our Lord: "Do not think that I have come to bring peace on earth; I have not come to bring peace, but a sword" (Mt 10:34). The fact that two-thirds of humankind are

4. C. Dean Freudenberger, "International Development and the World Mission of the Church in Ecumenical Perspectives" (Syllabus; School of Theology at Claremont, Fall 1976), 1.

5. Cf. John B. Cobb, Jr. Is it Too Late? (Beverly Hills, Ca: Bruce, 1972)

now suffering from hunger and poverty, and that there is a "growing gap" between the rich and the poor while the environment is threatened, is urgently challenging to the church on a global scale.⁶ Therefore, it is appreciated that "the identification of the challenge of development of the quality of human community in harmony with the biosphere in its international setting has been seen clearly, since the Church and Society consultations in Geneva, 1966, the Vatican II Council beginning in 1962, the SODEPAX consultation at Beirut in 1968, the General Assembly of the World Council of Churches, Uppsala, 1968, the Bangkok Conference of the Commission of World Mission and Evangelism of 1974, and the Fifth Assembly of the World Council of Churches at Nairobi, 1975, and adds further momentum to the Church's concern about its global ministry in a setting of injustice and human need."⁷ Thus the Church participates in the salvific ministry of our Lord in action.

In the following I will discuss the problem of "peace" (i) in its theological setting from the perspective of process eschatology, especially in connection with two important

6. Freudenberger, 1.

7. Ibid

ethical ideas in the present-day Christian camp, "development" and "liberation," (ii) as a matter of global ministry, especially in connection with the ecumenical movement as it deals with the "Christian responsibility in a hungry world," (iii) as a matter of missionary task and strategy in Japan today.

II. PEACE, DEVELOPMENT AND LIBERATION: FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF PROCESS ESCHATOLOGY

There are some key-terms in the present-day Christian arena, with which to consider, as fully as possible, the root problems inherent in the situation, together with the connected Christian responsibility. These are, among others, "peace," "development," and "liberation." My own theoretical position taken in this paper as to how best to proclaim the Good News of God in Jesus Christ in the inescapable context of today is focused on "peace," as is mentioned above. But, since a heated debate is on-going on an ecumenical scale between the upholders of "development" and the theologians of "liberation." I cannot evade the question raised by both.

A. Liberation and Development

Gustav Gutierrez, one of the best representatives of the Latin American theology of liberation, in his well-known

and provocative book, A Theology of Liberation, deals with this question in a sharp contrast; in fact, he sees a sheer contradiction between "liberation and development," which is the title of the second chapter of his book. He is quite aware that the world today is experiencing a profound and rapid sociocultural transformation.⁸ But, to him, it is at the same time quite clear that the changes do not occur at a uniform pace, and that the discrepancies in the change-process have differentiated the various countries and regions of our planet.⁹ The burgeoning of communications media has brought about the phenomenon of the "awareness of differences"¹⁰ among countries, which characterizes our era, particularly acute in the "developing" countries, less favored by the evolution of the world economy while inhabited by the vast majority of people. Thus, Gutierrez stresses:

"The poor countries are not interested in modeling themselves after the rich countries, among other reasons because they are increasingly more convinced that the status of the latter is the fruit of injustice

8. Gustavo Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation (New York: Orbis, 1973), 21.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid., 21-22.

and coercion."¹¹

He surveys three important trends as to the clarification of the concept of development, that is, (1) Joseph A. Schumpeter's idea of "innovation," signifying a new dynamism in contrast to the equilibrium called "circular flow" inherent in a capitalism, (2) the Australian economist Colin Clark's concept of "progress" in well-being (not in wealth), indicating the satisfaction derived from the resources at one's disposal, and (3) the Bandung Conference of 1955 where a large number of Asian and African countries met and recognized their common membership in a Third World--underdeveloped and facing two developed worlds, the capitalist and the socialist and issued a proclamation of the unacceptability of their condition of underdevelopment.¹² However, he carefully notices that the old idea of development as synonymous with "economic growth," therefore measured by a country's gross national product or its per capita income, is now in the process of being replaced by a new one signifying a "total social process, which includes economic, social, political, and cultural aspects".¹³ In this connection, he

11. Ibid., p. 22, italics mine.

12. Ibid., p. 23.

13. Ibid., p. 24.

shows a deep interest in Francois Perroix's humanistic approach to "place the notion of development in a wider context; a historical vision in which mankind assumes control of its own destiny."¹⁴ only to refer to his idea of "liberation" which appears to him as "a change of perspectives after certain additions and corrections."¹⁵

Gutierrez' introduction of the new concept liberation into today's socio-politico-economic sphere results from his observations: (1) that since the supporters of development did not attack the roots of the evil, they failed and instead caused confusion and frustration, (2) that great care was exercised, therefore, not to attack the interests of large international economic powers nor those of their national allies, the ruling domestic interest groups, and (3) that only a radical break from the status quo, that is, a profound transformation of the private property system, access to power of the exploited class, and a social revolution that would break this dependence, would allow for the change to a new society, a socialist society--or at least allow that

14. Ibid., p. 25, italics mine. Development for Perroux means "the combination of mental and social changes of a people which enable them to increase, cumulatively and permanently, their total real production" (Ibid.)

15. Ibid.

such a society might be possible.¹⁶

It is quite interesting to observe that for him the goal is not only "better living conditions," but a "radical change of structures," or a "permanent cultural revolution."¹⁷ Here his idea of "liberation" is a unique position distinct from "developmentalism" (desarrollismo); and, more important, in connection with the encyclical Populorum progressio (1965) and with the Second General Conference of Latin American Bishops held in Medellin, Colombia, in 1968, he has come to the following theological conclusion:

The freedom to which we are called presupposes the going out of oneself, the breaking down of our selfishness and of all the structures that support our selfishness; the foundation of this freedom is openness to others. The fullness of liberation -- a free gift from Christ -- is communion with God and with other men.¹⁸

B. The Possibility of Peace in Terms of the Primordial Nature of God

However, insofar as Gutierrez' fundamental view of life, as it ought to be liberated from individual and collective selfishness, is confined to human life, the present writer strongly affirms that it needs, as process theologians

16. Ibid., pp. 26-27.

17. Ibid., p. 32.

18. Ibid., p. 36, italics mine.

such as John B. Cobb, Jr. and David R. Griffin demand, a radical "extension"¹⁹ in order to "provide sufficient motivation for ecological survival and care of the world and its inhabitants."²⁰ If it undergoes such a radical extension, it will envision a radical possibility for peace which is a higher synthesis of hope for liberation and the Buddhist serenity, compassionate toward all sentient beings.

It is hoped, for that purpose that Christology in the theology of liberation be radically connected with a doctrine of creation that grasps God's continual participation in the process of sustaining all that exists, through what A.N. Whitehead has called God's primordial nature.²¹ That is, theologians of liberation should find a new way of articulating the meaning of the Christ-event in accordance with the meaning of all events in the universe, which is to be investigated in terms of Christian natural theology. Otherwise, the Christ-event, as they reinterpret it according

19. David Griffin, "Human Liberation and the Reverence for Nature," Anticipation, No. 16 (March 1974) 30.

20. L. Charles Birch and John B. Cobb, Jr. "Gods Love Ecological Survival and the Responsiveness of Nature," Anticipation, No. 16 (March 1974), 34.

21. Ibid.

to their particular experiences of oppression and hope for liberation, would be substantialized in such a way that they overlook a general possibility for subjective aims in the universe, the primordial nature of God being the initial state of those.

The most essential task for the theological conceptualization of hope for liberation, in my opinion, is radically to break through the final nature of time as "perpetual perishing." If, in this connection, the second law of thermodynamics (entropy tends toward a maximum) is absolutely true of the inmost nature of the universe, to the effect that the "physical universe is headed toward an eventual increase of disorder or randomness to the point where significant concentrations of energy will finally no longer exist,"²² there can finally be no hope. But this is a misconception of the true nature of the universe, as we in the second chapter of this dissertation have already clarified, (though not this clearly there) in terms of the understanding of time. Not entropy but the intensification of energy is the final thrust of nature. This truth is, for instance, manifested

22. William A. Beardslee. "Sex, Biological Bases of Hope," in Harry James Cargas and Bernard Lee (eds.) Religious Experience and Process Theology. (New York: Paulist Press, 1976).

by L. Charles Birch in his process biological perspective as follows:

The theory is saying that the only sort of universe in which evolution of organisms can occur is one in which the entities have subjective aim, and that there is an evolution of subjective aim alongside physical evolution. That is, it becomes more complex. It becomes conscious in man and, in so far as man can have long-range plans which he can execute, his conscious subjective aims or purposes can control the future direction of evolution.²³

The above truth is, maximally, the truth of what A.N. Whitehead calls the primordial nature of God, i.e., the Logos, as mentioned above. But the Logos has another aspect, that is, what Takizawa calls the an-sich nature of the Logos in relation to the metaphysical ultimate, Buddhist Emptiness or Whitehead's creativity. In this aspect, the Logos represents and exemplifies in its as-it-is-ness or suchness (i.e., in its "inner-trinitarian" nature as the principle of possibility). Emptiness or Creativity (i.e., the absolute wealth of potentiality). Thus, the Logos is what John B. Cobb, Jr. calls the everlasting Buddha or the Supreme Empty One.

23. L. Charles Birch. "Can Evolution Be Accounted for Solely in Terms of Mechanical Causation?" in John B. Cobb, Jr. and David R. Griffin (eds.) Mind in Nature, (Washington: University Press of America, 1977).

In accordance with this aspect of the Logos, nature appears, minimally, as materialistic or mechanical. Each actual entity in its atomic nature as being here-now, however, never loses its unique value: it has intrinsic value in and for itself inasmuch as it is an instance of "concreteness", i.e., time as the self-expression of the Eternal Now.

In contrast, each actual entity in its panpsychic aspect, aiming at the intensification of energy, becomes more complex in the future, that is, it has its peculiar instrumental value for the future experiences, viewed from its nature as becoming actual and relational through time as "transition."

The above discussion was necessary for me in order to conceptualize peace at least at its possible stage. In such consideration of the double nature of reality as present and futuristic, panpsychic and mechanical, or intrinsic and instrumental, which expresses itself, maximally, in the Logos, and minimally, in the non-human creatures, the possibility of peace lies in a higher, creative synthesis of the Buddhist spirituality of serene openness to present relationships and the Christian future-orientated spirituality, since "the essential truth that Peace demands". according to

Whitehead, is "the conformation of Appearance to Reality."²⁴

C. The Actuality of Peace in Terms of the Consequent Nature of God

What we have discussed in the above does not mean in the least that the intensity of "liberation" as it expresses itself in the socio-politico-economic context is minimized. On the contrary, it is kept and, moreover, promoted in such a way that "God grows as the universe evolves, because his experience expands with his participation in all creation,"²⁵ namely, that God grows as humans as God's co-creators act for the liberation of both the human and the non-human worlds.

Our creative and salvific praxis is, therefore, best understood and metaphysically undergirded, in terms of the consequent nature of God as thus explained, i.e., in terms of the incarnate Logos or the Christ, to use the traditional notion. It is to be noted in this connection that Paul conceives "all things" in a two-fold way. He says on the one hand: "...in him (Christ) all the fullness of God was

24. Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures of Idas (New York: Mentor, 1933) p. 291.

25. Birch and Cobb.

pleased to dwell and through him to reconcile to himself all things, whether on earth or in heaven, making peace by the blood of his cross" (Col. 1: 19-20), that is, he understands all things from the perspective of reconciliation or peace with God. But he says on the other hand: "... the creation itself will be set free from its bondage to decay and obtain the glorious liberty of the children of God" (Rom. 8: 21), that is, he views all things from the perspective of redemption of the bodies or hope for liberation.²⁷

Such double structure of "all things," as viewed by Paul from his Logos theological perspective, is not alien to Whitehead's idea of peace, namely, that (1) peace is the harmony of the soul's activities with ideal aims that lies beyond any personal satisfaction, (2) to the extent that one's purposes, escaping from the restless egoism, extend beyond values for oneself to values for others. This double nature of peace means for him the immanence of the total deity which he calls the "Great Fact including this initial Eros and this final Beauty which constitutes the Zest of self-forgetful transcendence belonging to

26. Ibid.

27. Cf. Ibid.

Civilization at its height."²⁸ Here we should note that his term "immanence" designates the superjective actuality of the total God, i.e., both the initial Eros or the primordial nature of God and the final Beauty or the consequent nature of God, and that this actuality, subjectively viewed, is itself the attribute of the consequent nature of God whereas, objectively viewed, it expresses and represents the consequent nature (i.e., the supreme sympathy), the primordial nature (i.e., the source of the initial aim or the principle of possibility), and the metaphysical ultimate (i.e., creativity or Emptiness).

From the axiological perspective, actuality as the consequent nature of God expresses itself as a double problem: pragmatic value which lies not so much in what is, as in what, through our participation would be verified by the superjective nature of God qualifying creativity with his satisfaction as "one" with the universe, with intended instrumental value which lies in the transcendence of egotism at the present moment while striving to fulfill divine purpose for the future, that is, in a synthesis of intrinsic value and instrumental value. In other words, actuality is at once

28. Whitehead, AI, p. 381.

experimental courage or faith and self-forgetful love for others, and courage is important insofar as it bears fruits or consequences whereas love is important insofar as it is genuine in intention or motivation.

From the above discussion results a new realization of "peace": that peace is a creative synthesis of pragmatic value and intended instrumental value which is itself a higher synthesis, as the possibility of peace as conceived in terms of the primordial nature of God, of intrinsic value and instrumental value. In this new realization of peace, newness is related to the conception of pragmatic value, whose metaphysical undergirding we owe to Hartshorne. (See chapter three.) When he states that goodness as the good will, being "twice good" (enriching one's own present experience and in its consequence tending to enrich future experiences not necessarily one's own), is peace, Hartshorne is, it seems to me, conceptualizing peace in terms of a higher synthesis of intrinsic value and instrumental value. But when he goes further to regard peace as "the self in its purposes transcending the personal future and making itself trustee for others (according to religion, finally,

trustee for God),"²⁹ he is, I think concerned for a creative synthesis of the above synthesis and pragmatic value, the above synthesis being the checking point of pragmatic bias and the contrasted pole of pragmatic value.

If that is the case, Eugene Fontinell in his essay "Religious Truth: A Pragmatic Reconstruction" may well say as follows:

Ideas, beliefs, ideals are all in a sense hypotheses -- they are guides to further thought and action, but the only way we have of winnowing out and developing those which are of worth or are true is by continually attending to the consequences which ensue -- or by observing the quality of life to which they give rise. Hence, the human community is, in the broad sense, experimental and self-correcting; while it does achieve consummatory moments, these are never absolute or final but simultaneously serve as instruments for further development.³⁰

However, this does not mean that there is no drastic factor of negating pragmatic bias in the universe. It really exists. It is the primordial nature of God as the Supreme Empty One

29. Charles Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis & Philosophic Method (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1970) p. 308, *italics mine*.

30. Eugene Fontinell, "Religious Truth: A Pragmatic Reconstruction," Cargas and Lee, p. 250. Cf. also Joseph G. Ramisch, "Dewey and the 'Rage for Order': A Critical Comparison of Dewey's Naturalism with the Foundational Theology of David Tracy", in Philosophy of Religion and Theology: 1976 Proceedings (Missoula: University of Montana, 1976), pp. 74-91; also Charles L. Stevenson, Facts and Values: Studies in Ethical Analysis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963) pp. 96-116.

which exemplifies Emptiness or creativity so as to lure all the creatures, especially human beings, to become actual/empty, that is, to become creative while negating themselves in their relationships with the rest of the universe.

It is precisely in this context that John Cobb views a possibility for conceptualizing a Christianized Nirvana as follows:

There is immediate gratification in working for a future in which we can believe. Furthermore, every convincing image of the future encourages an anticipatory participation in the future that is expected.³¹

His "immediate gratification" concerns intrinsic value of praxis whereas "working for a future" is related to intended instrumental value of praxis. He goes further to conceptualize the pragmatic value of praxis, in terms of his idea of "anticipatory participation in the future." But inasmuch as he envisions that "In some measure the future Kingdom was already realized in Jesus' ministry,"³² he does not hesitate to incorporate in his Christian mode of life the Buddhist idea of present serenity:

31. John Cobb. "Can a Christian be a Buddhist, Too?" (Unpublished, Spring 1977), p. 19, italics mine.

32. Ibid., italics mine.

If we understand the realization of a Christianized Nirvana as the future for which we hope, we can allow ourselves now the joy of pure immersion in the moment as a part of our orientation to that future for all. In Buddhist terms the Christian can accept the ideal of the Bodhisattva who refuses final entry into Nirvana until all sentient creatures can cross the threshold together.³³

Cobb's attempt at incorporating Buddhist spirituality into the Christian mode of life is significant particularly in connection with the self-criticism of Buddhism as attempted by Hakugen Ichikawa. Ichikawa appreciates that Buddhist authors such as D.T. Suzuki and Shin'ichi Hisamatsu have experienced peace as serenity at the present moment detached from the worldly anxieties about past and future because they have realized the substanceless nature or Emptiness of their selfhood and of the world. But he criticizes the fact that their openness for the present happening and their sense of peace (anjin in Japanese) receiving things as they are, lacks a sense of directivity toward future, and of strength to experience life's various intensities, to the extent that they tend to be obedient to the status quo, as most

33. Ibid.

conspicuously manifested by the Zen Buddhists' cooperation with the governmental war policy during World War II.³⁴

Such a self-correcting development of the Christian and the Buddhist modes of life is, I believe, one of the most profound and promising symptoms of peace between East and West, inasmuch as "theology, or man's belief about the nature of the universe," especially its self-correcting, developing form, is, as David Rhys Williams affirms, "the turtle of Atlas -- the real foundation upon which man's world eventually rests."³⁵

D. Peace and Violence

Theology at the present time must come to realize a two-fold task of the "international development" which I referred to in Section One as "development of the quality of human community (as well as individuals) in harmony with the biosphere in its international setting" (Freundenberger).³⁶

34. Hakugen Ichikawa, Zen to gendai shisô (Zen and Contemporary Thought) (Tokyo: Tokuma Shoten, 1967) 209-13.

35. David Rhys Williams, World Religions and the Hope for Peace (Boston: Beacon Press, 1951), 206.

36. Freudenberger, op. cit., 1. Also cf. Richard Dickinson, Line and Plummet (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1968), 94-97.

I hope our previous discussion has clarified the point from the perspective of process theological understanding of peace. The intention of the present chapter, furthermore, lies in bringing in the concept of "peace" for such a theological context of today, precisely because it has a connotation of "tragedy" as Whitehead clearly states:

At the heart of the nature of things, there are always the dream of youth and the harvest of tragedy. The Adventure of the Universe starts with the dream and reaps tragic Beauty.³⁷ This is the secret of the union of Zest with Peace.

The human tragedy manifested in Auschwitz and Hiroshima, together with the results of colonialism, racism, totalitarianism, and sexism, should be thoughtfully kept in mind when we talk about liberation and development enthusiastically. Peace sees tragedy. Peace reflects upon the results of violence which appear in the forms of what Johan Galtung calls "personal violence" and "structural violence" or social injustice.³⁸

Galtung defines violence as "the cause of the difference between the potential and the actual, between what could have been and what is,"³⁹ that is, in my view, between conceptual

37. Whitehead, AI, pp. 294-95.

38. Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace and Peace Research," Journal of Peace Research, No. 3 (1969) 167-91.

39. Ibid., 168.

value and physical, pragmatic value of praxis. Therefore, for him, "violence is that which increases the distance between the potential and the actual, and that which impedes the decrease of this distance."⁴⁰ Actually speaking, "violence is present when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realization are below their potential realizations."⁴¹ It is quite interesting to notice that Galtung regards "peace" as "absence of violence (as defined above)" and defines a "peaceful social order" not as a point but as "the vast region of social orders from which violence is absent," with which "a number of ideologies outlining other aspects of social orders" are "compatible."⁴² Marxist socialism and capitalist democracy are both within his scope.

But, to refer to one thing unsatisfying to me in Galtung's thought, since his idea of the "potential" seems to be restricted to the total present-day achievement of civilization, the term actual cannot be extended to all "actual entities" including man, nature, and God. It is suggested that he extend his idea of the "potential

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

realization" to the fundamental unity of the human, the non-human worlds, and God who is the "unlimited conceptual realization of the absolute wealth of potentiality."⁴³

The fundamental man-nature-God unity is the conceptual value of the world. Hence, our pragmatic value as inherent in praxis and orientated toward the future experiences, not necessarily one's own, ought to precisely be the actual, physical realization of that unity.

But when the above "ought to" is broken, what is the main cause? Galtung cannot answer this question. In my opinion, there is no such cause, ontologically or metaphysically. That is to say, there is an ontological or metaphysical impossibility, i.e., what Karl Barth calls das Nichtige. I dealt critically with this concept in the second chapter, because Barth sometimes identifies it as the chaos in Genesis 1: 2. Ontological impossibility is quite other than the creative chaos, but the "original hybris," as in the phrase: Eritis sicut deus. But since this is sheer

43. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, (New York: Macmillan, 1929), p.521. The same idea is expressed by Katsumi Takizawa in his theology/philosophy of "Immanuel." Cf. Notto R. Thelle, "A Barthian Thinker Between Buddhism and Christianity: Takizawa Katsumi," Japanese Religions, VIII, 4 (October 1975), 54-86.

impossibility, the "original hybris" is at the same time the "original abandonment" -- abandonment, in such a sense as Paul says: "And since they did not see fit to acknowledge God, God gave them up to a base mind and to improper conduct" (Rom. 1: 28).

My idea of evil/violence as at once "original hybris" and "original abandonment" result from my view of the Logos as at once the Supreme Empty One and the initial aim; evil/violence can be defined as the original revolt against the Logos as thus conceived. In Whiteheadian terms, the Logos as it is related to creativity (or Buddhist Emptiness) is "the essential unity of the Universe conceived as an actuality, and yet in abstraction from the 'life and motion' in which all actualities must partake,"⁴⁴ that is, Plato's Receptacle (which, in my view, is equivalent to Nishida's Basho); the Logos as it is related to the world is "the Divine Eros as the active entertainment of all ideas, with the urge to their finite realization, each in its due season."⁴⁵ Whitehead's conceptions of evil as "discord" or lack of harmony and "triviality" or lack of intensity can be

44. Whitehead, AI, p. 274

45. Ibid., p. 276.

understood in terms of the above Logos theological perspective.

From the above perspective, Whitehead's notion of tragedy in relation to peace mentioned earlier becomes significant to me. He writes:

Each tragedy is the disclosure of an ideal:--What might have been, and was not: What can be. The tragedy was not in vain. This survival power in motive force, by reason of appeal to reserves of Beauty, marks the difference between the tragic evil and gross evil. The inner feeling belonging to this grasp of the service of tragedy is Peace--the purification of the emotions.⁴⁶

But there must be one's existential expression of tragedy, repentance and confession, in order that one might experience the "purification of the emotions," since the "service of tragedy" is not an automatic objectivity. Whitehead is silent about this problem. But it seems to me that unless one, in prayer or art or any personal and communal expression, discloses existentially "what might have been," he or she cannot break through the abandonment -- that is, the existential situation of being cast away into his or her self-made salvation -- into a deep trust or what Luther calls "desperatio fiducialis." There is no direct way from the experience of tragedy to peace.

46. Ibid., p. 285.

But if one expresses tragedy existentially, that means that one has radically conformed to reality which always is the "general drive towards the conformation of Appearance to Reality,"⁴⁷ the supreme redemptive love. And, moreover, then one is in a creative process which is "its (the past's) absorption into a new unity with ideals and with anticipation, by the operation of the creative Eros,"⁴⁸ i.e., in praxis or what Whitehead calls Adventure.

My thesis of peace as I have developed thus far is: that the possibility of peace lies in a higher synthesis of intrinsic value and instrumental value, that is, in intended instrumental value, in terms of the primordial nature of God, the Logos, that the actuality of peace lies in a creative synthesis of the possibility of peace culminating in intended instrumental value and pragmatic value, in terms of the consequent nature of God, and that peace as the double problem, i.e., possibility with actuality is necessarily to be served by tragedy.

This my view of peace, first at least at the possible level, is not alien to Whitehead when he regards the

47. Ibid.,p.292.

48. Ibid.,p.275.

intrinsic value of the universe as Beauty, the instrumental value as Truth, and the intended instrumental value as Art or what he calls Truthful Beauty. According to him,

Beauty thus concerns the inter-relations of the various components of Reality, and also the inter-relations of the various components of Appearance, and also the relations of Appearance to Reality. Thus any part of experience can be beautiful. The teleology of the Universe is directed to the production of Beauty.⁴⁹

The fact that Truth is an instrumental value is manifested by Whitehead as this: that "Truth, in itself and apart from special reasons to the contrary, becomes self-justifying,"⁵⁰ accompanied by "a sense of rightness in the deepest Harmony."⁵⁰ that "Truth derives this self-justifying power from its services in the promotion of Beauty,"⁵⁰ and that "Apart from Beauty, Truth is neither good, nor bad."⁵⁰ The intended instrumental value as Art is expressed by him as this:

Art is purposeful adaptation of Appearance to Reality. Now 'purposeful adaptation' implies an end, to be obtained with more or less success. This end, which is the purpose of art, is two-fold -- namely Truth and Beauty. The perfection of art has only one end, which is Truthful Beauty.⁵¹

My view of peace, second, at the actual level con-

49. Ibid., p. 264.

50. Ibid., p. 266.

51. Ibid.

forms to Whitehead's understanding of the pragmatic value of the universe as Adventure, synthesized creatively with Art or "a psychopathic reaction of the race to the stress of its existence,"⁵² in the idea of Peace which, in his view, is a Harmony of Harmonies, which shall bind together the other four qualities, i.e., Truth, Beauty, Adventure, and Art, "so as to exclude from our notion of civilization the restless egotism with which they have often in fact been pursued."⁵³

Peace is not, as in Galtung's idea of the "absence of violence," a negative entity which Whitehead calls, "anaesthesia," but an eschatologically "positive feeling which crowns the 'life and motion' of the soul."⁵⁴ It is not merely a hope for the future, nor is it merely an interest in present details, but a higher, creative synthesis of both, the eschatological spiritual reality as Jesus says: "...lo, I am with you always, to the close of the age" (Mat. 28: 20). Only with this is bound Jesus' Great Commission for praxis: "Go therefore and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and

52. Ibid., p. 271.

53. Ibid., p. 283.

54. Ibid.

of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, teaching them to observe all that I have commanded you" (Mat. 28: 19-20). And, moreover, in Peace is included the understanding of tragedy, and at the same time of its preservation, because the God of peace is the Supreme Sympathizer as well as the Call to praxis.

Peace, after a careful study of its prerequisites for being a theological concept, in confrontation with "development" and "liberation," can be defined as the radical conformation -- in a creative synthesis of Truth, Beauty, Adventure, and Art -- of the humans both as individual faith, love and hope, and in terms of socio-politico-economic transformation of orders, to the fundamental human-nature-God unity which, despite the vast amount of violence, evil, or tragedy in history, continually manifests the unlimited conceptual realization of the absolute wealth potentiality, that is, of the Triune God's own "immanent" love as creativity or Emptiness.

III. THE TASK OF PEACE IN THE GLOBAL MINISTRY OF THE CHURCH IN RELATION TO THE HUNGER PROBLEM

Barbara Ward stressed in her Stockholm address:

"The relentless pursuit of separate national interest by rich and poor alike can, in a totally interdependent biosphere, produce global disasters of irreversible environmental damage."⁵⁵ Here in her address we cannot evade seeing an actual global basis for the human life and the Christian ministry as well in the 20th century. The nation state cannot be a separate political unit today. The global crisis calls for a global politics "incorporating efforts to meet the Third World's needs, not ignoring them,"⁵⁶ and for a global ministry "undergirding our commitment to a healthy balance of human and subhuman life and keeping us sensitive to the total ecological consequences of our act."⁵⁷

55. Barbara Ward, "Only One Earth," Anticipation, No. 11 (July 1972), 31.

56. Thomas Sieger Derr, Ecology and Human Liberation: A Theological Critique of the Use and Abuse of Our Birthright, (WSCF Book, III, 1 (1973), 96, *italics his*.

57. Cf. Cobb, Is It Too Late?, 125. *italics mine*.

In other words, the "sustainability"⁵⁸ of our world becomes one of the most necessary and valid ethical imperatives for the present-day political consideration in general, and for the Christian ministry in particular. Metaphysically, we should give a first priority to Beauty or the intrinsic value of the universe. Otherwise, other elements of civilization, i.e., Truth, Art, and Adventure, will lose their purpose. However, this does not simply mean that we should be serene and open to present relations, but also that we should act for the promotion of Beauty in terms of Truth, Art, and especially Adventure. Only when our Adventure or pragmatic value of the universe conforms dynamically and processively to Beauty, we will be able to live together in Peace on this planet.

It is exactly in this connection that the hunger problem arises as a Christian responsibility. C. Dean Freudenberger and Paul M. Minus, Jr., in their book Christian Responsibility in a Hungry World, stresses the decisive importance of the true knowledge of the hunger crisis of today. They draw the readers' attention to the

58. Cf. "Energy for a Just and Sustainable Society," Study Encounter, XII, 3 (1976).

crucial fact that in the early 1970's adverse weather conditions affected crops in the Soviet Union, China, India, Australia, Sahalian Africa, and South Asia, creating unusually heavy worldwide food deficits and high prices for food everywhere.⁵⁹ They do not fail to notice warningly that this marked the first serious decline in food production in twenty years, that wheat reserves in the main exporting nations fell to the lowest point reached since World War II, and that soaring food prices contributed further to global inflation and placed nineteen nations in the perilous predicament of not being able to purchase food.⁶⁰ Through such abnormal change of food conditions all over the world, humankind came to realize staggeringly that not only international economics but also our existence itself are inextricably interwoven with nature. Our planet is now in the process of receiving a colder atmosphere. Therefore, we must prepare a suitable modes of food supply and life according to this new situation. Otherwise, the nearly 130 food-deficit

59. C. Dean Freudenberger and Paul M. Minus, Jr., Christian Responsibility in a Hungry World (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1976), p.15.

60. Ibid., italics mine.

nations' difficulty in feeding their people cannot be stopped.

As a Japanese pastor, I now feel an urgent call for a movement -- which I term "peace strategy" -- to promote in Japan and abroad the "radical, processive conformation to the fundamental man-nature-God unity," especially in view of the fact that (1) the age of economic nationalism as once rationalized by "the theory of international division of work", accelerating industrial production and export by importing cheap food, has ended; of the need that (2) the present-day predicament inherent in international power politics in terms of food policy should be overcome in an adventure towards world peace; and of the possibility that (3) the system of agriculture in the modern society, merely seeking low cost by technological innovation, can be transformed into that of community organization in which humans find a responsible interaction with the sub-human nature.

Metaphysically viewed, what I call "peace strategy" is urgent, because "developmentalism" as criticized by Latin American theologians of liberation is baseless since the true nature of the universe including our own personality is substanceless, or empty. It is urgent, second,

because the present-day international power games in terms of oil, food and other natural resource in addition to nuclear weapon, should be broken through from the perspective of a new politics or view of power which grasps world peace as a matter of double synthesis of possibility and actuality, a synthesis of Beauty and Truth, further synthesized with Adventure into Peace. It is urgent, moreover, because the total system of agriculture can be linked to a community organization which is based upon a totally new view of life, with Beauty or the intrinsic value of the universe at its base.

But here, in the section, I would like to deal with what the American Christians are thinking about their unique role in the global ministry.

Freudenberger and Minus, in their afore-mentioned work, survey some of the underlying problems in the last twenty pre-crisis years as follows:

- (1) During much of this period, although food production increased, food demand ran ahead of supply by about 0.7 percent a year because of growing population and mounting affluence.
- (2) Increased demand for food has reduced the level of international food trade, since many of the

former food-exporting nations have placed embargoes on food exports.

- (3) In some nation, farmer' incentives for food production have been destroyed, leading farm families to migrate to already crowded cities and hastening the decline of rural, food-growing areas.
- (4) The growth rate of global agricultural production has slowed ominously. Among the reasons for this are the difficulty of developing new agricultural projects on remaining marginal lands; the length of time necessary for producing new plant varieties; the resistance to change among most farmers; and the fact that upwards of a billion farmers must go about their daily work weakened by hunger.⁶¹

The present writer is very much interested in knowing what kind of positive outlook for the future the American Christians afford. Freudenberger and Minus state that world food demand is estimated to increase at the

61. Ibid., pp. 16-17.

rate of 2.4 percent per year, two percent resulting from population growth, and the remainder from rising affluence and the resulting desire for more food (sometimes, however, an increase of 3.7 percent annually will be necessary simply to keep pace with demand in the developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America).⁶² However, they notice, during the past decade their average annual increase has been only 2.7 percent.⁶³ The bitter gap between the expanding food needs and sky-rocketing costs and already struggling economies simply means the inability of the majority of the grain-importing food-deficit nations to finance food imports from the few food exporting nations (e.g. the United States, Canada, and Australia). Therefore, the only necessary and possible remedy, in the authors' view, is to follow the directions affirmed by the 1974 U.N. World Food Conference, that is to "end their reliance upon food from outside by rapidly developing their own food-producing capacities."⁶⁴ The advanced countries should help such rural/agricultural development by offering the wealth, agricultural skills, soil management abilities, personnel

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid.

and other resources necessary for this task which they possess.⁶⁵ (The same view of remedy is expressed by an able Japanese specialist in agricultural administration, Kunitarō Takeda, in his book Hunger Crisis and the Prospect of the Japanese Agriculture: Seeking the Solution as to the Strategic Weapon, Food.)

From such a point of view, Freudenberg and Minus confidently estimate that, in order to find an adequate fund, about \$5 billion annually, required for the above-mentioned development programs in the rural/agricultural sector;

Were the (advanced)nations to accept the World Food Conference's urgent recommendation that they reduce their spending for military arms by 10 percent (a reduction that would produce a sum of nearly \$30 billion), and were they to commit that amount annually for rural and agricultural development over the next twenty years, the world would be well on its way to ending the food-deficit problem in every nation.⁶⁶

Their estimate is not unreasonable insofar as the United States' amount spent for armaments (\$112 billion) gives the Americans an overkill capacity far beyond their legitimate defense needs. It is a well-known fact that 25%

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid.

of the world's people use 80-90% of its raw materials, and that the United States, with less than 6% of the population, uses 30-40% of these primary resources (energy and minerals).⁶⁷ What matters is whether or not the estimate is put into practice by the Americans, in order to prove their leading role in the quest for a hunger-free world.

In this respect, the authors' "heightning awareness" project by mobilizing church resources is exciting. After discussing, in Chapter 2, ten causes of hunger such as (1) the colonial legacy, (2) resource abuse, (3) complexity of agricultural development, (4) false assumptions (the first as to the transferability of temperate-zone agricultural technologies to the tropical and monsoon world, the second as to increasing America's production to feed hungry, food-deficit nations), (5) low status for agricultural development, (6) recent business expansion, (7) the dearth of agricultural and rural community leadership, (8) the arms race, (9) aid disenchantment, and (10) population growth, they refer, in Chapter 3, to "structures and processes for rural development" in terms of (1) farmer justice (the farmer must be paid well!), (2) rural life support

67. Ibid., p. 19; Derr, p. 82.

structures, and (3) farmer knowledge about food production and the environment, in case of the food-deficit nations, and in terms of (1) the International Agricultural Development Fund, (2) the World Food Council's world-wide emergency food relief program, and (3) the WFC's idea of cooperation between the industrialized nations and the raw-material producing nations as to creating mutual economic processes, in case of the affluent nations.

It is the authors' main intention, however, to articulate the Church's fundamental mission of "continuing Jesus' work of pioneering the responsible life that God intends for all people"⁶⁸ in an actual context. Therefore, a "way to proceed" is proposed--in the following chapters, 5,6,7,8,9--in four realms: (1) to help affluent people recognize both the gravity of the hunger crisis and the way beyond it; (2) to mobilize church resources so that they work maximally for bread and justice; (3) to develop personal lifestyles that allow the affluent to end waste and combat greed; and (4) to make America's political and economic institutions more effectively address the pain and

68. Freudenberger and Minus, p. 59.

causes of hunger.⁶⁹

To me as a Japanese theologian and pastor, the authors' missionary zeal, as it expresses itself when they state that "The American people are capable of responding to informed moral leadership that urges recovery of their nation's role as a wise champion of freedom and as a generous partner in the global battle against hunger," and that "The time is ripe for the churches to give such leadership,"⁷⁰ is, together with John Cobb's proposal of the "new Christianity" whose hallmark is the "extension of love to the subhuman world",⁷¹ a clear sign of promise after Vietnam, in terms not only of ministry in the United States but also of the ecumenical mission.

In their view, "The way of Jesus is the way of radical, creative sharing"⁷² and "The Christian life is a process of struggle toward total acceptance of Jesus' way as our own way."⁷³ They are really practically minded in pointing out that reducing Americans' consumption by only 10 percent for one year could result in freeing at

69. Ibid., p. 61.

70. Ibid., p. 111, *italics theirs*.

71. Cobb, Is It Too Late?, p. 125.

72. Freudenberger and Minus, p. 92.

73. Ibid., p. 93.

least 12 million people a year;⁷⁴ that by 1975 the nations were spending about \$275 billion annually for armament while the United States their principal supplier; and that in 1974 this nation spent \$78 billion for defense, the following year \$85 billion, and for 1976 the Administration proposed a defense budget of \$94 billion, department of defense projections calling for a 13 percent average annual increase in expenditure between 1975 and 1980.⁷⁵

"The U.S. defense budget", they even show a staggering comparison, "devours an average of \$246 million each day, but our government is proposing to give the World Food Council only \$200 million for a whole year."⁷⁶ Or, as to development assistance in 1975, they are open to the fact that their nation ranked 15th among the 17 major donor nations, namely, that U.S. development assistance amounted to only 1/5 of 1 percent of their GNP.

But, all of these numbers are shown only in order to direct the way ahead as some venturesome Christian pathfinders have already attempted, such as those engaged in (1) the Interreligions Task force on U.S. Food Policy,

74. Ibid., p. 95.

75. Ibid., p. 104.

76. Ibid., p. 105.

(2) the Food Research and Action Center, (3) Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, and (4) Bread for the World. The following are highlights of Taskforce recommendations made in July 1975 regarding U.S. development aid.

(1) The United States should commit itself to providing at least 0.70 percent of its Gross National Product for official development assistance by 1980 and 1.00 percent by 1983, and should begin in Fiscal Year 1976 a systematic process for attaining that goal.

(2) An increasing proportion of U.S. development assistance should be channeled through multi-lateral organizations such as the United Nations, its specialized agencies, and various development banks.

(3) The primary consideration in determining how U.S. bilateral development aid is to be allocated should be the level of a nation's need, not its political orientation or perceived value to U.S. political and security interests.

(4) Aid should be channeled to projects which most directly benefit the neediest people within a country.

(5) Monies should be used to fund indigenous projects that utilize local leadership and personnel and show

promise of eliminating poverty.

(6) U.S. development assistance should provide grants in relation to loans.

(7) Development assistance legislation should be separated from military and security legislation, with the Agency for International Development devoted exclusively to development assistance and disaster relief, and not used to further U.S. strategic and military foreign policy.⁷⁷

The present writer highly appreciates North American Christians' active participation in the fight against "the human family's most devastating but most conquerable foe," hunger.⁷⁸ Here I find a strong step toward what Asbjorn Eide and Marek Thee term "the dismantling of power from the inside."⁷⁹ Both in the Santiago UNCTAD conference and in the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment in 1972 eradication of poverty and improvement of human environment were notably linked to problems of disarmament. It seems clear, the UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim stressed, that we shall not be able to overcome these staggering

77. Ibid., p. 112.

78. Ibid., p. 14.

79. Asbjorn Eide and Marek Thee, "Power Politics and Peace," in: Bulletin of Peace Proposals, (1972), 193.

problems unless a very substantial part of the massive sums devoted to military purposes is available for solving the urgent needs of life and society.⁸⁰ Only actions, in line with such insight into the root cause inherent in the present-day "dichotomy" between the rich and poor, have been lacking.

Freudenberger and Minus talk about their dream: "The violence of hunger, famine, landlessness, high infant mortality rates, and short life-span will dissipate; so will the need for armies and police states."⁸¹ This dream must be actually linked to "breaking up the power pyramid through decentralization, where smaller-scale communities become the main framework for economic and political activity."⁸² Thus, the idea of development acquires a new phase, namely, "decentralization" which is nothing other than the socio-politico-economic manifestation of the radical conformation of humans to the fundamental man-nature-God unity. Metaphysically speaking, the fundamental man-nature-God unity as what Whitehead terms the primordial nature of God or Takizawa's Proto-factum Immanuel, is the

80. Ibid., p. 196, italics mine.

81. Freudenberger and Minus, p. 122.

82. Eide and Thee, p. 196.

Supreme Empty One as the exemplification or quality of the metaphysical ultimate, i.e., creativity or Emptiness. Hence, this quality must also be expressed socially, politically, and economically in terms of "decentralization" inasmuch as any entity, any individual, in the universe is a direct partaker in this quality, and it has its own intrinsic value.

On the other hand, however, there must occur "the development of self-reliance from the outside," which, together with the former, is "the only road to the achievement of a peaceful, egalitarian, non-warring world, in harmony also with the natural environment."⁸³ Here, the theologies of "liberation"--Latin American, Black, and Feminist -- have their actual goal. From my metaphysical perspective, any individual is a co-worker of God, and it can have an important role in the universe to processively contribute to the future experiences, not necessarily of its own. Hence, one's self-reliance should be developed within the context of the contributive relationality to the rest of the universe.

83. Ibid., italics mine.

Any place is the center of the universe; this Buddhist idea of the universe, basically orientated to present relationships is however, to be synthesized creatively with the Christian idea of service which presupposes the dignity of every person consisting in his or her ability of contribution to God, humanity, and nature. Hence. our "peace strategy."

The global ministry of the Church in terms of the eschatological spiritual reality "peace", therefore, having two-fold aspect; "development as decentralization" and "liberation as self-reliance," expresses itself in a living dialogue between the poor and the rich, mutually criticizing and mutually repenting in the presence of "God of Peace" in the ecumenical arena.

IV. PEACE STRATEGY AS THE TASK OF THE CHURCH IN JAPAN

Japan is a unique country. Our nation has twice experienced "liberation," that is, Meiji Restoration in 1868 and Unconditional Surrender and the import of the American democracy in 1945.

In the former case, Japanese people, abolishing feudalism of the Tokugawa shogunate, opened the door for the

outer world and assiduously imported the Western civilization in order to modernize the total structure of our country, in terms of socio-politico-economic and cultural transformation.⁸⁴ However, the result was insufficient, rather, tragic. We fought with China (1895-96) and with Russia (1905-6) and won. We subjugated Korea and annexed it in 1910. But were at last defeated by the Allies in 1945. We experienced "Hiroshima" and "Nagasaki." Our nation's "liberation", therefore, was colored with tragedy--tragedy in the sense that "liberation" turned into chauvinism, invasion, militarism, and totalitarianism resulting into a national destruction.⁸⁵

In the latter case, the post-war democracy under the "Peace Constitution" gave the Japanese people "freedom" (of speech, religion, and so forth). But, insofar as Japan, especially since Korean War (1950), was involved

84. Confucianism and Christianity, owing to their keen sense of rightness, or justice, played a great role in the modernization-process of Japanese society. Cf. Saburo Ichii, "On Tradition and Innovation," Japan Quarterly, XXI, 3 (July-September 1974), 273-83; also Masao Takenaka, Reconciliation and Renewal in Japan (New York: Friendship Press, 1957)

85. Cf. Michio Fujimura, "Japan's Changing View of Asia," Japan Quarterly, XXIV, 4 (October-December 1977), 423-31.

in a harsh reality of power politics while guarded by the "nuclear umbrella" of the U.S. in terms of Japan-U.S. security treaty, the civil liberties the Japanese are enjoying do not have a nature of "self-reliance." This fact, together with Japan's geographical position, explains the dichotomy Japanese people feel in dealing with foreign affairs and international economy.

(1) Politically speaking, Japan has been for about a quarter of a century under the rule of one and the same conservative political party -- the Liberal Democratic Party -- and Japanese foreign policy has been and is the making of the LDP Government. In the conduct of foreign relations, the maintenance and promotion of friendly relations with the United States have given first place.

(2) Economically speaking, Japan has an enormous amount of trade with the United States, although the ratio to her total trade has gradually fallen recently, from a third to a quarter or less. This trade relationship is of vital importance for Japan. In particular, Japanese imports from the United States mainly consist of essential raw materials for industry and foodstuff.⁸⁶

86. Mizuo Kuroda, "Issues and Challenges Japan Faces in Foreign Relations," Pacific Community, VIII, 1 (October 1976), 20.

Japanese people, like Prime Minister Miki at the Rambouillet conference in 1975 who stressed that Japan was the only participant from Asia, feel, on the one hand, to be a member of the society of industrialized nations, and at the same time to belong to the families of Asian countries.

That implies that Japanese people, through a double experience of "liberation," have a unique task of "the dismantling of (super) power from the inside" and of "the development of self-reliance from the outside" at the same time. My proposal of "Peace Strategy" comes on here.

A. It is quite reasonable in this context that Kunitarô Takeda, to whom I referred earlier, stresses Japan's self-reliance regarding food production, as it expresses itself in a transformation of the modes of landholding, in community organization, and in con-

scientization for world peace.⁸⁷ The social liberation

87. Kanitarô Takeda, Shokuryô Kiki to Nihôn no Tembô (Hunger Crisis and the Prospect of the Japanese Agriculture), (Tokyo: Kyoikusha, 1975), 150-218. Takeda insists on "transformation of consciousness" in order to achieve "self-reliance" uniting agricultural ability Japanese farmers have, land, and governmental budget. He notices the fact that Japan supplies by herself only 47% of grains she needs and, therefore, imports 10,000,000 tons annually (1972). He stresses that Japanese people must feel a deep moral responsibility in view of the developing countries' demand for a just distribution of food (203). He believes that, after a short term of nationalistic tendency as it now expresses regarding oil or other resources, there will arise again a tendency of unification of the world, and therefore food will also be dealt with within a context of demand and supply, in terms of International division of work.

However, it is also his contention that basic demand for food must be satisfied within smaller communities (204). Therefore, new modes of agriculture and community organization become a central task of men and women of adventure for peace today.

Was, in his view, is substantially anachronistic. A crucial alternative is laid before us either to achieve political unification by an uncoersive, persuasive means or to destroy the whole human civilization by a nuclear war (216). He says that an age of ever-lasting peace is awaiting beyond nuclear terror and hunger crisis (217). (The book is written in Japanese.)

To feel it real, in my view, the total revolution of the total vision of the universe is necessary.

In this connection, Freire's concept of "conscientization" (conscientizacao) is very much interesting and important. "The conviction of the oppressed that they must fight for their liberation is not a gift bestowed by the revolutionary leadership, but the result of their own conscientizacao." Paulo Freire. Pedagogy of the Oppressed (New York: Seabury Press, 1970) 54, The global task is everyone's task.

in Japan has to be sought in the context of hunger crisis. This task should be connected with the two great liberation movements in the present-day Japan, that is, Korean Japanese movement and Buraku people's movement. (650,000 Koreans in Japan have been under racial discrimination and 2,000,000 Buraku -- originally meaning "village" -- people have been under class discrimination.)

B. On the other hand, Japanese people, in particular Christians (although they constitute only 1.6% of the total population, 110,000,000), must use their unique international position between North and South, in order to dismantle power from within; there must be an important task and opportunities for Japanese people to survey what multinational corporations are doing overseas, what kind of exploitation, pollution they are causing there, and what kind of military-industrial complex they are forming domestically and internationally.

C. However, for the achievement of the afore-mentioned two tasks Japanese people need a thorough-going transformation of their vision of the universe, that is, the radical conformation of the fundamental human-nature-God unity. As for this third point, we have to study the Process thought of Kitarō Nishida, Shin-ichi Hisomatsu, and of Katsumi

Takizawa who, I think, correspond to Alfred North Whitehead, Charles Hartshorne, and to John B. Cobb, Jr., respectively, in the Western world. (See Chapter two and three.)

D. The establishment of a center for the study of "Peace" theology -- dedicated to the study of "peace" in terms of Christian theology and global ministry as discussed in this paper above -- is urgent.

The Kyodan (United Church of Christ in Japan), the largest church in Japan with 1658 member churches, 2224 pastors, and about 200,000 participants, to which I as a minister belong, is now in a conflict. The root cause is that it was established during World War II under the pressure of the government. Numerous denominations, including Congregational, Presbyterian, and Methodist Churches, were then united for the purpose of the ideological reinforcement of the war policy. This fact has been radically questioned by the younger ministers and lay parsons when the Kyodan, together with the NCC, in 1969 decided to participate in the governmental project, Expo '70 at Osaka.⁸⁸ Opinions were split. In the course of a severe confrontation between the conservative leaders and

88. Cf. Toshikazu Takao, "Can a Christian Be a Marxist." Japan Christian Quarterly, XLI, 1, (Winter 1975) 38-46.

the radical "problem posers" since then, four moderators of the Kyodan appeared successively' Rev. Suzuki, Rev. Ii, Rev. Yoshida, and the present Moderator Rev. Toda, who, elected by and representing the "problem posers", takes the taiwa rosen (dialogue policy), which some conservative elements within the Kyodan consider unjust. The conflict has already become a theological one; people are arguing whether or not to make the Kyodan Confession, which was enacted after the establishment of the Kyodan, "normative" in dealing with ethical matters and ministerial qualification exams.

The present writer thinks, regarding the present Kyodan situation, that (A) the problem posers' insistence on the cooperation with Koreans and Buraku people should be appreciated and also be linked to the ecumenical combat against hunger and racism in terms of "self-reliance";⁸⁹ (B) the Kyodan should send to the ecumenical movement many more funds, personnel, and theological studies concerning, in particular, the problems inherent in the presence of

89. In this connection, a report in English of the Kansai Urban Industrial Movement (KUIM) entitled On the Scene: "Reality Ministry" in Japan (February 1976), ed. by Satoshi Hirata, is really interesting. It shows frank, "un-retouched" pictures of the unique Christian ministry in the Western district of Japan.

Japanese multinational corporations in Asia, Latin America, and Africa; (C) the Kyodan should officially pay more attention to the theological study and education, in particular concerning a comparative research between Japanese and American Process theology which can be an important basis for international peace research; (D) the Kyodan should prepare for or contribute to building up an international research center for "peace" in terms of systematic theology and Christian social ethics.

In this dream I share a common Christian responsibility with American Christians who say: "Some dream dreams and say 'why?' Others dream and say 'why not?' This future can come. It requires trust, sacrifice, hope, and love. God speaks to us out of the misery of his people, just as he spoke to Moses; 'Go. Set my people free!'"⁹⁰

The present writer as a representative of the Kyodan expresses his statement of "Confessing Jesus Christ Today" as follows:

A. We deplore cheap conversions, without consequent actions. We sometimes stress "justification by faith"

90. Freudenberger and Minus, 122.

in such a way that there is no room for finding the true meaning of "action." Jesus said: "As you did it to one of the least of these my brethren, you did it to me" (Mt 25:40). The human action of love is inseparable from the Lord who is working in us today; it is not salvation by work but salvation at work (cf. also Mt 11:2-6). We confess our own fear of suffering with Jesus in terms of supporting, and collaborating with the persecuted people (for instance, Buraku people and Koreans in Japan).

B. We deplore conversions without communicating the Gospel to the people in an actual socio-politico-economic context. Christian evangelism involves the persistent protest against the status quo which necessitates for its existence social injustice, violence, racism, oppression and repression of peoples in various parts of the world. We confess our own involvement in imperialism which is implicit, explicit or latent not only in the Western missionary undertaking but also in the non-Western politico-religious propagandism such as the threatened resurgence of national Shintoism in modernized Japan.

C. We deplore also the fact that our confessing Christ

today is hindered not only by the divisions of denominations, which split the confessing community of the Church, but also by the formal unity forced by political powers as in the establishment of the Kyodan (UCC in Japan) in World War II.

D. In the witness of our whole life and in our confessing community we work with passionate love for the total liberation of the people, while finding the Christ as the true Mediator not only between faith and action in terms of theology but also between priesthood and laity in terms of ecclesiastical polity we anticipate God's Kingdom to come.⁹¹

91. Cf. David M. Paton (ed.) Breaking Barriers (London: SPCK, 1976), 43-45.

CHAPTER 3

CONCLUSIONS

We have studied in this dissertation time, praxis and peace from the perspective of process philosophy/theology based upon the thought of Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne in a critical comparison with its Japanese counterparts, Kitaro Nishida's and Katsumi Takizawa's philosophies. Our major interest thereby has been to articulate a new framework of eschatology in a process perspective. We started from such a understanding of the eschatological problem as this: that any authentic revolution of a society presupposes a radical conscious breakthrough of the perishing nature of temporality, or an eschatological zest, that a theology of revolution/liberation, if it lacks eschatological penetration, will result in a shallow amelioration. I hope I have clarified that what I call "post-modern" religious revolution in East and West provides a real eschatological groundwork for social revolution.

In chapter 2, I have studied how Whitehead and Nishida showed their respective solution to the eschatological problem, i.e., the nature of time as "perpetual perishing." Both of them agree that becoming or concrescence

itself is out of time. This is one solution. This solution is manifested typically in Nishida's idea of Basho (or place), and equivalent to Plato's Receptacle. This idea, as I understand it, is a new explication of Buddhist Emptiness, which John Cobb identifies with Whitehead's creativity.

But here one difficult problem arises. That is how to differentiate between that Emptiness and the Christian God, or the primordial nature of God, to use the Whitehead's notion. I focused, in this connection, on Whitehead's idea of the primordial character of creativity," which is his explanation of the primordial nature of God, in comparison with Takizawa's notion of the Proto-factum Immanuel, i.e., the Logos. Because I view that only the clarification of this "character" provides a reasonable foundation for discussing the difference and relation between Buddhist interest in the what-problem and Christian concern for the how-problem. Here our interfaith dialogue with the Buddhist has a common locus in terms of natural theological conceptualization of time. Whitehead has shown his peculiar solution to the problem of temporality in his idea of the primordial nature of God as the initial aim, and of the consequent nature as the everlasting, constant recipient and retainer of the experiences of the world. His is the processive

solution to the eschatological problem.

In chapter 3, I concentrated on the second phase of the eschatological problem in its naturalistic theistic fashion: how praxis is possible. My method of study thereby was a comparative examination of the thoughts of Charles Hartshorne and John Dewey. Both of them agree that praxis can be dealt with in terms, for instance, of intrinsic, instrumental, intended instrumental, and pragmatic value. But Hartshorne differs from Dewey in that he senses continuity of praxis at a deeper level than in human actions, in that he understands quality of feeling as extendable to all creatures, and as finally felt by God, the supreme sympathizer, and in that ethical decision occurs precisely as an analogous service to that God.

Hartshorne in his panpsychism identifies God as nature. Here I raised a question from a Japanese point of view, namely, that Takizawa's notion of Proto-factum Immanuel elucidates the difference/relation/order between the Triune God and nature. Takizawa's contribution in clarifying the possibility of praxis is theistic, similar to Hartshorne, and critical to the Japanese Marxist New Testament scholar, Kenzo Tagawa. But Takizawa's theory of praxis works primarily as a checking principle whereas Hartshorne's

paradoxical appreciation of Dewey's pragmatism furnishes a theistic basis for creative praxis or adventure.

In chapter 4, I attempted to show a higher synthesis of Buddhist understanding of time as expressed in Nishida's philosophy and its Christian counterpart. In Whiteheadian process thought and also a creative synthesis of Buddhist and Christian views of praxis -- both in a new conceptualization of Peace. I studied the first synthesis in terms of the possibility of peace from the perspective of the primordial nature of God, and the second synthesis in terms of the actuality of peace from the perspective of the consequent nature of God. First, intrinsic value or Whitehead's Beauty is to be synthesized with instrumental value or Truth, as intended instrumental value or Truthful Beauty, that is, Art. Second, that synthesis in the idea of intended instrumental value is to be further synthesized with pragmatic value or Adventure, as peace or Harmony of Harmonies which comprises and see Tragedy.

The above double synthesis is important in that Buddhist present-orientated spirituality and Christian future-orientated spirituality are incommensurable, but quite compatible in a new way. By breaking through the perishing nature of temporality, we can have a true zest for

future which is at the same time empty of egotism -- egotism as found in any merely purposeful enterprise of humanity based upon a substantialist view of the universe including God, nature, and humanity. By finding a true basis for the actual possibility of praxis we can do live in peace while engaged in a creative praxis, called Jesus. "Follow me!"

Evangelization in a real, global context is a task of peace, or abolition of violence, in connection with total human development both in the advances and the developing countries and in connection with total human liberation as self-reliance, linked together with the creature's hope for "adoption as sons, the redemption of our bodies" (Rom.8:23.) Facing the global threats to humanity of today, hunger and the vulnerability of the environment to many kinds of pollution in addition to nuclear threat, this task of peace is unavoidable for the ecumenical and the local churches. We Christians are called by God to be makers of peace in the following four-fold sense:

1. First, we are called to begin with the confession of faith that the world and all its people, including ourselves and the whole human prospect, are under God as revealed to us in Christ -- that is, they are in Beauty or the empty/relational wholeness of the universe. We are

first asked to recognize everybody's and everything's intrinsic value: "Look at the birds of the air: they neither sow nor reap nor gather into barns, and yet your heavenly Father feeds them. Are you not of more value than they?" (Mat. 7: 26)

2. Second, we are called to recognize Truth or the instrumental value of everything including our own personality. We are not asked to live The Proud Tower as Barbara Tachman vividly described: from 1900 to 1914 the people in Western Europe and North America believed that "they had the world and its future in their control, living as they did in their proud tower."¹ In this connection, the Far Eastern version of the proud tower also should be destroyed for the sake of Truth which continuously requires our contribution for the good of the whole nations, especially developing countries.

3. Third, we are called to be pure in heart as to the task of Art of Love. Our intended instrumental value only starts from this recognition: that "the billion or more people who are most threatened in our world are one with

1. John C. Bennett, The Radical Imperative (Philadelphia:Westminster Press, 1975) p.194.

ourselves and we with them."² Further, we must know that we are one with the whole creature which "have been groaning in travail together until now" (Rom 8:22). Otherwise, there is no authentic possibility for Peace in our world.

4. Four, therefore, we are called by God to be engaged in Adventure or creative praxis, collaborating with other numerous fellow-workers of the Sprit both in the church and in the world. I agree with John Bennett as he states:

The influence of the gospel has broken through many walls of partition; it has created new realities not only in the church but also in the world, and has created new possibilities that remain ahead of us.³

Now is the dawn of the post-modern religious revolution. Feudalistic heteronomy was broken through by courageously independent people such as Puritans of America, soon followed by the men and women of French Revolution, Russian Revolution, Mieji Restoration, Chinese Revolution, and other numerous independence/liberation movements in the world. But if people are simply revolting against the status quo in a quite similar way as they are oppressed by it -- namely, by means of what Barnard Loomer terms "unilateral power"⁴ --

2. Ibid., p.196.

3. Ibid., p.198.

4. Bernard M. Loomer, "Two conceptions of Power," Criterion(Winter 1976) 12-29

they are doomed to fall in group tyranny. Here we are asked to break through this pitfall of modern autonomy; that is, we need a revolution of "modern revolution," namely, the post-modern religious revolution. My conceptualization of Peace is finally related to this task of the church and the world. In peace, we are saved from restless egotism resulting from our personal purpose, and yet we are engaged in a creative praxis for the future experiences, not necessarily of our own.

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